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Abstract 
The thesis contrasts two hostile and divergent intellectual paradigms in social 
sciences: rational choice and critical theory. Both rational choice and critical theory 
offer contrasting perspectives on the structures of social interaction. However, 
both critical theory and rational choice theory share overlapping concerns ie., both 
are preoccupied with determining what rational can mean in the realm of social 
and political interaction. 
In the case of rational choice paradigm, instrumental reason forms the 
cornerstone of the theoretical edifice. Ever since the publication of Jurgen 
Habermas' The lhemy qf Communicative Action Vol. / (1984) and Vol. II (1986) 
instrumental reason has come under severe attack. His critique anchors on a theory 
of communicative reason. What makes Habermas' work distinctive is that he does 
not regard instrumental reason as the single inevitable concomitant of modernity. 
Habermas sees in modernity an alternative way of conceptualising social interaction 
in terms of communication rather than strategy. So in a way, his work is a 
challenge to the defenders of modernity aiming to build a unified social science 
Jurgen Habermas advances the notion of communicative reason as the 
centerpiece of a social theory as opposed to instrumental reason. By providing a 
systematic grounding of the concept of reason in human language, he hopes to 
establish normative basis of critical theory. This model of reaching agreement or 
consent constitutes a process of dialogue in which reasons are exchanged between 
participants. This process is perceived to be a joint search for consensus. Such a 
dialogic concept of collective choice would necessarily work not with fixed 
preferences to be amalgamated (as rational choice theories do) but with 
preferences that are altered or modified as competing reasons are advanced in the 
course of discussion. In rational discussion, the only thing supposed to count is the 
power of better argument. 
Both rational choice and critical theory conceptualise politics in different 
ways. Rational choice theories critique democratic mechanisms failing to generate 
general will. Consequently, the political prescriptions offered are limited 
government or market. On the contrary, the political implications of Habermas' 
theory of deliberative democracy is anchored in the notion of liberal public sphere 
envisaging a cognitivist, rationalist vision in which discourse forms a critical 
normative basis for evaluating the political and moral principles. 
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Introduction 
Intellectual histories of rational choice and critical theory 
Before contextualising the problem of my thesis, let me briefly run through the 
mutually hostile intellectual histories of rational choice and critical theory. Critical 
theory was a product of the Institute for Social Research and the group is referred 
to as the Frankfurt School, but it is misleading since the members of the Institute 
rarely shared a readily identifiable collective position and the differences between 
them overshadowed the similarities. The founding members of critical theory 
include Max Horkheimer, Theodore Adorno, Herbert Marcuse etc. 
One of the significant developments in the trajectory of critical theory was 
the shift from the project of producing multidisciplinary social theory rooted in the 
Marxian critique of political economy to that of a new philosophical critique of 
science, technology and instrumental reason. It found expression in Horkheimer's 
and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947), which combined a novel critique 
of western civilisation and rationality with a powerful critique of the administered 
society, which became the target of their social criticism. Although Horkheimer 
and Adorno extended their critique of fascism and capitalism, they distanced 
themselves from the Marxian theory of history and critique of political economy, 
subordinated science and politics to philosophy, and tended to make the 
domination of nature the fulcrum of their analysis, rather than such classical 
Marxian themes as political economy, social relations, class struggle or the 
transition to socialism. 
Critical theorists saw themselves giving voice to dissent in the form of 
negative dialectics etc. At the same time they were critical of Marxist reductionism 
and replaced the critique of political economy with a critique of instrumental 
reason. Recognising the changing social and political relations with the advent of 
science and technology, critical theorists focused their critique on science and 
technology. Soon it became an intellectual paradigm offering critical perspectives 
on culture, art and aesthetics, media, politics, methodologies of natural and social 
science. Critical theory addresses a full range of issues raised by the impact of 
modernity on the spheres of economic, political and social and cultural life. 
Moreover it provides an excellent access to modernity because it has incorporated 
the positions of some of the major theorists and critics of modernity in its work. 
Although it has been closely connected with Marxism; in the 1930s it began 
engaging the positions ofNietzche, Freud, Weber, Heidegger and others who have 
carried out both rationalist and irrationalist critiques of modernity. Eventually 
critical theorists incorporated many positions from these thinkers, and thus were 
able to provide much more complex, multidimensional and stimulating perspectives 
on modernity than those who took a more one-sided approach. Concepts like 
critique and ideology have been redefined to offer a critique of advanced capitalist 
rationality. 
My primary concern is with the work of Habermas. What makes Habermas' 
work interesting is his critical defense of the project of modernity. Unlike his 
predecessors who ended up in giving a romantic critique of modernity, Habermas 
anchors his project in a theory of communicative rationality and ethics. Moreover 
Habermas' critical engagement with the analytical tradition also gives an added 
advantage in making sense of the esoteric continental debates. Habermas 
conceptualises enlightenment as a process of differentiation of cultural spheres and 
the development of autonomous criteria of rationality and universality in the fields 
of knowledge, morality, law and justice, and art. The project of modernity also has 
unrealised potential to increase social rationality, justice and morality. For 
Habermas the project of modernity resulted in part in the colonisation of the life 
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world by the logic of scientific-technological rationality and domination by the 
culture of experts and specialists. 
Critical theory and rational choice theory provide two radically different 
versions of modernity. Rational choice theory is firmly rooted in the project of 
modernity and it has unreflectingly assumed that there is a unique rational answer 
to most questions. Like the critical theory, rational choice paradigm is not a 
homogeneous theoretical enterprise. It typically includes multiple theories like 
rational choice, public choice, social choice and game theory etc. Although there is 
an underlying common theme running through their works there are deep 
differences in their solutions to the problems. The classics of rational choice 
include work by intellectual figures like James Buchanan, Anthony Black, Anthony 
Downs, and Mancur Olson. 
In this thesis, I contrast these two theoretical traditions and assess the 
implications of these theories for democratic politics. The two traditions can also 
be grouped under homo economicus and homo sociologicus. Economics and 
rational choice are commonly thought to be focused on the narrow concern of 
what the actor calculates is best to do. Sociology is commonly thought to be about 
matters in which individuals do not have choices, cannot calculate, and often are 
guided for odd or even in rational reasons. Although this contrast is pristine, it 
makes for a seemingly neat disciplinary dividing line between the two paradigms. 
Defining Collective Choice: the theoretical dilemma 
Rationality has always been at the centre of the debates in social and political 
theory. In trying to theorise the logics of social interaction, two dominant 
paradigms emerged offering distinct perspectives on the modes of social 
interaction. One is broadly called rational choice theory (which includes public 
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choice, social choice and game theory) and the other Critical theory (as 
represented in Habermas' writings). The two theoretical paradigms are mutually 
hostile in their intellectual histories and what demarcates them is their divergent 
emphases on contrasting notions of rationality - instrumental reason and 
communicative reason. Rational choice theories attempt to provide a 'theory of 
rationality' that can be applied in principle to all interactive situations. Theorists 
working in this paradigm apply economic methods to politics and claim to provide 
solid microfoundations for the study of social interaction. 
The intellectual opposition to instrumental reason has been articulated by 
the founding members of the Frankfurt school like Max Horkheimer, Theodore 
Adorno and Herbert Marcuse. Both Dialectic of Enlightenment (Horkheimer and 
Adorno: 1972) and One-dimensional Man (Marcuse: 1964) challenged modernity, 
seeing it as the expansion of instrumental reason. But their challenges were devoid 
of any normative basis for critical theory. Continuing in this tradition and at the 
same time critical of his predecessors Jurgen Habermas redefined the definition of 
critical theory in terms of Communicative reason. The strength of Habermas' two-
volume The Theory of Communicative Action (1984: Vol. I) and (1987; Vol. II) 
lies in articulating an elaborate theory of communicative reason showing the 
limitations of instrumental-strategic rationality. His alternative theoretical 
programme investigates the potential for organising actions around communicative 
action rather than merely instrumental or strategic action. Habermas' critical 
defense of modernity sees 'modernity' as a rationalisation process crystallising in 
not just instrumental reason but also communicative reason. Habermas precisely 
challenges -this 'identity thinking' and draws our attention ·'10 the multiple 
dimensions of reason. In the light of this critique, I would like to explore the 
implications, both explanatory and normative, for political theory. 
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But surprisingly not many social and political theorists are enthusiastic to 
explore the nature of the challenge posed by this work. It is also surprising to see 
the common concerns of both paradigms. Both are preoccupied with determining 
what rationality can mean in the social and political world. Both are defenders of 
enlightenment reason and modernity but in different ways. Both argue for a social 
science which is empirical: rational choice theory attempts to discover solid micro 
foundations for social sciences and on other hand critical theory in its present form 
advocates reconstructive sciences. Rational choice aims to build a unified social 
science and critical theory attempts a critical social science. Attempts to bring in 
both the theoretical paradigms to engage in critical conversation are not without 
problems. 
Given their apparently divergent claims about rationality and politics, the 
aim of this study is to initiate conversation across the two contrasting traditions. I 
would briefly set out the problem for political theory. The theoretical problematic 
involves defining 'collective choice.' Insofar as politics involves conflict of interests, 
disputes among the members of the community, it is a realm of collective choice. 
In a collective choice the decision of some is binding on all. Moreover the 
decisions taken are seen as representing the expression of the popular will. The 
notion that politics involves a general will is widely accepted idea in political 
theory. This idea that democratic mechanisms represent the general will has come 
under severe attack from rational choice theories. They criticised the notions such 
as "general will" or "national interest". So the theoretical dilemma for political 
theory is: how do we define collective choice? What constitutes a fair and just 
rule? Two theoretical traditions with hostile intellectual histories have offered 
.' 
contrasting theoretical explanations. One is rational choice and the other is critical 
theory. I argue that rational choice theories are inadequate in that they fail to 
provide any conceptual handle to overcome the problem. 
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Admittedly, the rational choice programme is not a monolithic paradigm. It 
constitutes multiple theories having their own rationality assumptions. So the term 
'rational choice' is employed loosely to include literature that sometimes travels by 
the names public choice theory, social choice theory, game theory and rational 
actor theory. The literature which emerged under the title public choice theory 
includes works such as James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), Anthony 
Downs (1957), Mancur Olson (1965), William Riker (1982). Public choice theory 
works with a model of instrumental rational self-interested maximisation. They 
claim to have exposed the myth of ' social choice' through a series of discoveries i.e. 
e.g. aggregation from individual to collective preferences may not be well defined. 
Hence there can be no acceptable universal rule to convert any collection of 
individual preferences into collective preferences. The disconcerting implication of 
public choice theory is that majoritarian democracy is both conceptually and 
motivationally flawed. If democracy is defined as the consent of the governed 
based on majority rule then lack of agreement is the modal problem of democracy. 
In the words of Barry and Hardin (1982), public choke paints a picture of 'rational 
man and irrational society'. The tradition claims to have demonstrated the 
impossibility, incoherence or undesirability of democracy. 
Given these dismal conclusions of public choice theories on the functioning 
of democratic institutions and the legitimacy of the state, social scientists, under 
the banner of rational choice theory, have been quick to explore the problem of 
collective choice from a strictly rational self-interest perspective. However, the 
vacuousness of this model has come under increasing attack from within rational 
choice theory: especially the concept of preference formation. This critique is most 
powerfully articulated by Jon Elster (1983a 86a~ 89a). Elster (1986b) himself 
recognised the strengths of Habermas' discourse ethics in modelling collective 
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choice. This provides a good entry point for a productive conversation between 
rational choice and critical theory. 
Unlike rational choice theories, critical theory conceptualises the 'subject' as 
constitutive of cognitive, moral and subjective aspects and not instrumental ones. 
Internal critiques of rational choice theorists like Elster is have begun to explore 
the work of Jurgen Habermas and have recognised the fragility of the subject 
modelled as homo economicus. By contrast critical theorists have always 
characterised rational choice as aiming to build a positivistic natural social science. 
The theoretical inquiry also has normative implications for democratic political 
theory. Rational choice theorists conceptualise democracy in non-cognitivist 
political language whereas critical theorists line up on behalf of 'moral-cognitivist 
political rationalism.' Politically, the public choice programme is hostile to 
democratisation, conceiving it as inherently unjust since it creates cycles. Public 
choice theorists have a narrow conception of democracy, interpreting it as a device 
for preference aggregation under conditions of non-cognitivism in individual 
preferences, instrumentally rational behaviour and self- interest. Non-cognitivism 
means simply that values and preferences are like emotions, beyond the reach of 
rational argument. 
The practical implication of Habermas' theory is towards a politics of 
deliberation. Habermas wants to restore a conception of the political which is 
constituted by an autonomous public sphere. 
Summary of the arguments of the chapters 
Chapter 1 
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In this chapter, I discuss public choice theories by way of reviewing the major 
works of James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962); William Riker (1982); 
Mancur Olson (1965); Anthony Downs (1957); All these four works deal with the 
problem of collective choice. Public choice applies economic methods to politics 
in relation to two central problems: the problem of preference aggregation (voting) 
and the collective action problem (free-rider problem). The first problem has 
shown the undesirability of majority rule as mechanism for aggregating 
preferences. The second problem has exposed the myth of collective action. Both 
problems have serious and interesting implications for democratic theory. 
Chapter 2 
In this chapter, I explore that challenge to instrumental reason articulated in Jurgen 
Habermas' theory of communicative action. His is an alternative model of 
collective choice that sees politics not as a process of preference aggregation but as 
dialogic process of advancing reasons. Habermas' communicative action appeals to 
a richer range of motivations other than purely instrumental ones. Communicative 
action is seen as an alternative way of organising social action. 
Chapter 3 
In this chapter, I contrast two different normative theories of collective choice. 
One o( the public choice version of contract and the other discourse ethics. 
Contrasting Buchanan and Habermas, I argue that Buchanan's notion of agreement 
is inadequate. As regards normative collective choice, Buchanan's contractarian 
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solution can be seen as a model of agreement. On the other hand, Habermas' notion 
of discourse is not just seen as compromise and bargaining but as rational 
consensus based on advancing reasons. Interpreting discourse ethics, Benhabib 
contrasts two lines of interpretation of discourse ethics: one is a legal-juridical 
interpretation and the other is a moral transformatory interpretation. She argues 
that discourse ethics is not merely procedural and formal but can be contextualised 
in specific historical and social conditions. 
Chapter 4 
In this chapter, I shall discuss some of the internal critiques of rational choice 
theories relating to the limits of strategic rationality. Although the internal critiques 
vary in their content, almost all of them point to the problem of indeterminacy. To 
overcome this problem rational choice theories have appealed to norms as opposed 
to mere interests in order to better explain some of the cooperative behavioJ..lr 
which occur in the everyday life. Quite apart from the problem of indeterminacy, 
one other theoretical lacuna in their edifice is the failure to recognise the variance 
of strategic talents among players. 
Chapter 5 
Finally, contrasting rational choice t~eories and critical theory I conclude that 
rational choice theories have a narrow conception of democracy as merely 
aggregation of preferences or as a mere legal procedure, reducible to something 
like the counting of votes in majority rule or the rule of law in liberalism. Like the 
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one-sided conceptions of enlightenment reason their theories of democracy lack 
moral-cognitive content. By contrast, critical theory sees modernity as not just 
instrumental reason but opening up possibilities for normative and expressive 
realms of reason. Democracy, in this view, assumes institutionalisation of learning 
and discussion within the public sphere. The idea of a public sphere is a central 
conceptual category in Habermas' theoretical enterprise. 
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CHAPTERl 
Theoretical Foundations of Rationality: A Public Choice Approach 
Introduction 
The purpose of the chapter is to elucidate the rational choice approach to politics. 
Politics is a realm of collective choice. So what constitutes the rationality of 
collective choice in politics forms the subject matter of rational choice theories. 
Political theorists for a long time have been preoccupied with the problem of 
collective choice. This problem has drawn many brilliant minds to examine the 
conditions of cooperative behaviour. For Thomas Hobbes 'disorder' as absence of 
co-operation is expressed in the state of nature as 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and 
short'. Hobbes' answer to this dilemma in Leviathan (1651) was one of the earliest 
applications of the idea of rational choice to study the conditions of co-operative 
behaviour .. 
Although the idea of rational choice goes back to Hobbes and utilitariap.s 
like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, it crystallised as a distinct theoretical 
programme only with the publication of the classic texts: Kenneth Arrow's Social 
Choice and Individual Values (1951), Anthony Downs's An Economic Theory of 
Democracy (1957), Duncan Black's The Theory of Committees and Elections 
(1958), James Buchanan~d Gordon Tullock's The Calculus of Consent (1962), 
Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action (1965). As Green and Shapiro 
(1994: 3) argue, what -sets contemporary rational choice scholarship apart is the 
systematic manner in which propositions about the micro foundations of political 
bebaViour are derived. The theory rests on axioms of 'consistency' rather than on 
,. 
the traditional 'psy~~ological'assUmptions of utilitarianism. In -this ooBpect rational 
chotce:.thOOrists derive inspiration from economic models m"1heir efforts to explain 
political phenomena appealing to deductive accounts of incentives, constraints, 
calculations that confront individuals. Consequently they employed mathematical 
analytical tools with great technical rigour and sophistication in approaching 
traditional questions of political theory in novel ways. 
Throughout this thesis the term "rational choice" is used loosely to include 
literature like public choice theory and social choice theory (economic theories of 
politics; collective action problems; problem of preference aggregation), game 
theory (prisoner's dilemma problems in strategic interaction), rational choice 
theory (includes broadly internal critiques like Elster). Although rational choice 
emerged as a distinct theoretical paradigm, it is important to note that it is not a 
single, monolithic theoretical enterprise but constitutes multiple theories each 
depending on its own rationality assumptions (Hardin 1987: 67). 
Public choice theory is defined as the application of economic methods to 
politics (Mueller 1989; McLean 1987). Starting from the fundamental postulates of 
methodological individualism, instrumental rationality and the principle of homo 
economicus, the theory focuses on self-interested individuals as they endeavour to 
maximise their utility through consistent choices. The underlying explanatory 
assumption is that people are rational and their choices have a broad cost-benefit 
structure. This approach to the study of politics emerged as one of the dominant 
paradigms geared to build a unified social science on such micro foundations. This 
rather simple but powerful idea lies at the root of the influential discipline of 
economics. In the recent years, the idea that this theory can be fruitfully applied 
outside the traditional realm of economics has been very widely held, not only by 
economists with imperialistic ambitions for the expansion of their discipline, but 
also by political theorists. Public choice theorists take pride in the parsimonious 
nature of their theory. The project is also seen as a defense of modernity insofar as 
the theory aims to build a unified social science. 
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In this chapter, I focus on public choice theories and postpone the 
discussion of the other theories of rational choice whose critique exposed the limits 
of instrumental rationality and the principle of homo economicus. 
My concern in this chapter is to examine the concept of "instrumental 
rationality" in public choice theories. The concept of "rationality" is conceived as a 
matter of means, not ends. It is seen as a relation of consistency between 
preferences, information and action. One other feature is that public choice 
theorists essentially conceptualise social interaction as "parametric" which means 
agents take their environment as "given" or "constant". The rational agent assumes 
his environment to be made up a) of natural objects ruled by causal laws and b) of 
other agents whose behaviour makes no difference to him. So the agent thinks of 
himself as a variable and of all other agents as constants. 
The theory of public choice claims to have discovered paradoxes in 
democratic mechanisms. To put it in a nutshell, the basic theoretical discovery is 
that individual rational choices can sum to collectively irrational outcomes as when 
everyone in a sports stadium stands up to get a better view. Although its details 3.!"e 
constantly questioned, criticised, defended and reformulated, the rational choice 
paradigm - founded on methodological individualism and the assumption that 
individuals are motivated by self interest - forms the thread uniting politics and 
economics. 
1.1 Instrumental Rationality and the Principle of Homo economicus 
1.2 Paradox of Rationality: Conflict of Individual and Collective 
Rationality 
1.3 Public Choice Interpretation of Democracy 
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1.1 Instrumental Rationality and the Principle of Homo Economicus 
As said earlier, in terms of basic assumptions, public choice works with a 
model of instrumentally rational 'self interested' maximisation. Homo economicus is 
a instrumentally rational and calculating seeker of preference satisfaction. The 
theory is based exclusively on the model of 'preference satisfiers'. 
This model of instrumental rationality is famously used in politics by Downs 
(1957: 6); and further developed by Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Riker 
(1982). Rationality is cast in a means-ends framework with the task of selecting the 
most appropriate means for achieving ends (i.e. preference satisfaction). Thus 
individuals are deemed rational because they select actions which will best satisfy 
those preferences. Technically then individuals must have a 'preference ordering' 
because it is only when preferences are ordered that one will be able to begin to 
make judgements about how different actions satisfy our preferences in different 
degrees. So acting instrumentally to satisfy one's preferences becomes the 
equivalent of utility maximising behaviour. Although this maximising, calculating 
view of instrumental reason is common in economics, it should not be confused 
with utilitarianism. 1 
The theory assumes that every individual has a preference ordering. The 
metaphor of utility maximisation then works in the following way. Suppose a 
person prefers driving to catching the train and so chooses to drive. Individual 
preferences are measured in ordinal utilities. Public choice theorists arrived at a 
conclusion that there is no way one person' satisfaction can be compared with 
another's. It is meaningless across persons. 
Instrumental rationality is defined as having the following axioms (Heap 1992: 6): 
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Reflexivity: It demands that any bundle is always as good as itself 
Completeness: Any two bundles can always be compared and ranked. 
Transitivity: It entails that when A is preferred to B, and B to C, then A should be 
preferred to C. 
Continuity: It implies that given two goods in a bundle, it will always be possible 
to define another bundle which is indifferent to the first. 
In these thin-rational accounts, the content of the utility maximisation is not 
specified. The claim that public choice theory assumes only instrumental rationality 
and is agnostic about the type of ends (e.g., selfish or altruistic) that individuals 
pursue (Buchanan and Tullock 1962: 17) is debatable. Where this claim prefaces 
an exercise in economic theory, Buchanan and Tullock do go on to assume self-
interested ends and abandon their thin-rational agnosticism in favour of a thick-
rational Homo economicus assumption. Moreover since Buchanan and Tullock 
(1962) juxtapose the economic approach to collective choice against the 
assumption that the representative individual seeks to find the 'public interest' Qr 
'common good', it requires Buchanan and Tullock to portray political actors as 
selfish and profit seekers. And once one grants that the same motivations drive 
people's economic and political behaviour, then it follows that political agents must 
be motivated by self interest. This is what is called the symmetry assumption 
(Brennan and Buchanan 1985: 48-50). 
Although 'intentional action' and 'means-ends rationality' can in principle be 
combined with any type of motivation, for most forms of collective action, rational 
choice theorists usually add the assumption that rational agents are motivated by 
self-interest, i.e., they are egoistic, utility maximisers. This assumption is made 
because self-interest seems to be the most easily universalisable motivation: i.e. it 
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can explain a larger fraction of collective behaviour than any other single 
motivation. 
The argument for the defense of homo economicus model in politics is, 
though the wicked are fewer in number than the righteous, yet because we cannot 
distinguish them, there is a necessity of suspecting, heeding, anticipating, 
subjugating, self-defending, every incident to the most honest and fair conditioned 
(Brennan and Buchanan 1985: 60). The other argument in defense of the use of 
homo economicus in politics is essentially a methodological one. In short there is a 
clear methodological requirement of motivational consistency of human behaviour, 
and it is on this basis that homo economicus is imported into politics. Any attack 
on the use of homo economicus in politics is seen equally to be an attack on its use 
in market analysis: the case for homo economicus stands or falls across the board. 
-
Public choice theory is methodologically individualistic, in the sense that the basic 
units are choosing, acting, behaving persons rather than organic units such as 
parties, provinces or nations (Buchanan 1978: 5). 
1. 2. Paradox of Rationality: Conflict of Individual and Collective Rationality 
Having defined the structure of instrumental rationality and the principle of 
homo economicus, let me tum to examine the seminal works which applied this 
model to the study of politics. Basically the thrust of public choice paradigm is to 
offer a new perspective on politics. It is 'new' in the sense that it revealed the 
conundrums which hitherto went unnoticed in political theory. The conundrums 
directly relate· to the logistics of the _institutional mechanisms in a democratic 
society. ro put it in nutshell, public choice theories deconstructed the myth of 
collectivity or public interest characterised in the benevolent state theories in 
political science. In other words, Barry and Hardin (1982) say, 'public choice 
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theories paint a picture of rational man and irrational society'. This problem is 
defined as the 'paradox of rationality' - meaning the conflict between individual 
rationality and social rationality. For a long time political theorists thought that the 
institutional mechanisms of democracy were representing the "will of the people". 
This myth was exposed by public choice theorists with baftling theoretical results. 
The main critique is of "majoritarian democracy". If democracy is defined as the 
consent of the governed then what constitutes this consent has become the 
problem for public choice theories. 
A common theme that unifies the theoretical works of public choice is that 
of rationality. It is argued that when the preferences or actions of rational 
individuals are brought together, the outcome is collectively irrational. Starting 
from such narrow definition of rationality postulate, public choice theories proceed 
to show the paradox involved in what is called 'collective choice'. The theory offers 
very powerful insights in understanding these paradoxes. Before proceeding to 
discuss the arguments, it is important to clarify one important feature regarding the 
intellectual history of. public choice research programme. If one looks at th~ 
trajectory of public choice theory, it did not emerge as a coherent and unified 
research programme, like its counterpart Frankfurt school. As Abrams argues, 
Public choice theories emerged in disparate parts with divergent 
theoretical results. In one sense the whole body of work constitutes 
'discrete theoretical islands', seemingly disconnected with no 
meaningful relation to each other. In actuality, the disparate parts or 
fields are essentially variations of a common underlying conceptual 
theme (Abrams 1980). 
It is in this sense that one may consider it as a unified theoretical programme. The 
single conceptual theme is to demystify the notion of collective choice. The 
problems I discuss here are as follows: the problem of preference aggregation: 
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Kenneth Arrow (1957) and William Riker (l982)~ the collective action problem: 
Anthony Downs (1957) and Mancur Olson (1965); James Buchanan and Gordon 
Tullock (1962) on the logical foundations of democracy. Although the birth of 
public choice is frequently identified with Duncan Black and Kenneth Arrow, in 
political science it has been solidified as an intellectual programme only with 
Anthony Downs and James Buchanan. 
The Problem of Preference Aggregation: Kenneth Arrow and William Riker 
Although this problem had been known earlier, Arrow called attention to 
its broader significance to the study of politics. 2 In essence, Arrow proved that one 
cannot design a social choice function such that the social choice will accurately 
reflect individual values or preferences. The problem of preference aggregation is: 
how does one define a "popular will"? It says, if an institution is run on democratic 
lines it may not be clear how an institution's 'will' or 'interest' should be defined. 
Consider an assembly,- in which each member is a perfect representative of the 
interests of his constituency and suppose that they have to decide among three 
proposals. For specificity, think of a municipal assembly that has to choose among 
building an indoor swimming pool, subsidising the local symphony orchestra or 
setting up a golf course. Now, if there is one alternative that everybody thinks best, 
the choice of that option can plausibly be called an expression of the popular will. 
But in politics, unanimity is the exception. 
And since politics is about resolving conflict of interests, it is thought that 
"majority voting" will elicit or indeed ~onstitute popular will. But this is not the 
case. Suppose there are three blocks in the assembly, of approximately equal size, 
representing the business community, industrial workers and health and social 
service professionals. Let us suppose that they rank the options as follows: 
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Golf course 
Orchestra 
Swimming pool 
Businessmen workers 
1 
2 
3 
2 
3 
1 
professionals 
3 
1 
2 
Suppose that majority voting is taken as expression of the popular will or the 
community interest. 
1. Then the popular will is that it is better to have a golf course than to subsidise 
the orchestra, since the businessmen and workers together form a majority with 
this preference. 
2. Similarly, the popular will is that subsidise the orchestra is better than building a 
swimming pool, since -business men and professionals together form a majority 
with this preference. 
3. But the popular will also supports the swimming pool over the golf course, since 
workers and professionals together have this preference. 
So the conclusion is that the notion of popular will based on majority voting results 
in incoherent. Thus it results in cyclical majority preferences. 
Briefly stated, Arrow's theorem !s worked out at a high level of abstraction, 
showing the impossibility of devising satisfactory collective choice mechanisms that 
do not lapse into dictatorship. This theorem is one of finding a 'decision making 
rule' which aggregates the preferences of individuals. Arrow's impossibility 
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theorem rendered all democratic rules of collective decision potentially suspect. In 
response to Abram Bergson's influential analysis of social welfare functions, which 
appeared to show that the State could maximise social welfare through objective 
aggregation of individual preferences, Arrow demonstrated that so long as minimal 
assumptions of rationality and the complexity of choice are granted, no SWF exists 
that is neither imposed nor dictatorial. This impossibility result had an enormous 
impact on how rational choice theorists have thought about the basic 
characteristics of democracy and 'majority rule'. Thus when three voters (1,2,3) 
attempt to decide among three alternatives (a,b,c) by majority rule, a voting cycle 
may result. It says, that even though every individual may have a clear preference-
ranking of all alternatives, it is not possible to aggregate these individual rankings 
into a collective rationality given certain reasonably acceptable conditions. 
For a more powerful criticism of the mechanisms of democratic institutions, 
one of the significant contributions has come from William Riker. He tries to show 
in his book Liberalism Against Populism (1982), the superiority of liberalism over 
populism. Riker's argument is based on the application of the minimal criteria of all 
rational choice explanations: utility maximisation and consistency of preferences. 
Riker exemplifies the rational choice approach to the explanation of political 
behaviour. For Riker, politics is a process of selecting, producing and enforcing the 
policies to realise individual preferences. These are assumed to be well-formed, in 
the sense that preferences are complete and consistent. 
Riker (1982: 129-135) argues that Arrow's result displays a theoretical 
invulnerability in which the reasonableness of the conditions is difficult to question. 
For Riker the consequence of the situa!ion revealed by Arrow's theorem is either 
that power is concentrated or that the process of voting may be manipulated. 
Assuming democracies do not tolerate extreme concentration of power, then their 
methods of aggregating preferences are subject to manipulation. Riker 
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distinguishes two methods of manipulation (Riker 1982: 137). One is the false 
revelation of preferences and the other is the arrangement of the agenda. The 
former method of manipulation is strategic voting (Riker 1982: 156), wherein 
voters vote contrary to their tastes in order to bring about an outcome more 
desirable than the outcome from voting truthfully. All methods of voting are 
manipulable in this way. Since we can never be certain what "true tastes" are - all 
we ever know are revealed tastes - we can never be certain when voting is 
strategic. Yet if strategic voting occurs it is hard to say that the outcome is a fair or 
true amalgamation of voters' values, especially when the successful manipulators 
are a small minority. It is possible that strategic voting is commonplace in the real 
world, as for example vote trading. If so, then, Riker argues that all voting is 
rendered uninterpretable and meaningless (Riker 1982: 237). Manipulated 
outcomes are meaningless because they are manipulated, and unmanipulated 
outcomes are meaningless because they cannot be distinguished from manipulated 
ones. 
The second method of manipulation is by control of agenda (Riker 1982: 
169) to change the outcome from what it would be in the absence of such control. 
Leaders can control agendas by establishing the sequence and content of business. 
Riker argues that political dispute involves control and manipulation of the agenda 
, 
and is commonplace in the real world. But it is hard to identify it. Since this 
manipulation is frequent and difficult to identify, all outcomes of voting are 
rendered meaningless and uninterpretable. In Riker's view, a dynamic method of 
controlling agenda is the introduction of a new dimension and issues in order to 
generate disequilibrium in which the previous kinds of manipulation are possible. 
Suppose that, by processes no individual person controls, the set of alternatives has 
been reduced to precisely two and that one of these always wins by a simple 
majority vote. This seems to be a stable equilibrium; yet it can be upset, 
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dynamically, by the introduction of new dimensions and issues. If new issues result 
in situations vulnerable to strategic voting and manipulation of the agenda, then 
even stable equilibria are dynamically unstable. Riker argues that all social 
decisions obtained by disrupting equilibria with new issues are not fair and true 
amalgamation of public opinion, even though the disruption may be socially and 
morally necessary and desirable. 
Riker's (1982: 244) theory of democracy is sceptical about the ability of 
political parties within a liberal democracy to implement the popular will. The main 
burden of Riker's sceptical challenge rests upon an increasing awareness of the 
fragility of majority rule as an instrument for translating individual preferences into 
a social choice. The inadequacy of majority rule carries implications in Riker's eyes 
to the extent to which we should allow matters of public policy and collective 
action to be decided by political parties competing for a winning share of the 
popular vote. 
Thus Riker draws upon the body of results in formal social choice theory 
highlighting two sorts of problems with voting: "instability" and "ambiguity." 
Voting is unstable because aggregation mechanisms generate cyclical social 
orderings. Because of this indeterminacy, electoral outcomes are subject to 
manipulation via strategic voting (Riker 1982: 115-95, 236-38). And secondly, 
voting is ambiguous because electoral outcomes are artefacts of the process by 
which votes are counted. Starting from the same initial profile of individual 
preferences, Riker argues that because the aggregation mechanism violates criteria 
of fairness or consistency, no independent external standard exists for 
discriminating between methods of vote counting. In particular, there is no way to 
-
determine which voting method most accurately represents the popular or 
collective will. 
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Based on these analytical results Riker concludes that voting IS 
meaningless. He argues that electoral instability and ambiguity subvert "populist" 
theories that, inspired by Rousseau, see the outcomes produced by democratic 
practices as corresponding to a coherent popular will. By contrast, it bolsters a 
liberal theory of democracy in which, echoing Schumpeter, elections perform the 
solely negative task of disciplining elected officials. 
Given the pervasive aspects of majority voting cycles, Riker has become 
suspicious of political parties in a democracy. In polarising the choice between just 
two alternatives (in the American case), political parties must necessarily be 
imposing an arbitrary structure on the pattern of citizen preferences. On this 
account political parties manufacture popular will rather than reflect or represent 
it. Riker came to the conclusion that the populist conception of democracy is not 
effective. Instead one should seek for a set of institutional arrangements that allow 
electorates to reject those political leaders who are intolerably bad rather than elect 
those leaders who are going to be strikingly good. 
Riker's analysis show how deep and pervasive social choice problems are. 
In this context there is another interpretation which it is possible to place on the 
apparent nihilism of the results in formal social choice theory. It would be possible 
to argue that what these results show is how difficult it is to build a liberal theory 
of social choice on purely procedural foundations. The formal results that Riker 
presents and discusses involve little by way of a substantive account of human 
interests and welfare. From critical theorists' point of view, these results 
underscore the inadequacy of purely aggregative notions of democracy in ways 
that can sharpen the case for deliberation (Knight and Johnson 1994: 280). 
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The Calculus of Consent: James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock 
Thus since the 1950s rational choice models have generated a series of 
theorems about the logic of majority rule. These findings of the logic of majority 
rule have prompted new types of reflection on the normative foundations of 
democracy. One of the significant features underlying Buchanan, Brennan and 
Tullock's argument is a critique of politics seen as truth-discovery process. In other 
words, to see democracy as discovering public good is a myth. They expose the 
myth of government benevolence (Brennan and Buchanan 1985: 33-46). James 
Buchanan's initial reaction to the discovery of Arrow's impossibility theorem was 
one of unsurprise. He says that since political outcomes emerge from a process in 
which many persons participate rather than some mysterious group mind, why 
should anyone have ever expected social welfare functions to be internally 
consistent? (Buchanan 1978: 8). Democracy better reflects individuals' preferences 
than do any of the well-known alternatives such as the military junta, the single 
party dictatorship etc. Politics being a process of discovery aimed at identifying the 
public good, the advantage of the democratic mode of search activity is that it 
seeks to consult the maximum feasible constituency and to reconcile the separate 
interests of the largest possible number of social actors. 
The task is not an easy one. Moreover, if each individual has a meaningful 
conception of what he conceives to be the public interest then there will be as many 
social welfare functions as there are individuals in the group. 
The preferred direction for institutional reform will require the difficult 
balancing of the values of independence, self-reliance; and liberty on the one hand, 
against those of community, fraternity aItd dependence on the other. Individuals 
simultaneously want to be free and to belong to a community (Buchanan 1978: 
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239). It is this duality of desire which makes the study of the whole of democratic 
enterprise worth undertaking. 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962) develop a normative theory of collective 
choice. The critical normative presupposition on which the whole contractarian 
construction stands or falls is the location of value exclusively in the individual 
human being. The individual is the unique unit of consciousness (Brennan and 
Buchanan 1985: 21). Values have no external existence or objective content 
independent of each individual's choice calculus. By way of examining the apparent 
ideological dominance of majority rule, Buchanan and Tullock analysed 
alternatives to majority rule. This led them to construct an economic theory of 
political constitutions, out of which emerged The Calculus of Consent (1962). 
They adopt a contractarian approach for a construction of a theory of 
constitutional choice. 
James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962) make use of Hobbesian social 
contract theory in attempting to provide a device or criterion to change the existing 
rules or institutions. Accepting much of Hobbes's theoretical framework, especially 
his grim state of nature and the idea that people might escape from this state by 
drawing up a social contract, Buchanan and Tullock emphasise the dangers of 
giving power to anyone and try to show that rational individuals would build 
constitutional constraints on the government into the social contract. The use of 
Hobbesian contract as a device is to tease out the implications to understand the 
workings of alternative political institutions so that choices among such institutions 
can be more fully informed. 
Buchanan and Tullock's The Calculus of Consent (1962) is a path breaking 
work in systematically applying economic concepts to the analysis of political 
institutions. Individual's confrontation with alternatives and his "logic of choice" 
becomes the central part of analysis (Buchanan and Tullock 1962: vi and vii). This . 
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book is not about the 'ideal' political constitution for society but is an attempt to 
analyse the calculus of the rational individual when he is faced with questions of 
constitutional choice. They examine the process extensively only with reference to 
the problem of decision-making rules (Buchanan and Tullock 1962: vi). The 
central question is 
if individuals have differing preferences and at the same time some 
aspects of life are inherently collective or social, rather than purely 
private, then the problem is ... How are differing individual preferences 
to be reconciled in reaching results that must be shared jointly by all 
members of the community? (Buchanan 1978: 5). 
Buchanan and Tullock attempt to construct a theory of collective choice. 
Collective choice must be composed of individual actions. Their theory basically 
begins with the acting or decision making individual as he participates in the 
process through which group choices are organised (Buchanan and Tullock 1962: 
3). As the title of the book itself suggests - The Calculus of Consent - it is a 
calculus of the rational utility maximiser as he confronts what can be called 
constitutional choice (Buchanan and Tullock 1962: 265). 
Buchanan conceded that the social contract is not a valid account of the 
historical origins of government. Rather his idea is that it can provide a criterion 
for changes in political institutions (Brennan and Buchanan 1985: 22). Social 
contract is seen as a hypothetical invention which can be used as a standard for 
judging, and altering, these institutions. Along the lines of contract tradition, the 
standard is what would be agreed by rational, self-interested individuals (or utility 
maximisers). Applying such economic concepts to the polity and treating the polity 
analogously to the market, Buchanan and Tullock hope to construct a theory of 
political choice. In other words, the question posed is what are the means or device 
that would enable one to pass from individually identifiable interests to something . 
26 
that might be called public interest. The theory is economic only in that it assumes 
that separate individuals are separate individuals and are likely to have different 
aims and purposes for the results of collective action. Any theory of collective 
choice must attempt to explain or to describe the means through which conflicting 
interests are reconciled (Buchanan and Tullock 1962: 3-4). 
In other words, Buchanan and Tullock try to develop an argument for a 
just constitutional contract. 'Constitution' is a term referring to a set of rules that is 
agreed upon in advance and within which subsequent action will be conducted 
(Buchanan and Tullock 1962: vii) and the selection of decision-making rules is 
itself a group choice (Buchanan and Tullock 1962: 5). So the question is 
what rules do rational individuals agree upon to formulate collective 
choice? Starting from the premise of rational utility maximisers, the 
question is posed as when will a society composed of free and rational 
utility maximisers choose to undertake action collectively rather than 
privately (Buchanan and Tullock 1962: 43-44). 
As Lessnoff puts it, what areas of life would such individuals agree to 
subject to collective regulation by the state? and on what terms? What constitution 
would they accept? (Lessnoff 1986: 124). The theory of political choice that 
Buchanan and Tullock hope to construct is difficult at the outset because of the 
fundamental interdependence of individual actions in social choice. The important 
choice that the group must make is: how shall the dividing line between collective 
action and private action be drawn? What is the realm for social and for private or 
individual choice? It is not the function of a theory to draw a precise line; theory 
assumes meaning only in terms of an analytical model which describes or explains 
the processes through which individuals of the group can make this all important 
decision (deductive logic). In deriving this model we shall be able to describe, in 
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general terms, some of the characteristic features of a "solution" (Buchanan and 
Tullock 1962: 5). 
Buchanan and Tullock got over the problem of collective choice by looking 
at how rules for ordinary parlour games are settled before the fall of the cards is 
known. There are basically two levels of argument in Buchanan and Tullock. One 
is the "constitutional stage" and the other is the "parliamentary stage". 
At the constitutional stage, Buchanan (1989: 59) uses the assumption of a 
"veil of uncertainty" to help formulate rules for collective action. In considering 
constitutional questions, the rational individual though self interested is thus not 
motivated to favour a rule that promote his interests. Since individuals are ignorant 
of the future positions they occupy once the constitutional rules are drafted, it is 
rational from each and every individuals' point of view to accept those rules which 
are in the interests of the collective rather than purely individual interests. So at the 
constitutional stage, when the fundamental rules of the game are being forged, 
there is only one decision making rule and it is unanimity of consensus. So central 
are the rules that there cannot be any rational individual who would wish to absent 
himself from participation in the process of discussion, bargaining and compromise 
that culminates in the contract. 
One means to escape this hopeless methodological dilemma is that of 
introducing some rule for unanimity or full consensus at the ultimate 
constitutional level of decision making. (Buchanan and Tullock 1962: 
6). 
At this stage the rule of unanimity is applied. Only those rules are accepted 
which have the consent of all individuals. Once the rules are formulated at the 
constitutional stage based on unanimity where the issues of redistribution and 
property and legal rights are settled, the only decisions left to decide at the 
parliamentary stage are' allocational efficiency issues. 
28 
At the parliamentary stage Buchanan and Tullock do not argue for the 
principle of unanimity but instead develop their costs-benefits analysis of the 
decision making framework. Since unanimity is costly and time consuming rational 
utility maximising individuals accept only those decision making rules which 
minimise their costs and maximise the benefits. Buchanan and Tullock proceed to 
examine one principle in particular i.e. the majority principle as a decision making 
rule in a democratic society. 
The principle of unanimity is good, but expenSIve. Since a rational 
individual is one who has a set of preferences over a set of alternatives, he has a 
transitive preference ordering. And moreover he views the merits of decision 
making rules from the viewpoint of cost-benefit analysis. A cost is seen as a loss of 
utility and a benefit is seen as a gain in utility. From such a simple set of 
assumptions, Buchanan and Tullock develop their arguments for 'decision-making 
rules' at a parliamentary stage. Buchanan and Tullock argue that each individual is 
in the best position to determine when he or she is suffering a loss of utility from 
the actions of others. The choice of decision making rule represents a trade off 
between external costs and decision costs. While individuals would prefer· a 
unanimity rule as the best means of protecting against external costs, they will 
accept less than unanimity rules in order to avoid decision costs. The exact 
decision rule would depend on the relative importance of the potential external 
costs and the potential decision costs for the individual. The important point is that 
the existence of decision costs makes it rational to consider decision rules other 
than the unanimity rule. Buchanan and Tullock also say that as an ideal the 
unanimity rule is desirable and that in a world without decision costs, it should be 
the choice of rational individuals. They argue that all cases of collective action do 
not suggest the same decision making rule. There is no reason why that should 
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prevail. Government officials have consistently failed to recognise this fundamental 
truth. There is no single decision making rule. 
Furthermore, Buchanan and Tullock criticised the majority rule for its 
oppressive exploitation of minorities i.e. its injustice. Pareto optimality is 
achievable when all individuals are free to exchange goods, services, money or 
votes in an effort to improve their lot. Under majority rule, those voting for the 
minority position receive nothing in return for their vote and so the result is not a 
pareto improvement. 
The theory of constitutional choice has normative implications only 
insofar as the underlying basis of individual consent is accepted. The 
costs and benefits from the collective action, as these confront the 
choosing individual, can be assessed only on the basis of some analysis 
of the various choice processes. The central part of the book is an 
analysis of one of the important rules for collective choice - that of 
simple majority rule (Buchanan and Tullock 1962: 7). 
Buchanan and Tullock argue that the reason why the 'self interest' 
assumption is given prominence is because one cannot be assured that the 
individual will always follow the moral rules agreed on by the philosophers as 
being necessary for harmonious social life. The individual may gain unfair 
advantage over his fellows. They argue against the assumption that individuals 
assume roles that are institution dependent: for example, that in politics persons 
take on character roles as statesmen, whereas in the market they take on character 
roles as possessive profit seekers. 
Buchanan and Tullock argue that the operation of their theoretical model 
does have explanatory value although not in the sense that it is capable of 
explaining all conceivable configurations that might be observed in the real world 
political process The important doctrinal implications of their construction lie in its 
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implicit rationalisation of a political structure that has never seemed to possess 
rigorous theoretical foundation. 
The traditional intellectual defense of majoritarian democracy is made for 
its superiority in generating an independently existing public good. By contrast, the 
contractarian paradigm defense of democratic institutions is based on their ability 
to facilitate the expression of individual values. These institutions are not 
understood to be discovering the public good. The contractarian construction 
itself is used retrospectively in a metaphorically legitimising rather than historical 
sense. The implications of the contractarian vision of politics can be understood 
through the exchange analogy. So long as the source of value is exclusively located 
in individuals and there is no differentiation among persons, the whole enterprise of 
politics can be viewed only as a complex many person system of exchanges or 
contracts. Individuals must be conceived to join together to explore and ultimately 
to agree on the establishment of collective entities or arrangements that prove 
mutually beneficial. 
Politics is concerned with resolving conflict of interests. On their view, 
political order must be antecedent to economic order. Even if a unanimity basis for 
establishing the legitimacy of the institutions of social order is acknowledged, on a 
practical level a requirement for unanimity may seem to be mere utopian 
romanticising. Individuals come to the contractual process, even in its most 
idealised form, with separated values and with separately identifiable interests. 
However Buchanan's contract cast in the homo economicus paradigm is 
prone to numerous problems which I shall discuss in comparison to Habermas' 
discourse ethics in chapters 3 and 5. 
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Social Dilemmas - Free-riding and Paradox of Voting: Mancur Olson and 
Anthony Downs 
The problem of collective action is associated with Mancur Olson's account 
of The logic of collective action (1965) and Anthony Downs' An Economic Theory 
of Democracy (1957). The result says individual motives for action may not fit 
collective preferences for outcomes even when the latter are well-defined. It is 
essentially an explanatory model involved with the problem of motivation. It says 
that even when there is an acceptable rule for aggregating preferences, one finds 
motivational difficulties in implementing the collective preference. This is explained 
in situations like the free-rider problem and public goods. 
It involves the problem of co-operative action among strategically rational 
individuals for the purpose of providing themselves with 'public goods' or 
'collective goods', i.e. goods which, if they are provided at all, must be provided to 
all members of a community. The problem occurs at the level of enforcement of a 
- . 
collective decision rule in the sense that individuals do not adhere to the agreed 
upon rules even when the rule is unanimously agreed. 
The problem of collective action is also known as the prisoner's dilemma 
problem (in game theoretic literature), the free rider's problem or the condition of 
common fate, depending on the context in which it arises. The multiplicity of 
names is indicative of the failure to generalise the nature of problem. Before 
examining the problem, it is important to define certain terms relating to this 
problem. One is the concept of public goods. A good or service is a public good if 
it is in some degree indivisible and nOli-excludable. A good is said to exhibit perfect 
indivisibility or jointness of supply if once produced any given unit can be made 
available to every member of the public. A good is said to exhibit non-excludability 
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if it is impossible to prevent individual members of the group from consuming it. 
By contrast, a perfectly divisible good is one that can be divided between 
individuals. Once any part of it is consumed by any individual, the amount available 
for consumption by others is reduced by the whole of that unit. A loaf of bread or a 
chocolate are examples of perfectly divisible goods. A good which is perfectly 
divisible is called a private good. Thus, in order to be public, a good must exhibit 
some degree ofindivisibility or jointness. 
A good is nonexcludable to the extent that it is difficult or costly to operate 
a system of charges, denying access to the good to people who do not pay the 
charge. Collective goods or public goods are goods which can provide benefits for 
many people simultaneously. Clearly, the range of collective goods is enormous -
clean air, safe streets, national security, a just society and so on. If an individual is 
not excluded from consumption or use of the public good, it is possible for him to 
be a free rider on the efforts of others, i.e. he can consume or use the public good 
that is provided by others; whether or not he will in fact be a free rider is 
something one has to examine. 
Employing the self-interest axiom, Olson attacked conventional pluralist 
accounts of interest groups. It is characteristic of the traditional theory in all its 
forms that it assumes that participation in voluntary associations is virtually 
universal. Olson argued by contrast that since groups organise around collective 
goals, it is often not rational for self-interested individuals to join in such activity; 
they can better pursue their interests by free-riding on other people's efforts. Hence 
large groups are often under-organised. This is because people reason that their 
individual participation will make little or no difference to a group's success and 
failure, and they will gain the same -level of collective benefits whether they 
participate or not. 
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The defining characteristic of a collective action problem is very roughly 
that 'rational egoists are unlikely to succeed in co-operating to promote their 
common interests'. The argument of collective action is as follows: that if all 
individuals refrained from doing A, every individual as a member of the community 
would derive a certain advantage. But now if all individuals less one continue 
refraining from doing A, the community loss is very slight, whereas the one 
individual doing A makes a personal gain far greater than the loss that he incurs as 
member of the community. This is the problem of collective action: If any 
individual is narrowly self-interested he would presumably not refrain from doing 
A. Suppose smog in metropolis could be prevented if all individuals would 
voluntarily pay to have a certain anti-pollution devices installed in their cars. 
Voluntary action would not solve the smog problem if too many individuals were 
narrowly rational. In a similar way, much less voluntary activity in many realms 
such as the green movement can be explained by this logic. 
Evidence of this logic at work is seemingly everywhere. So the argument of 
the logic of collective action is based on the strong assumption that individual 
- . 
actions are motivated by self interest. The appeal of the assumption of narrow 
rationality is methodological: it is relatively easy to assess in generalisable 
behaviours. 
Olson challenges the view that groups of individuals with common interests 
usually attempt to further those common interests. 
Groups of individuals with common interests are expected to act on 
behalf of their common interests as much as single individuals are often 
expected to act on behalf of their personal interests. This view is 
widely . accepted in the theories which explain state, class, group 
behaviour in farm lobbies etc. The view that groups act to serve their 
interests presumably is based upon the assumption that the individuals 
in groups act out of self interest. So if the members of a group have a 
common interest then individuals would be rational and self interested 
to act to achieve that objective. But it is not true that the idea that 
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groups will act in their self interest follows logically from the premise 
of rational and self interested behaviour. Unless the number· of 
individuals in a group is small, unless there is coercion or some other 
special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational 
self interested individuals 'will not act to achieve their common or 
group interests'. In other words, individuals voluntarily will not act to 
achieve that common or group interest (Olson 1965: 1·2). 
Olson explores this inconsistency between group interests and individual 
interests. These points, Olson (1965: 2) argues, would hold true even when there is 
unanimous agreement in a group about the common good and the methods of 
achieving it. The widespread notion in the social sciences is that groups tend to 
further their interests on the assumption that groups act in their self interests 
because individuals do. 
Olson draws on the tools of economic theory to study individual behaviour 
in a group, but the conclusions of the study are relevant to political science. The 
kinds of organisations that are the focus of this study are expected to further the 
interests of their members: labour unions; farm organisations; cartels; the 
corporation; and finally even the state is expected to further the common interests 
of its citizens. The important aspect Olson brought to light is the free rider problem 
in public goods and collective action problems. The free· rider is one who gets 
benefits independent of his contribution to the collective good. 
Olson's main contention is that the larger the group is, the farther it will fall 
short of providing an optimal supply of any collective good, and the less likely it 
will act to obtain even a minimal amount of such a good; In short, the larger the 
group, the less likely it will further its common interests. 
There are three arguments in support of- this conclusion to be found in 
Olson's work. Before examining these issues it is important to clarify some 
definitions. A group is said to be "privileged" if it pays at least one of its members 
to provide some public good unilaterally, i.e. to bear the full cost of providing it 
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alone. Any group which is not privileged is said to be "latent". Where the group is 
privileged, there is, in Olson's view, a presumption that the public good will be 
provided; but there should be no such thing in the case of a latent group. However 
Olson argues that there are groups which are small and capable enough to provide 
themselves with public goods. He calls such groups intermediate groups. Here in 
this group an individual's contribution to the provision of a public good will not go 
unnoticed by other members. In the latent groups - i.e. large groups - it is 
impossible to notice individual contributions to public good and so Olson argues 
that there is a need for 'selective incentives' which in tum motivate individuals to 
pay for public goods. So the individual receives benefit if and only if he contributes 
and incurs private cost if and only if he fails to contribute. Thus, for example, trade 
unions which are funded primarily to provide for their members certain public 
goods such as higher wages and better working conditions have also had to offer 
prospective members sickness, unemployment and dispute benefits and other 
positive selective incentives. 
So in deciding whether or not to participate, the individual weighs the 
costs-benefits calculation to see the gains of participation. So there are three 
arguments which Olson offers in support of his claim that the larger groups are less 
likely than smaller groups to provide any amount of the public good. 
1. The larger the group, the smaller is each individual's net benefit from the public 
good. 
2. The larger the group, the less the likelihood that it will be privileged or 
intermediate. 
3. The larger the group, the greater the organisation costs of providing the public 
good (costs of communication and bargaining). 
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It is often taken for granted, at least where economic objectives are involved, that 
groups of individuals with common interests, usually attempt to further those 
common interests. This view is based upon the assumption that the individuals in 
groups act out of self interest. If the individuals in a group altruistically disregarded 
their personal welfare, it would not be very likely that collectively they would seek 
some selfish common or group objective. Such altruism is considered exceptional, 
and self interested behaviour is usually thought to be the rule, at least when 
economic issues are at stake. The idea that groups tend to act in support of their 
group interests is supposed to follow logically from this widely accepted premise 
of rational self interested behaviour. 
Olson disputes the idea that groups will act in their self interest follows 
from the premise of rational and self interested behaviour. It does not follow from 
the fact that all o~ the individuals in a group would gain if they achieved their group 
objective, that they would act to achieve that objective, even if they were all 
rational and self interested. 
Olson's study focuses on organisations or groups with significant economic 
- . 
interests. The kinds of organisations that are the focus of this study are expected to 
further the interests of their members. Although the logic of the theory can be 
extended to cover communal, ethnic, religious and philanthropic organisations, the 
theory is particularly useful in studying groups whose interests are primarily 
economic. Olson also shows the reasons why some organisations or groups are 
possible. The fact that other large groups have been organised would seem to 
contradict the theory of latent groups offered in the study. So how does one 
explain the organisation of some large groups? The argument is as follows: 
The large economic groups -that are organised do have one common 
characteristic which distinguishes them from those large economic groups that are 
not, and which at the. same time tends to support the theory of latent groups 
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offered in this work. The common characteristic which distinguishes all of the large 
economic groups with significant lobbying organisations is that these groups are 
also organised for some other purpose (Olson 1965: 132). So the large and 
powerful economic lobbies are in fact the by-products of organisations that obtain 
their strength and support because they perform some function in addition to 
lobbying for collective goods. 
Similarly, Olson applies his argument to "special interest" groups like 
business groups which form an important segment of society and has the largest 
number of lobbies working on its behalf The power wielded by business In 
American politics may puzzle the person of democratic predilections: a 
comparatively small minority exercises enormous power (Olson 1965: 142). The 
number and power of the lobbying organisations representing American business is 
indeed surprising in a democracy operating according to majority rule (Olson 
1965: 142). 
Olson goes on to argue that the power that the various segments of the 
business community wield in this democratic system, despite the smallness of their 
numbers, has not been adequately explained (Olson 1965: 142). There have been 
many vague, and even mystical, generalisations about the power of the business 
and propertied interests, but these generalisations normally do not explain why 
business groups have the influence that they have in democracies~ they merely 
assert that they always have such an influence, as though it were self evident that 
this should be so. Olson poses the question: But why? Why is it natural and 
necessary, in democracy based on the rule of majority, that the political power 
should fall into the hands of those who hold the property? (Olson 1965: 143). 
The high degree of organisation of business interests, and the power of 
these business interests, must be due in large part to the fact that the business 
community is divided into a series of (generally oligopolistic) industries, each of 
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which contains only a fairly small number of firms. Because the number of firms in 
each industry is often no more than would comprise a privileged group, it follows 
that these industries will normally be small enough to organise voluntarily to 
provide themselves with an active lobby - with the political power that naturally 
and necessarily flows to those that control the business and property of the country 
(Olson 1965: 143). 
There may be a sense in which the narrow "special interests" of the small 
group tend to triumph over the (often unorganised and inactive) interests of the 
people. At other times, practical observers may be sensing the fact that the 
organised and active interest of small groups tend to triumph over the unorganised 
and unprotected interests of larger groups. Often, a relatively small group or 
industry will win a tariff, or tax loophole, at the expense of millions of consumers 
or taxpayers in spite of the ostensible rule of the majority (Olson 1965: 144) . 
Thus the large or latent groups have no tendency to voluntarily act to 
further their common interests. For the unorganised groups, the groups that have 
no lobbies and exert no pressure, are among the largest groups in the nation, and 
they have some of the most vital common interests. Migrant farm labourers are a 
significant group with urgent common interests. The white collar workers are a 
large group with common interests, but they have no organisation to care for their 
interests. Even taxpayers and consumers belong to such groups. 
Nor can such groups be expected to organise or act simply because the 
gains from group action would exceed the costs. The existence of large 
unorganised groups with common interests is therefore quite consistent with the 
basic argument of this study. 
The advocates of group theory like Commons, Bentley, Truman, Latham, 
and some of the pluralist and corporatist writers have emphasised the pressures of 
the different economic. groups. Many of these writers have taken for granted that 
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large econonnc groups working for their econonnc interests are absolutely 
fundamental in the political process. They affirmed the existence of groups with 
something other than self interested economic purposes, but still self interested 
economic groups always play the largest role in their writings. 
Since relatively small groups (privileged and intermediate) will frequently 
be able voluntarily to organise and act in support of their common interests, and 
since large groups (latent groups) normally will not be able to do so, the outcome 
of the political struggle among the various groups in society will not be 
symmetrical (Olson 1965: 127). Practical politicians and journalists have long 
understood that small "special interests" groups, the "vested interests", have 
disproportionate power. The somewhat too colourful and tendentious language 
with which the men of affairs make this point should not blind the scholar to the 
important element of truth that it contains. The small oligopolistic industry seeking 
a tariff or a tax loophole will sometimes attain its objective even if the vast majority 
of the population loses as a result. 
The smaller groups can often defeat the large groups which are normally 
supposed to prevail -in a democracy (Olson 1965: 127). The former triumph 
because they are generally organised and active while the latter are normally 
unorganised and inactive. 
So Olson's conclusion is that majority rule does not necessarily serve the 
interests of the majority but serves the interests of the minority. 
However not all collective action problems are alike in nature. There is a 
very important class of problems which arise in connection with the use of 
resources to which there is open access i.e. resources which nobody is prevented 
from using. These resources need not be public goods. Garret Hardin's "tragedy of 
the commons" (1968) concerns resources of this kind. This problem is one where 
there is 'non excludability' but not 'indivisibility' which means that access to public 
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good is indivisible. Hardin asks us to imagine a common pasture open to all. So 
each herdsman is assumed to seek to maximise his own gain. As long as the total 
number of animals is below carrying capacity of the common, a herdsman can add 
an animal to his herd without affecting the amount of grazing of any of the animals. 
But beyond this point, the tragedy of the commons is set in motion. A herdsman 
adds one more animal thinking that this entails for him a gain and a loss: on the one 
hand, he obtains the benefit from this animal's yield and on the other hand, the yield 
of each of his animals reduced because there is now overgrazing. The benefit 
obtained from the additional animal accrues entirely to the herdsman. The effect of 
overgrazing is shared by all the herdsmen. The result is that the herdsmen 
collectively bring about a situation in which each of them derives less benefit from 
his herd than he did before the carrying capacity of the common was exceeded. So 
in both the cases above, individual strategic rationality brings out collectively 
irrational outcomes. This paradox led to the thinking of the discussion on states, 
private property, community and norms as the alternatives for the effective 
provision of public goods. 
Even the so-catled Prisoner's dilemma ·is closely allied to Mancur Olson's 
free rider dilemma. 
In a similar way, Anthony Downs' An Economic Theory of Democracy 
(1957) grasped the logic of collective action in the context of 'voting' and 'party 
competition' within a democratic political system. In his model, only a government, 
parties and voters inhabit the political scene. The government is made up by the 
party which maximised votes at the last general election. Political parties are 
assumed to be completely united behind the leader and solely concerned to 
maximise votes as their only goal is to reap the rewards of holding governmental 
office. To that end it is rational for parties to be flexible and adopt whichever 
policies will advance electoral success. In Downs' world it is not rational for parties 
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to be committed to policies and to be active in persuading voters to give them their 
support. For their part, voters see elections as a chance to choose a government 
and because they too are assumed to be rational and self interested individuals they 
will vote in the way which they consider will offer them the best policy package at 
the lowest tax cost. The trouble is that informing oneself so as to vote rationally 
involves costs (both time and money). So it is seen as making sense for voters to 
attend less to the detail of policy and performance and more to the ideologies for 
the parties since these give a rough guide to probable policies. Given these 
assumptions about voters and parties, Downs was able to predict that the two 
party competition will produce a kind of consensus policies in which parties will 
tend to develop policy positions near to each other in order to win the marginal 
votes, although the threat of abstention by the committed party extremists will 
encourage parties to keep a little away from the centre. This economic theory of 
democracy clearly parallels the neo-classical picture of the economy. Voters are 
political consumers using votes as politicians are seen as supplying policies to win 
votes and secure the fruits of government office. 
The other problem which Downs analyses is the aspect of voting' in 
democracy. Using economic assumptions and cost-benefit analysis, Downs came to 
the conclusion that. voting costs time and money and so most people would 
rationally calculate not to vote. The difficulty involved with co-operative action to 
provide collective goods revolves around the results of a rational actor's 
calculations as to whether the costs of participating in such action outweigh the 
benefits. So in regard to voting, it appears that a rational individual would decide 
not to vote, for the simple reason that the cost of time and effort of that act is far 
too high when measured against the benefit of having his favoured party win. He 
thinks the likelihood that his one vote will make the difference between his party 
winning or losing. By not voting the individual does not measurably change the 
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collective outcome of the results. If his party loses, it would have done so even if 
he had voted for it. By contrast, if it wins, he gets the benefits of the collective 
good without any cost. So here the individual is a free rider. But the conclusion 
that it is not rational to vote has disturbing consequences for both political 
philosophers and rational choice theorists. So the problem which arises regarding 
voting arises with all types of collective action situations. 
The most significant contribution of Downs' analysis is the "rational 
ignorance hypothesis": it holds that the information-seeker continues to invest 
resources in procuring data until the marginal return from information equals the 
marginal cost (Downs 1957,215). 
Downs (1957: 238) argues that citizens acquire political information for 
two main reasons: 1) to help them decide how to vote, and 2) to form opinions 
with which they can influence government policy formation during the period 
between elections. In Downs' model voting is a means of selecting the best possible 
government from among the parties competing for the job. Therefore a rational 
man votes because he would rather have one of these parties than any of the 
others. The margin of his preference is his party-differential. 
Since information involves costs, Downs argues that a rational man may 
invest in informatio~ for three reasons: 1. he wishes to influence the government's 
policies, 2. his prediction of how other voters will act indicates that the probability 
is relatively high that his own vote will be decisive or 3. he derives entertainment 
value or social prestige from such data. So it might seem that political information 
is useful to voters because it enables them to have specific preferences which in 
tum influence government policies that affect them. But Downs comes to a 
different conclusion. 
Downs argues that information is relatively useless to those citizens who 
. care which party wins and those citizens for whom information is most useful do 
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not care who wins. In short, then, nobody has a incentive to acquire political 
information. In so far as voting is concerned, rational behaviour implies both a 
refusal to expend resources on political information per se and a definite limitation 
of the amount of free political information absorbed. 
Every rational voter realises that he is not the only person voting. This 
knowledge radically alters his view of the importance of his own vote. The party 
which eventually wins will probably be elected no matter how one casts his ballot, 
as long as the other citizens vote independently of him (Downs 1957: 244). 
Because nearly every citizen realises his vote is not decisive in each election, the 
incentive of most citizens to acquire information before voting is small (Downs 
1957: 299). A large percentage of citizens - including voters - do not become 
informed to any significant degree on the issues involved in elections, even if they 
believe the outcomes to be important (Downs 1957: 299). 
Contrasting ethical models of democracy and his model, Downs argues that 
they differ in two ways. The contrast arises from the simultaneous truth of two 
seemingly contradictory propositions (Downs 1957: 246): 1) Rational citizens 
want democracy to work well so as to gain its benefits, and it works best when the 
citizenry is well informed, but 2) it is also individually irrational to be well 
informed. Here individual rationality conflicts apparently with social rationality; 
i.e., the goals men seek as individuals contradict those they seek in coalition as 
members of society. This paradox exists because the benefits men derive from 
efficient social organisation are indivisible. Downs (1957: 246) argues that every 
citizen benefits in the long run if government is truly run "by consent of the 
governed"; i.e., if every voter expresses his true vie:ws in voting. By his true views, 
Downs means, the views he would have if he thought that his vote decided the 
outcome. 
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But in fact his vote is not decisive: it is lost in a sea of other votes. Hence 
whether he himself is well informed has no perceptible impact on the benefits he 
gets. If all others express their true views, he gets the benefits of a well-informed 
electorate no matter how well-informed his is; if they are badly informed, he cannot 
produce these benefits himself Therefore as in all cases of indivisible benefits, the 
individual is motivated to shirk his share of the costs: he refuses to get enough 
information to discover his true views. Since all men do this, the election does not 
reflect the true consent of all governed (Downs 1957: 246). In a democracy, 
government cannot force people to become well-informed. This view of rationality 
conflicts sharply with the traditional idea of good citizenship in a democracy. 
Indeed, the whole concept of representative government becomes rather empty if 
the electorate has no opinions to be represented (Downs 1957: 245). The tension 
which exists between individual and social rationality prevents the governed from 
expressing their true consent when they select a government. 
Downs argues that there are significant differences between acqumng 
information in order to "vote" and acquiring it in order to "influence policy-
making." In the first·· place, voters automatically communicate their decision ·to 
government in the act of voting, but influencers must transmit their opinions to 
government by specific act in order to get results. Although this also involves cost, 
the cost or benefit depends on the position of the citizen of society. If the citizen's 
interest in a policy area stems from his business, he can charge the costs of 
transmitting his views to his firm, which will probably deduct them from its taxable 
Income. 
There is a distinction between two types of return from information: almost 
everyone at least considers voting, -but relatively few citizens ever consider 
exerting influence in any particular area of policy. A voter's party differential is 
subject to heavy discounting because of the great number of other voters. In 
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contrast, an influencer's intervention value may suffer hardly any discount. because 
only a small number of others are interested in the policy he wants to influence 
(Downs 1957: 253). Perhaps many people are affected by this policy, but since 
most of them do not realise in advance the source of these effects, they cannot seek 
to alter policy pursued at that source. Such ignorance is not the result of mere 
apathy; rather it stems from the great cost of obtaining enough information to exert 
effective influence. Each influencer must be acquainted with the situation at least 
well enough to be in favour of a specific policy. Many people voice strong policy 
preferences without benefit of much information, and the ballots these people cast 
are just as potent as those of the well-informed. Nevertheless, the government 
knows that its behaviour in a given policy area will affect many people who show 
no immediate interest in that area. Consequently, it must be persuaded that these 
presently passive citizens will not react against whatever policy an influencer is 
promoting. A would-be influencer has to be knowledgeable enough to carry out 
this persuasion. 
Thus formulation of policy requires more knowledge than choosing among 
alternatives which others have formulated. As a result, influencers need more 
information about the policy areas they operate in than even the most well 
informed voters; hence their data costs are higher. The complexity of these areas 
often forces influencers to become experts before they can discover what policies 
best suit their own interests. And because many influencers with different goals are 
competing with each other for power, each must 1. produce arguments to counter 
any attacks upon him, 2. assault the others' contentions with data of his own 3. be 
informed enough to know what compromises are s~tisfactory to him. 
In contrast, a voter need find only the differential impact on him of a few 
alternatives formulated by others. He does not have to examine all the possible 
alternatives, since not all are open to his choice - though all are open to the choice 
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of a policy maker. Also a voter need not be well informed enough to think of 
compromises since either one party or the other will win. 
The gist of the analysis is that influencers are specialists in whatever policy 
areas they wish to influence; whereas voters are generalisers trying to draw an 
overall comparison between parties. Specialisation demands expert knowledge and 
information and most people cannot afford to become expert in many fields 
simultaneously. Therefore influencers usually operate in only one or two policy 
areas at once. This means that in each area, only a small number of specialists are 
trying to influence the government. Thus the potential returns from influence are 
high enough to justify a large investment of information. In almost every policy 
area, those who stand the most to gain are the men who earn their incomes there. 
So for all these reasons, producers are more likely to become influencers 
than consumers. The former can better afford to invest in the specialised 
information needed for influencing and to pay the cost of communicating their 
views to the government. However every man is both a producer and consumer at 
different moments of life. So men are more likely to exert political influence in their 
roles as income earners than in their roles as income spenders, whether acting ·as 
private citizens or as members ofa corporate entity (Downs 1957: 254-55). 
The cost of acquiring information and communicating opinions to 
government determines the structure of political influence. Only those who can 
afford to bear this cost are in a position to be influential. 
A striking example is the failure of consumers at large to exercise any 
cogent influence over government decisions affecting them. For instance legislators 
are notorious for writing tariffs laws which favour a few producers in each field at 
the expense of thousands of consumers. On the basis of votes alone, this practice is 
hardly compatible with Downs' central hypothesis about government behaviour. 
But once we introduce the cost of information, the explanation springs full armed 
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from Downs' theory. Each producer can afford to bring great influence to bear 
upon that section of the tarifflaw affecting his product. Conversely, few consumers 
can bring any influence to bear upon any parts of the law, since each consumer 
cannot even afford to find out whether tariffs are raising the price they pay for any 
given product. 
Under these conditions, government is bound to be more attentive to 
producers than to consumers when it creates policy. In general, economic decisions 
of a rational government in a democracy are biased against consumers and in 
favour of producers (Downs 1957: 239). Economically speaking, governmental 
policy in a democracy almost always exhibits an anti-consumer, pro-producer bias. 
And this bias exists not because the various agents concerned are irrational, but 
because they behave rationally (Downs 1957: 256). 
"Division of labour" and "uncertainty" inevitably cause men to be informed 
to different degrees. The inequality of information always results in a 
corresponding inequality of influence over governmental policy formation. This 
conclusion emphasises once more the inherent inequality of political power in 
democratic societies (Downs 1957: 257). 
Democracy is well defined as government by consent of the governed To 
go a step further, g~:)Vernment by consent of the governed is defined as decision 
making in which the decider makes each choice on the basis of the preferences of 
those affected by it and weights the preferences of each in proportion to the degree 
to which he is affected. Though this complex definition is still ambiguous, it is clear 
enough to compare with the method of weighting preferences used by the rational 
government in our model. 
The comparison shows that the cost of information prevents Downs's 
model government from ever functioning by consent of the governed in a pure 
sense. This does not mean that government makes decisions without considering 
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the desires of the people affected by them; on the contrary, it is extremely sensitive 
to the wishes of the electorate. Nevertheless, because of the very structure of 
society, each government decision cannot result from equal consideration of the 
wishes of men who are equally affected by the decision. To this inherent disparity 
of influence, if the inequalities of power caused by the uneven distribution of 
income are considered, then we have moved a long way from political equality 
among citizens (Downs 1957: 257). 
Downs (1957: 258) argues that this conclusion by no means implies that 
democracy cannot work, or that it is without benefits, or that it embodies only 
sham equality. A contrast between Downs's model and the communist model 
would probably show that democracy is relatively successful at achieving political 
equality. Nevertheless his model does tend to verify the following assertion: even if 
society's rules are specifically designed to distribute political power equally, such 
equality will never result in an uncertain world as long as men act rationally. In 
short, perfect political equality is irrational when uncertainty exists, unless there is 
no division oflabour. 
In an appendix (Downs 1957: 274) titled: the possible existence ·of 
irrationality in the model, Downs argues that every citizen who wishes to vote but 
is indifferent about w.ho wins chooses a party at random and votes for it. From the 
point of view of the individual, there is no reason why random selection is not 
preferable to certain other methods of choice. Since he cannot distinguish between 
the parties on the basis of their policies, he might as well use any other basis which 
pleases him. For instance, he might vote for the party whose leader has the most 
charming personality, or the one his father vote4 for. Thus a rational man may 
employ politically irrational mechanisms to decide for whom to vote. The difficulty 
with these arguments is that they rationalise everything. If it is rational to vote for 
. prestige, then why is it not rational to vote so as to please one's employer or one's 
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sweetheart? Soon all behaviour whatsoever becomes rational because every act is a 
means to some end the actor values. Though the use of such devices is individually 
rational, it is socially irrational (Downs 1957: 274). 
1. 3. Public Choice and Democracy 
In this section, I shall discuss the implications of these results for 
democracy. To sum up, the theoretical conclusions of public choice theories of 
democratic politics have shown the paradoxes of individual and collective choice. 
I have roughly discussed three problems: One, following Arrow and Riker, is that 
the notion of social preferences is in general not well-defined: the problem of 
preference aggregation. Second, Buchanan and Tullock's construction of a 
normative theory of collective choice by way of a critique of the "majority 
principle." Finally, Olson and Downs argue that social action is likely to be 
distorted by the private interests of the agents: the collective action problem with 
reference to public goods. 
What unites all these works of public choice theory is a powerful critique of 
democratic institutions, describing in great detail the nefarious effects of economic 
individuals pursuing advantage through political mechanisms and thereby exposing 
the myth of "general will." Hence the normative problem for public choice theorists 
has been to open up new reflections on the normative foundations of democracy. 
But it is important to remember that normative responses are varied. Buchanan, 
Tullock and Riker call for a limited government. Olson argues for "selective 
incentives" to individuals in groups as a way of overcoming the free rider problem. 
Of all the positions, Buchanan and Tullock provide the most concrete normative 
foundation of a theory of collective choice 
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Democracy is both an ideal and a method. As a method, it deals with the 
procedural characteristics of the ballot box and all that goes with it. And the ideal 
is justice and individual self-realisation involving essentially free human persons. 
Populist interpretations of democracy see it as a just political device for 
representing the "general will." Public choice theorists, by contrast, contend that 
the failure to apply the "self-interest" axiom to politics was because of the 
dominance of Rousseau's ideas fostering the view that governments in a democracy 
have no real existence apart from the "will of the people." The result is an 
unconscious assumption that all governments are run by altruists: this criticism of 
democratic consent as "general will" operating on the principle of majority rule lies 
at the heart of all public choice theorists (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Downs 
1957: 279-294; Riker 1982; Olson 1971). 
Thus public choice theories have come up with two findings about 
democracy: one is the conceptual incoherence of majoritarian democracy and the 
second is the collective action problem. A common objection to the method of 
majority decision is that it is illiberal. If apparent majorities are often chimerical, if 
minorities can manipulate democratic decision rules to generate the results they 
desire, and if there is no way to amalgamate individual desires into a general will, 
as Rousseau had claimed in The Social Contract (1762), then the nature and 
desirability of democracy require re-evaluation. 
The theory of public choice is a theory about the way the preferences of 
individual persons are amalgamated into a collective choice of society. The crucial 
attribute of democracy is "popular participation" in government. Although the 
institutions of participation have been many and varied, they have always revolved 
around the simple act of "voting." - As Riker (1982: 5) says, voting is not 
equivalent to democracy, only voting that facilitates popular choice is democratic . 
. This condition excludes voting both in oligarchic bodies and in plebiscites in 
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communist and military tyrannies, where voting is no more than forced 
approbation. Thus one can say that democracy implies voting but voting does not 
imply democracy. So voting is a necessary, but not sufficient condition of 
democracy. To render them equivalent, voting must be surrounded with numerous 
institutions like political parties and free speech which organise voting into a 
genuine choice. Thus public choice theorists see voting as a central act of 
democracy. 
Because "voting" is one method of aggregating values, public choice 
theorists have come up with a theory of voting. And although participation can 
take many forms, it invariably includes "voting." Therefore, the theory of choice is 
highly relevant to the theory of democracy. Voting as a fair democratic procedural 
ideal assumed importance in the twentieth century when it became more frequently 
used as a method of social decision. Public choice theory is an analytic theory 
about the main institution of democracy - namely voting (Riker 1982: 4). 
Contrasting liberal (or Madisonian) and populist (Rousseaunian) 
interpretations of "voting" Riker (1982: 239) argues populism as a moral 
imperative depends Qn the existence of popular will discovered by voting. But if 
voting does not discover or reveal a will, then the moral imperative evaporates 
because there is nothing to be commanded. By contrast liberals interpret voting as 
a democratic device as inadequate and fear the tyranny of majority. Using the 
results of social choice theory, Riker tries to show the superiority ofliberalism over 
populism. Riker uses these results to draw a conservative normative conclusion: 
that democracy cannot possibly live up to many of the claims made for it, and that 
only what he calls liberalism (democracy restricted by checks and balances) is 
supportable. So the only alternative is liberalism, which is a form of democracy 
with entrenched rules to prevent the tyranny of the majority. 
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The normative response of Buchanan and Tullock is to model collective 
choice on the basis of the contractarian paradigm. Contrasting rationalist 
democracy and individualist democracy Buchanan and Tullock argue that: 
Political theorists do not seem to have considered fully the implications 
of individual differences for a theory of political decisions. The choice 
making process has been conceived of as the means of arriving at some 
version of "truth"; some rationalist absolute which remains to be 
discovered through reason or revelation and which, once discovered 
will attract all men to its support. The conceptions of "rationalist 
democracy" have been based on the assumption that individual 
conflicts of interest, will and should, vanish once the electorate 
becomes fully informed (Buchanan and Tullock 1962: 4). 
The critical potential of public choice theories is seen in its critique of such 
concepts as general will which are shown to be deeply restrictive of liberty and 
supposedly impossible without the "sword of leviathan", to use Buchanan's phrase. 
The theory has been used to uncover the hidden operation of force and coercion in 
modem centralised political institutions and to point out the illusory character of 
many communitarian political ideals tied to the radical democratic tradition. 
Although the theoretical conclusions of public choice expose the myth of 
collective action, it does not mean that they do away with any notion of collective 
action. Public choice theorists oppose collective action if it means discovering 
some objective notion of public interest other than what individuals desire. On this 
account the goal of politics is instrumental, in the sense that politics has only to do 
with rules and not with any correct measures of individual interests. Buchanan 
(1978: 9) says the task of politics is to devise institutions that would enable us to 
pass from individually identifiable self-interest to ·something that might take the 
place of public interest. 
Collective rationality is seen as a question of co-ordinating or aggregating 
individual preferences. Buchanan and Tullock (1962) make "unanimity" a condition 
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for political decisions. They argue for unanimity on the libertarian grounds that 
anything short of it will violate the rights of the minority. Democracy is interpreted 
as a device for preference aggregation under conditions of non-cognitivism in 
individual preferences, instrumentally rational behaviour and self-interest. Non-
cognitivism means simply that values and preferences are beyond the reach of 
rational argument. 
As Buchanan (1986: 41-54) argues politics is a process in which conflicts 
among individual interests are settled. In this enterprise there is no independently 
existing interest analogous to "truth" towards which the interaction process 
converges. Rules become the reference point against which the justice of 
individuals' behaviour can be assessed. A fair rule is one that is agreed to by players 
in advance of play itself. So a rule is fair if players agree to it. Agreement in its 
purest form is unanimous agreement. 
Brennan and Buchanan (1985: 43) defend democratic institutions such as 
"majority rule" (because "unanimity" is costly and time consuming) on economic 
grounds. By contrast, Buchanan and Brennan (1985: 43) argue that proponents of 
majoritarian democracy defend it because of its alleged efficacy in discovering the 
"public good." Thus, on this view, democratic institutions stand or fallon their 
alleged superiority in generating the attainment of an independently existing public 
good. Moreover, proponents of democracy in the noncontractarian paradigm 
acknowledge that majority rule is less imperfect than its alternatives in part because 
the public good is not readily discernible. And, indeed, these very proponents may 
argue that non-democratic methods of reaching collective decisions are more 
efficient when the public good is more clearly outl~ned, as, for example, in war or 
emergency. 
By contrast the contractarian defense of democratic institutions, as 
constitutionally derived, is based on their ability to facilitate the expression of 
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individual values. These institutions are not understood to be discovering the 
public good, even if at some deeper philosophical level the existence or non-
existence of such a public good may be a subject of further inquiry. The argument 
is that since there is no external standard against which institutions can be 
evaluated in efficiency terms, any evaluative criteria must be applied directly to the 
institutional processes themselves. In the contractarian perspective, constitutional 
democracy, which may embody majoritarian voting rules in specified 
circumstances, is categorically distinct from all other political forms of authority. 
For the noncontractarian, majoritarian democracy is aimed at finding or 
discovering the public good. Thus politics is seen as the search for the grail of the 
public good . and the activity of discovery is carried on under the continuing 
presumption that what is sought exists independently of the expression of 
individual values in the search itself Hence any constitutional constraints on the 
"will of majority" will tend to be opposed. 
Although public choice theorists (like Buchanan and Riker) are obsessed 
with overcoming the paradoxes of voting, they fail to recognise that voting does 
not exhaust democratic practice. This is mainly because they share the view that 
the political process is instrumental rather than a public action, viz. the individual 
and secret vote. With these usually goes the idea that the goal of politics is the 
optimal compromise between given and irreducible interests (Elster 1986b: 103). 
Critics claim that public choice theories embody a confusion between "market" and 
"forum" (Elster 1986b). The average rational citizen is modelled on the lines of 
consumer, and they fail to recognise the distinction between the domain of the 
market and the domain of the forum. In the former"the consumer chooses between 
courses of action that differ only in the way they affect him. But in political choice 
situations, the citizen's choice inevitably affects other people who might differ. 
One can question the adequacy of the model of preferences that is built into 
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the approach when we are considering matters of political choice. In these models, 
judgements about the relative merits of alternative social states are represented in 
the same way in which tastes are represented in the choice of commodities by 
consumers. Although this principle can be applied in markets, the same cannot be 
true of political judgements (Weale 1992: 215). In any political argument people 
offer reasons for favouring their preferred alternative. So the logic of advancing a 
political preference must be understood in the light of these underlying reasons, 
and not simply as claims to have one's preferences satisfied whatever they happen 
to be. 
The conception of preferences based on instrumental reason presented in 
public choic~ theories has come under attack from both internal and external 
critiques. In the next chapter, I shall turn to the external critique articulated by 
Habermas in his theory of communicative action who distinguishes instrumental 
reason and communicative reason. This alternative model sees collective choice not 
as a process of preference aggregation but as a process of dialogue in which 
reasons are exchanged between participants in a process that is perceived to be a 
joint search for a consensus. 
Notes 
1 The key difference is that Bentham's social philosophy envisioned a universal currency of 
happiness for all people. Everything in people's lives either adds to the sum total of utility in 
society (i.e. it is pleasurable) to subtracts from it (i.e. is painful) and the good society is the one 
that maximises those utilities. This view is plainly controversial now because it presumes as we 
can compare one person's utility with another's. 
2 The foundations of the theory of choice were laid down in the eighteenth century. In 1785, the 
French mathematician Marie de Caritat better known as the Marquis de Condorcet, discovered 
the interesting "paradox of voting". This paradox was rediscQvered in the nineteenth century by 
Charles Dodgson, better known as Louis Carol, and in the early 1950s Kenneth Arrow used it as 
part of his "impossibility theorem". -
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Chapter 2 
Instrumental Rationality and Communicative Rationality: Habermas on 
Social Interaction 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I examined rational choice theory's defense of the 
concept of instrumental reason in modelling social interaction. It can be said that 
the origins of rational choice theory belong firmly in the project of modernity. In 
social sciences, the completion of the project of modernity is aimed at developing a 
rational theory of society. By contrast, critiques of modernity argue for the 
abandonment of the project of modernity. Although the critique of instrumental 
reason was at the heart of early Frankfurt school thinkers like Max Horkheimer, 
Theodore Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, they failed to provide critical theory with 
any alternative normative standpoint. Modernity is seen as constituting only one 
form of reason and that is instrumental reason. As Benhabib says, 
The Frankfurt school's critique of instrumental reason was an aporetic 
project precisely because once the identification of emancipation with 
the increased technical mastery of nature was rejected, there seemed no 
other instance" of human rationality to appeal to besides aesthetic 
reason (Benhabib 1986: 224). 
Jurgen Habermas maintains that the Frankfurt school's critique of 
instrumental reason need not appeal to a utopian reconciliation with nature; the 
true negation of instrumental reason is not utopian but communicative reason. For 
Habermas the earlier versions of critical "theory were inadequate because: 
In the first place, critical theory never really took the theoretical 
contributions of the social sciences and analytical philosophy seriously. 
It never engaged with them systematically, as it should have done, 
given its own intentions. Hence, secondly, it took refuge in an abstract 
critique of instrumental reason and made only a limited contribution to 
the empirical analysis of the over-complex reality of our society. And 
finally, it failed to give an unambiguous account of its own normative 
foundations, its own status (Dews 1986: 49). 
What makes Habermas' project unique and challenging is his emphasis on 
an enlightened suspicion of enlightenment, a reasoned critique of western 
rationalism. The point is that reason can only be defended by way of a critique of 
reason. McCarthy (1984: vi) aptly calls him the "last great rationalist". The central 
preoccupation of Habermas in his two volumes of The Theory of Communicative 
Action (Habermas 1984: Vol. I; 1987: Vol. II) is to give an exposition of the 
normative foundations of critical theory by way of a critique of subject-centered 
reason. From the standpoint of critical theory, rational choice theory conceives 
modernity merely in terms of instrumental reason and defends this form of reason. 
On the other hand, Habermas glves a critical exposition of modernity as 
multidimensional and redefines critical theory in terms of a theory of 
communicative rationality and ethics. Communicative action is not a metatheory 
but the beginning of social theory concerned to validate its own critical standards 
(Habermas 1984: xxxix). 
In this chapter, I shall examine Habermas' critical theory of modernity and 
discuss his theory of communicative reason as an alternative way of 
conceptualising social interaction. 
2.1 Communicative Rationality and Lifeworld 
2.2 Habermas' Transformation of Epistemology: Reconstructive Sciences and 
Social Evolution 
58 
2.3 Habermas on Social Interaction 
Strategic rationality and Communicative rationality 
2.1 Communicative Rationality and Lifeworld 
Habermas's central aim in The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. I 
(1984) alld Vol. II (1987) is to sketch a critical theory of modernity that suggests a 
redirection rather than an abandonment of the project of the enlightenment. It is by 
way of examining Weber's theory of the rationalisation process that Habermas 
elaborates his theory of communicative action. He takes Weber's analysis of 
rationalisation as a point of entry to discuss modernity. 
It is important to note the differences between Weber's and Habermas' 
characterisations of the cultural legacy of modernity. Habermas uses the notion of 
communicative reason as the key to a systematic reconstruction of the 
development of modem structures of consciousness and he thinks this development 
can be understood as a gain in rationality for the human species. Habermas' point 
of entry to address this complex question is Weber's theory of rationalisation. He 
then modifies Weber, in accordance with the communicative model. Habermas 
(1984: 140) characterises his approach to Weber as a "flexible exploration and 
deliberate exploitation". Undoubtedly specialists will find much to contest in his 
treatment of Weber. For present purposes, I am not concerned with such problems, 
but only with the role it plays in communicative rationality. 
The starting point of Habermas is that Weber employed an unclarified 
concept of rationality in analysing the process of disenchantment in the history of 
religion which is said to have fulfilled the necessary internal conditions for the 
appearance of occidental rationalism. In his analysis of societal rationalisation as it 
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makes its way in the modern period, Weber allows himself to be guided by the 
restricted idea of purposive rationality. 
Because Weber construed rationalisation in terms of the increasing 
dominance of purposive rationality, so he did not adequately grasp the 
selectivity of capitalist rationalisation or its causes. Following him in 
essential respects, Horkheimer and Adorno were led to deny any trace 
of reason in the structures and institutions of modern life. In Habermas' 
view this diagnosis misinterprets the very real distortions of modernity 
and underestimates its equally real accomplishments and as yet 
unrealised potentials (McCarthy 1984: xxxvi). 
The discontents of modernity are not rooted in rationalisation as such, 
but in the failure to develop and institutionalise all the different 
dimensions of reason in a balanced way (McCarthy 1984: xxxvii). 
Elucidating the concept of rationalisation Weber traces that long process of 
development from the breakdown of magical-mythical ways of seeing the world to 
the emergence of the Protestant ethic which allowed purposive rationality to be 
motivationally and institutionally anchored in such a way that capitalist 
rationalisation could finally take off. It is no simple matter to link all of Weber's 
statements together into a cohesive, multi-dimensional account of the different 
senses and degrees of rationalisation which are invC?lved in that process. 
Habermas does not think that such an account can be given unless 
significant changes are made. Habermas' contention is that the root problem is that 
Weber's theoretical framework is too restricted to grasp adequately the range of 
phenomena he hoped to take account of. The task Habermas sets for himself is to 
rethink Weber's theory, using the communicative model's resources to overcome its 
difficulties. The ultimate purpose of thi~ undertaking is not simply the interpretive 
one of generating greater coherence; it is rather the provision of a richer account of 
what Weber saw as the costs of modernisation or rationalisation: the loss of 
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freedom in an increasingly bureaucratised society and the loss of meaning or unity 
in a fully disenchanted world. 
From Habermas' (1984: 186-215) perspective, Weber's analysis of 
rationalisation is interesting on three different levels: worldviews, societal 
rationalisation, differentiation of various cultural value spheres. In his sociological 
study of religion, Weber analysed that process of disenchanment, whereby the 
magical-mythical view of the world broke down under the influence of what he 
called "world religions" (Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam). The 
universal hallmark of such religious-metaphysical worldviews is that they represent 
the cosmos as a coherent, meaningful whole, within which an explanation for 
'suffering' is given as well as directions for the sort of life conduct which is 
necessary to earn salvation from that suffering. Weber was particularly interested 
to show how this universal rationalisation process happened, in the west, to give 
rise also to a process of societal rationalisation, that is, a rapid increase in the 
degree to which areas of social life, economy and administration, were organised 
according to criteria of formal, purposive rationality. For Weber the answer was 
the Protestant ethic. 
Weber connected rationalisation at the level of worldviews with, on the one 
hand, the societal form of rationalisation and, on the other, the rationalisation of 
worldviews which also results in a differentiation of various value spheres. 
Habermas (1984: 143, 279-286) argues that Weber's analysis of modernity as 
rationalisation process was restricted on two counts: 
In the first place, in his analysis of the emergence of the modem world view, 
primarily in the light of the evolution of world religions, Weber focused on the 
dimension of the ethical transformation of such world religions and overlooked 
developments in the scientific cognitive and the aesthetic-practical spheres. 
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Habermas (1984: 233-34) strongly emphasises that the decentration of the 
worldview in modernity results not primarily in the dualistic ontology which 
juxtaposes a normatively regulated social life - "a sphere of values" - to objectivity 
- "a sphere of facts" - but in the differentiation of three realms. These are "world", 
"society" and "self". These categories are not ontological but referential ones: they 
designate an objective domain of facts, a normatively regulated intersubjective 
sphere and a subjective domain of the selfs inner experiences. Such a decentered 
worldview allows the acting and knowing subject to adopt different basic attitudes 
toward the same world. These differentiated spheres become accessible for 
cognition and action in different modes: their separation from one another also 
seems to render fluid the attitudes with which the knowing and acting self can 
relate to these worlds attitudes which are named by Habermas (1984: 237) the 
"objectifying", the "norm-conformative", and the "expressive". Only when these 
three basic attitudes toward the three worlds become cognitive possibilities are we 
presented with the full range of the rationalisation potential contained in the demise 
of world religions. 
In the second place, this cognitive potential becomes anchored in social life in the 
institutionalisation of. cognitive, normative, and aesthetic ideas in cultural action 
systems. The differentiation of science and technology, law and ethics, and 
aesthetics in modernity is accompanied by their institutionalisation in universities 
and research academies, legal and juridical professions, and an autonomous realm 
of art production and criticism. Through such institutionalisation, modes of 
appropriating cognitive, social, and subjective values become reflexive, i.e., 
increasingly subject to discourse validation and argumentation. As argumentative 
modes of generating beliefs and procedures for testing them are institutionalised, 
the rationality of such processes is seen to lie increasingly in their procedural 
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characteristics rather than in their substantive content. The rationality of belief 
systems is attributed, first and foremost, to the procedures through which they are 
acquired and through which they can be revised or refuted. 
However, in Weber's mind, societal rationalisation had only one possible 
course to take: the spread of spheres of societal rationalisation was identified with 
purposive rationalisation. But, for Habermas, such an identification is not 
necessary. Habermas argues one can open up the question of whether purposive 
rationalisation is the only possible way of developing that broader potential for the 
rationalisation of action which is made available with the culture of modernity. 
Habermas argues that western modernisation constitutes only a one-sided 
utilisation of the rationality potential of modernity. The important implication that 
would follow is that one could see the dilemma of loss of meaning and loss of 
freedom against the background of counterfactually projected possibilities for 
organising social action differently. 
The idea is that the modern social world is composed of a number of 
distinct provinces of activity, each having its own dignity and its own immanent 
-
norms. Instead of conflating 'enlightenment reason' with instrumental reason, 
Habermas sees in modernity increasing potential for more congenial kinds of social 
and political interaction organised around "talk" rather than strategy. This contrast 
between instrumental reason and communicative reason is a constant theme in 
Habermas'work. 
In order to open up the conceptual space for such inquiry, Habermas 
introduces the concept of rationalised lifeworld to complement his theory of 
communicative action. Habermas' specific interest to flesh out the notion of 
rationalisation of worldviews requires that one possess a clear theoretical 
framework, in terms of which one systematically generates insights. Weber does 
not seem to have had one. Disenchanment signifies a breakdown of a sociocentric 
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consciousness of a seamless magical-mythical world and the construction of a 
decentered consciousness which recognises clear demarcations between the 
natural, social, and subjective worlds. And again the demarcation of formal world 
concepts also means increasing recognition of the differentiated system of validity 
claims corresponding to the three worlds. This change can be described as a 
process of rationalisation because it enhances the learning capacity of mankind. It 
does this because it provides actors with the conceptual means of constructing a 
reflexive or self critical perspective. 
Habermas stresses that the destruction of the unity of reason does not 
mean a general loss of rationality. Even if, as regards the substantive content of 
ideologies and worldviews, the loss of meaning is irreversible, the unity of reason 
can be preserved via those communicative processes through which validity claims 
can be redeemed. The new paradigm of rationality is not substantive but 
'discursive'; it thematises not the content but the form of those necessary 
argumentation procedures in light of which the validity claims of "truth", 
"rightness", and "truthfulness" are settled. 
Habermas (1984: 234-5) connects each of the three cultural value spheres 
( cognitive, normative, and aesthetic) with corresponding interest positions, or 
"orders of life", that regulate the possession of "ideal goods": science/knowledge, 
religion/morality, and art/taste and "material goods": economy/wealth, 
politics/power, counterculture/love. These value spheres are logically irreducible to 
one another. So construed, none of the three rationality complexes is capable of 
exerting a structure-building influence on society as a whole; as a consequence, 
value-rational orientations are entirely uprooted from their religious base and are 
replaced by instrumental and hedonistic modes of conduct. The resulting loss of 
freedom- is in part symptomatic of the disappearance of moral autonomy. What 
emerges is a model of selective rationalisation in which society, culture, and 
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personality are overburdened with integration problems while at the same time 
being threatened with absorption into the combined economic-bureaucratic 
apparatus. 
" ... the tensions among the ever more rationalised spheres of life go 
back in fact to an incompatibility of abstract standards of value and 
aspects of validity, or rather to a partial and therefore imbalanced 
rationalisation - for example, to the fact that the capitalist economy and 
modern administration expand at the expense of other domains of life 
that are structurally disposed to moral-practical and expressive forms 
of rationality and squeeze them into forms of economic or 
administrative rationality" (Habermas 1984: 183). 
Habermas does not deny that the freedom to adopt differing attitudes 
toward the three domains of reality 
can become a source of conflict as soon as different cultural value 
spheres simultaneously penetrate the same institutional domains, so 
that rationalisation processes of different types compete with one 
another in the same place (Habermas 1984: 244-45). 
But Habermas adds that 
cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical, and the aesthetic-expressive 
orientations of action ought not to become so independently embodied 
in antagonistic orders of life that they overburden the personality 
system's average capacity for integration and lead to permanent 
conflicts between lifestyles (Habermas 1984: 244-245). 
The three value spheres - cognitive/instrumental, moral/practical, and 
aesthetic/expressive - are stabilised in permanent," cumulative learning processes, 
and these demarcate value spheres possessing their own "inner logics" and capable 
ofbeing"organised into professional discourses. 
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Reflexivity is a general characteristic of modem belief systems, 
institutionalised in the specialised discourses of science, jurisprudence, and 
aesthetics. For Habermas, increased reflexivity and the differentiation of value 
spheres result in a loss of meaning for the modem individual, but this loss also 
strengthens those communicative processes through which alone a sense of validity 
can be regained. Suppose that one were to raise the following objection: whatever 
one's evaluation of this process the argument concerning the binding nature of 
reflexivity begs the question. Certainly self-questioning, the justification of one's 
standpoint through reasoned argumentation, analysis of implicit and explicit 
presuppositions, and the like have been ideals in western culture. 
Like Weber, Habermas maintains that cultural modernisation processes are 
in some sense irrevocable (Benhabib 1986: 275-7). In establishing this point, he 
often utilises arguments drawn from cognitive-developmental theories, which 
maintain that in a normal course of development, the individual will make the 
transition from one stage to another in a sequence which is irreversible. Once 
having attained stage four, adolescents do not fall back to stage two unless 
functioning as a normal human being is impaired by conditions of severe trauma, 
breakdown, shock, and the like. Of course, this covers a number of problems. One 
would want to know more precisely what these debilitating conditions are or could 
be. 
Habermas claims that factually there has been an increase of rationality, 
cumulative learning process, in these three spheres - the cognitive-instrumental, the 
moral-practical, and the aesthetic-expressive ones. But equally he means that 
normatively one ought not to equate loss of meaning with a loss of rational 
potential in modem culture. The loss of meaning can be attributed to the cultural 
impoverishment of the lifeworld in the wake of the emergence of a culture of 
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experts who are in tum incapable of transmitting the achievements of science and 
art back to the lifeworld. 
This is described as a process of rationalisation because it enhances the 
learning capacity of mankind. It does this because it provides actors with the 
conceptual means of constructing a reflexive or self critical perspective~ that is, the 
categorical scaffolding constituted by the system of three world relations and 
corresponding validity claims makes possible an articulated consideration and 
evaluation of alternative interpretations of what is the case, what is legitimate and 
what is authentic self expression. It is this complex multidimensional learning 
potential of modernity that Habermas wants to emphasise, not just the mastering of 
formal, operational modes of cognition, leading to the capacity to do science and 
technology. The latter logocentric emphasis is in fact what has often led to an 
uncritical self-interpretation of the modem world that is fixated on knowing and 
mastering external nature. 
In order for this enhanced learning potential which emerges with the 
rationalisation of worldviews to be set free, it must be crystallised into separate, 
" . 
"specialised forms of argumentation" which are institutionalised in corresponding 
cultural spheres. The communicative model gives Habermas what he thinks is a 
deeper understanding, of that process of cultural rationalisation which begins with 
disenchantment and comes to fruition in the institutional anchoring of specialised 
forms of argumentation. This institutionalisation takes the following form. 
a) the establishment of a scientific enterprise in which empirical-
scientific problems can be dealt with according to internal truth 
standards, independently of theological doctrines and separately from 
basic moral-practical questions~ b) the institutionalisation of an artistic 
enterprise in which the production of art is gradually set loose from 
cultic-ecclesiastical and courtly-patronal bonds, and the reception of 
works of art by an art-enjoying public readers, spectators, and listeners 
is mediated through professionalised aesthetic criticism and c) the 
professional intellectual treatment of questions of ethics, political 
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theory, and jurisprudence in schools of law, in the legal system, and in 
the legal public sphere (Habermas 1984: 165-66,340). 
It is in relation to this overall process of cultural rationalisation that 
Habermas wants to stake his universalist claim. He asserts that 
If we do not frame occidental rationalism from the conceptual 
perspective of purposive rationality and mastery of the world, if instead 
we take as our point of departure the rationalisation of worldviews that 
results in a decentered understanding of the world, then we have to 
face the question, whether there is not a formal stock of universal 
consciousness expressed in the cultural value spheres that develop, 
according to their own logics, under the abstract standards of truth, 
normative rightness, and authenticity. Are or are not the structures of 
scientific thought, posttraditional legal and moral representations, and 
autonomous art, as they have developed in the framework of Western 
culture, the possession of that "community of civilised men" that is 
present as a regulative idea? The universalist position does not have to 
deny the pluralism and the incompatibility of historical versions of 
"civilised humanity"; but it regards this multiplicity of forms of life as 
limited to cultural contents, and it asserts that every culture must share 
certain formal properties of the modern understanding of the world, if 
it is at all to attain a certain degree of "conscious awareness" or 
"sublimation." (Habermas 1984: 180). 
Habermas argues that once this universally significant process of cultural 
rationalisation is conceptualised then one can properly understand the process of 
societal rationalisation. Habermas introduces another equally important concept, 
called the 'lifeworld' to supplement his theory of communicative action. The 
distinctiveness ofHabermas's concept oflifeworld enters in modifying it in terms of 
rationalised lifeworld. The formal system of world relations and corresponding 
validity claims come to constitute, in the modern world, general structures of the 
lifeworld, that is, structures which remain the same even within different particular 
lifeworlds and forms of life. As these basic structures of modern consciousness are 
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institutionalised in differentiated cultural spheres, crucial change occurs in the 
relationship between action and lifeworld. 
To the degree that the institutionalised production of knowledge that is 
specialised according to cognitive, normative, aesthetic validity claims 
penetrates to the level of everyday communication and replaces 
traditional knowledge in its interaction-guiding functions, there is a 
rationalisation of everyday practice that is accessible only from the 
perspective of action oriented to reaching understanding - a 
rationalisation of action systems like the economy and the state. In a 
rationalised lifeworld the need for achieving understanding is met less 
and less by a reservoir of traditionally certified interpretations immune 
from criticism; at the level of a completely decentered understanding of 
the world, the need for consensus must be met more and more 
frequently by risky, because rationally motivated, agreement 
(Habermas 1984: 340). 
In a rationalised lifeworld then, the formal scaffolding of modem structures 
of consciousness can increasingly be used by the individual as a framework in 
terms of which new experiences are accommodated to the stock of unproblematic, 
substantive background convictions which constitute his lifeworld. As this occurs, 
each agent's .. own critical capacities are increasingly rationalised. Ancl this means 
actions are not guided by some authority or tradition but are subjected to 
discursive reasoning. In sum, Habermas introduces a second dimension to societal 
rationalisation, one that transpires "more in the implicitly known structures of the 
lifeworld than in explicitly known action orientations". 
The question is, how does a society reproduce itself both symbolically and 
materially? Within Habermas's theoretical framework, the question of symbolic 
reproduction is the same as the question: how is the lifeworld reproduced? 
Communicative action plays an important role in the reproduction of the lifeworld, 
that is, in how communicative action generates ongoing patterns of social relations 
and the integration of individuals irito them. Communicative action now becomes 
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interesting as a "principle of sociation". And one of the hallmarks of modernity is 
the enhanced role of this principle in organising the symbolic reproduction of 
society. 
In order to grasp the reproduction process adequately the notion of the 
lifeworld must be further articulated. The diffuse notion of "unproblematic 
background" is simply too undifferentiated as it stands. In searching for a way to 
elaborate this notion, Habermas finds that no existing theories of the lifeworld 
satisfactorily grasp the breadth of what actually constitutes the unproblematic 
background of action. Different thinkers have focused on the lifeworld as a cultural 
storehouse, or as a source of expectations about the ordering of social relations, or 
as a milieu out of which individual competences for speech and action are formed. 
Habermas (1984: 167) wants to emphasis the fact that part of what constitutes a 
rationalised lifeworld is its "structural differentiation" of precisely these three 
dimensions: culture, society and personality . 
The consequence of the structural differentiation of the 'lifeworld' into 
culture, society and personality also leads one to think in terms of differentiated 
processes of reproduction. These processes are identified by Habermas 'as "cultural 
reproduction, social integration, and socialisation". Habermas maintains that 
the unity of rationality in the multiplicity of value spheres rationalised 
according to inner logics is secured precisely at the formal level of the 
argumentative redemption of validity claims (Habermas 1984: 249). 
Given his admission that arguments play different roles with different 
degrees of discursive "binding force" depending on whether they are 'cognitive', 
'normative' or 'aesthetic', such a claim can hardly be expected to carry much 
conviction. The rational decentering of consciousness that allows actors to adopt 
different attitudes with respect to different domains of reality provides Habermas 
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with the reference points required to construct a nonselective model of social 
rationalisation. Such a model depicts those rationalisable action systems that must 
not be subordinated to laws intrinsic to heterogeneous orders of life if 
institutionalisation of the three value spheres is to proceed toward balanced 
equilibrium. 
The concept of lifeworld (Habermas 1987: 119) has its roots in the 
phenomenological and hermeneutical tradition before it underwent reconstruction 
in Habermas' critical social theory. Habermas agrees with the phenemenological 
tradition that the lifeworld designates the horizon of unthematised, intuitive, and 
always already assumed expectations, definitions, and modes of orientation. Social 
action always occurs against the background of such a horizon; in each case, it is 
only a specific and limited segment of the lifeworld which is drawn into the action 
situation. Only the framework of communicative rationality can do justice to the 
three dimensionality of the lifeworld. This means that the first, lifeworld is the 
domain of cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialisation. Second, the 
lifeworld must not be viewed as transcendentally constituted, but as one that. is 
reproduced over time and whose structures change. Against the atemporality of 
phenomenological analysis, Habermas insists that symbolic reproduction must be 
understood as a dynamic and temporal process. Both these theses are grounded in 
a third: linguistically mediated communicative action can fulfil all three functions of 
symbolic reproduction. Communicative action serves the transmission of cultural 
knowledge, of action coordination, and identity formation. The concept of 
lifeworld is complementary to communicative action. If one does not interpret the 
term 'constitution' as the achievement of a transcendental ego but as symbolic 
-
reproduction, one could say that in a sense the lifeworld is both constitutive of, and 
constituted by, communicative action. 
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Communicative action unfolds against this background of a semantically 
interpreted sociallifeworld. It is the uniqueness of language that it can constitute it 
own reflective medium. In speaking, any of the validity claims which we take for 
granted can be challenged. When this background consensus breaks down, it can 
only be re-established via special argumentation procedures. It is possible to reach 
an understanding only by giving reasons to re-establish the validity of criticisable 
claims. Such reasons can be cited with reference to the three domains of external 
reality, which first become clearly differentiated from one another in modernity: 
these are the objective, the social, and the subjective worlds. In speaking we make 
reference to the world about us which we conceive of as the arena in which to 
carry out our. action plans; to the social world, the rules and nonns of which 
constrain us to act in certain ways rather than in others; and to our own subjective 
world of feelings, .. desires, and intentions. Communicative action has a threefold 
world reference (Habermas 1984: 88-9). These frameworks of reference, named 
the world, society and self are the pragmatic presuppositions of ollr ~peech acts: a 
cognitively interpreted external reality, a nonnatively interpreted social one, and an 
-
individually interpreted subjective sphere. In each of these domains agreement, 
once lost, can be reestablished by argumentation processes. We can thematise the 
validity claims of the truth of propositions which refer to the external world, the 
rightness or correctness of the nonns which are invoked by them, and the 
authenticity or sincerity of a speaker's reference to his or her inner world. 
Language can serve as a medium of action coordination only because it 
allows us to continue and reestablish, via argumentation, a background consensus 
of the institutionalised value spheres, i.e. science, morality and aesthetics 
(Habennas 1984: 94-5). 
The key to Habermas' notion of reaching understanding is the possibility of 
using good reasons or grounds to gain intersubjective recognition for criticisable 
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claims. In fact, Habermas' claim is even stronger: he maintains that· not only 
reaching understanding but understanding as such is only possible if we would 
know hypothetically what it would mean to redeem the claims to validity of certain 
utterances. 
The claim has been named the cognitivist or rationalist core of Habermas' 
concept of action. For he maintains that the linguistic achievements of ordinary 
social actors presuppose a core of communicative competence, the essential aspect 
of which is the ability to continue and reestablish a lost consensus via 
argumentative processes in which reasons are advanced, debated, and evaluated. 
This communicative competence is said to be the essential medium through which 
the coordination of social action, the reproduction of cultural meanings, and 
individual socialisation take place. This means that social individuals can 
accomplish all three functions because they are able cognitively to judge the 
validity of certain claims on the basis of reasons advanced to back them up. 
There are number of ways of settling disputed claims - for example by 
appeal to authority, to tradition or to brute force. One way, the giving 
of reasons-for and reasons-against has traditionally been regarded as 
fundamental to the idea of rationality (McCarthy 1984: x). 
In developing the model of communicative action, Habermas finally intends 
to break with the paradigm of the "philosophy of consciousness". From Descartes 
to HusserI, from F euerbach to Adorno, the philosophical tradition has offered two 
models of the self: either the thinking, cogitative self or the active one 
appropriating and transforming nature. Either a lonely self cogitates upon an 
object, or an active self shapes the world. At least since Hegel's revival of Aristotle, 
attempts have been made in the modern tradition to understand intersubjectivity 
and the relation between selves as well. But the focus has been on consciousness, 
not on language-in-use~ As Hegel put it, "a consciousness faces another 
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consciousness". Habermas maintains that neither the approach of continental 
philosophy which reduces interaction to a form of inter-consciousness, nor the 
debates concerning "other minds" predominant in analytic philosophy, can grasp 
the integrity of social interaction. Both approaches proceed from my mind to your 
mind, from my consciousness to your consciousness. Following an insight of 
Mead, Habermas claims that the "self' becomes an "I" by interacting with other 
selves. 
The Cartesian paradigm of the solitary thinker as the proper, even 
unavoidable, framework for radical reflection on knowledge and 
morality dominated philosophical thought in the early modem period. 
The methodological solipsism it entailed marked the approach of Kant 
at the end of the eighteenth century no less than that of his empiricist 
and rationalist predecessors in the two preceding centuries. This 
mono logical approach preordained certain ways of posing the basic 
problems of thought and action: subject versus object, reason versus 
sense (McCarthy 1984: vii). 
Neither has grasped the suppressed traces of reason that provide the better 
grounding for a critical social theory of modernity (Pusey 1987: 15) The 
explication of the conceptual relationship among communication, argumentation, 
and reaching understanding through 'reasons' serves Habermas empirically to 
explicate the meaning of the rationalisation of the lifeworld in modernity. By 
rationalisation of lifeworld is meant nothing other than the increase in 
argumentative practices within the everyday world in the three crucial domains of 
action coordination, the reproduction of cultural tradition, and socialisation. Thus 
the rationalisation of the lifeworld takes place via these three institutionalised 
interrelated processes. 
In the first place, the decentration of the modem worldview and the 
emergence of a dualistic ontology sharply distinguishes nature from culture, the 
external from the social world. 
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In the second place, this decentration of the worldview is accompanied by 
an increasing differentiation of the once-unified value spheres of science, morality, 
religion, law, aesthetics, and by institutionalisation of discourses aiming at working 
out the internal logic of these spheres. 
In the third place, the rationalisation of the lifeworld results in an increase 
in reflexivity. The rationalisation of the lifeworld brings with it an increase in 
reflexive, argumentation modes of coming to grips with the contents of the socio-
cultural universe as well as a reflexive reappropriation of the resources of the 
Iifeworld. 
In his Legitimation Crisis (1975: 45-50) Habermas attempts to reveal the 
immanent crisis tendencies of rationalisation processes. Since his early essays on 
Theory and Practice (1973), one of Habermas' chief concerns has been to show 
that the subject of modernity entailed a moral and political potential which could 
not be exhausted by the achievements of a primarily technical reason. In breaking 
with the utopian project of reconciliation with inner and outer nature as postulated 
by Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, Habermas turned to this practical legacy of 
modernity. The thrust behind the distinction between the rationalisation of 
"systems of action" on the one hand and that of the "lifeworld" on the other is to 
suggest that the latter contains processes and achievements whose normative 
potential we have not yet exhausted. 
Habermas introduces a differentiated sociological model which in the first 
instance distinguishes between 'system' and 'social' integration. Briefly explicated, 
the distinction between system integration and social integration is the following: 
by the former is meant a mode co-ordinating social action through the functional 
-
interconnection of action consequences, whereas social integration refers to the 
coordination of action through the harmonising of action orientations. The 
institutional differentiation of modem societies into the polity, the economy, and 
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the family meant that in two domains in particular - the economy and state 
administration - the coordination of social action was functionalised. Both the 
capitalist marketplace, and the modem state, relying on the medium of money as 
well as formal, juridical power, generate a series of social actions that influence one 
another through their unintended consequences. Behind the back of individuals and 
unintended by them, their actions give rise to other actions and reactions such that 
a domain of quasi self-regulating mechanism arises. But for Habermas, system 
integration refers only to one of the modes in which modem societies coordinate 
the action of individuals. The system perspective must be completed by the 
perspective of social integration (labour and interaction~ work and politics). 
Social integration means that individuals orient their actions to one another 
because they cognitively understand the social rules of action in question. Put in a 
nutshell, the thesis of The Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas 1987) is 
that rationalisation processes are paradoxical because they undermine the very 
rationality of the lifeworld which first made societal rationalisation possible. The 
rationalisation of the lifeworld, initiated by modernity, contains an emancipatory 
potential which is threatened by the dynamics of societal rationalisation spurred on 
by capitalist growth. The distinction between system and social integration in the 
legtimation crisis is the forerunner of the distinction between system and lifeworld 
in the TTCA (1987). As in Legitimation Crisis, in the present work as well, by 
'system', Habermas means that social life can also be viewed as quasi-purposive 
whole, where the unintended consequences of social actions come together to yield 
functional interdependencies. Such functionally interdependent systems of action 
can regulate themselves, adapt to the environment, "assume capacities of problem 
-
solving, and the like. Habermas maintains that the systemic perspective on society, 
which is always developed from the point of view of an observer, must be 
supplemented by the internal perspective of social actors. 
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The real methodological contribution of the TTCA (1987) consists in the 
introduction of the concept of lifeworld as the correlate of the concept of 
communicative action and in the explication of how communicative action can 
carry out the three functions of social integration, cultural reproduction, and 
socialisation. 
Making this distinction between the rationalisation of "systems action" and 
of the "lifeworld" allows one to see that the "iron cage" of modernity is not as 
sturdy as it might first appear, and that late capitalist societies contain many 
contradictions. The pathologies of the lifeworld (Habermas 1987: 143) arise in 
three domains: in the sphere of culture reproduction, the consequence is a loss of 
meaning; in the sphere of social integration, anomie emerges; and as regards 
personality, we are faced with psychopathologies. 
Habermas (1987: 153; 170-72) provides an analysis of social rationalisation 
from the dual perspective of society as "system" and "lifeworld" and a clarification 
of the way in which the normative principle of discourse ethics, via the model of 
communicative action, is reflected in institutions of the life-world. 
The systemllifeworld distinction is introduced by Habermas both as a 
distinction between two analytic perspectives that the social theorist can adopt and 
as a real distinction between two different institutional orders in modern societies: 
institutions that are largely integrated through consensually accepted norms 
(society as life-world) and institutions that are largely defined by their capacity to 
respond to the functional requirements imposed by the environment (society as 
system). Habermas (1987: 145-47) has insisted that this distinction is crucial for his 
analysis of the 'crisis tendencies' that can be found in modern societies: in short, 
-
'social pathologies' arise whenever the attempt to meet the requirements of 'system' 
maintenance spill over into domains of the 'lifeworld' properly integrated on the 
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basis of normatively secured or consensual interactions. Habermas refers to this 
process as 'colonisation of the lifeworld'. 
The distinction between system and lifeworld (Habermas 1987: 153-170) is 
also important in that it enables Habermas to identify two different sides to the 
process of social rationalisation: on the one hand, rationalisation is conceived as 
the differentiation of subsystems from the sociocultural lifeworld (and from each 
other) and an increase in system complexity-this is the aspect of social 
rationalisation predominant in the work of classical sociologists such as Weber, 
Durkheim, and Parsons. On the other hand, Habermas also speaks of the potential 
for increased (communicative) rationalisation within a lifeworld that has to a large 
degree been relieved of tasks taken over by the subsystems. What is central to this 
aspect of social rationalisation is not the expansion of formal instrumental reason 
to further dimensions of social life, but an opening up of processes of symbolic 
reproduction to consensual agreement among autonomous individuals in light of 
criticisable validity claims. 
In a similar vein, at the end of Legitimation Crisis (1975), Habermas. 
argued that the impact of the monetary bureaucratic system upon the life-world 
would lead to an increased demand for participation and legitimation whose 
possibility would depend upon the presence of meaning and value orientations in 
the culture that could be reactivated such as to generate new motivational patterns 
for individuals. A crisis of legitimation was likely when expectations were 
generated which could not be satisfied within available patterns of value or through 
other compensatory mechanisms. Legitimation crisis presupposes a motivation 
crisis. Habermas pointed to certain transformation in· the culture of late-capitalist 
-
societies, like the decline of civic, familial relations and maintained that bourgeois 
and pre-bourgeois traditions had been replaced by ideologies like scientism and 
universalist morality. To say that the structures of communicative rationality are 
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irrevocable can mean only the following: the legacy contains a potential which we 
would like to see realised, and for which we are ready to engage ourselves. The 
theory of cultural modernity is not a philosophy of history but a critical theory with 
practical-emancipatory intent. The fulfilment of this legacy is a practical question, 
not a theoretical one. The question here is: does such a demand for the fulfilment 
of modem reason project the image of a future we would like to make own? 
Habermas wants to claim that the decentered worldview and the reflexive 
differentiation of value spheres are constitutive of communicative rationality, and 
that such a structure of rationality and its constituents are quasi-transcendental. 
irrevocable, and binding upon us. Consequently to deny this leads to "performative 
contradiction": critiques employ reason in order to attack reason. 
Following Habermas, it can be argued that modernity has potential for 
different forms of rationality. Therefore, to presume strategic rationality and its 
universality as the only form of rationality which best explains human behaviour is 
a naive conclusion. Against the unidimensional and mono logical version of reason 
in rational choice theory, Habermas put forth his multidimensional rationalisation, 
thesis. Modernity does not constitute only instrumental reason. Of course, 
recognising this plurality of modernity in differentiation of value spheres he also 
prescribes language as a universal mode of regulating different spheres. The 
question is, is rational choice conception of rationality unidimensional? 
The project of an emancipated society does not entail the rejection of the 
cultural legacy of the modems, but its completion. One must distinguish the 
distortions caused by the one sided rationalisation of the economy and the 
administration under capitalism from the rationalisation of life world. It is the 
-
destructive dynamics which must be reversed. The constituents of cultural 
modernity -:.. decentration, reflexivity, and the differentiation of value spheres - are 
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binding criteria of rationality. The project of emancipated society implies the 
fulfilment of communicative rationality, not its transfiguration. 
2.2 Habermas's transformation of epistemology: social evolution and the 
reconstructive sciences 
Habermas' account of modernisation as rationalisation relies upon the 
concept of "reconstructive sciences" (Habermas 1979: 178-179). The aim of such 
'reconstructive sciences' is to make individuals aware of the rule competencies 
which they always already practice as an implicit know-how. Reconstructions serve 
the task of self-reflection in the sense of making individuals aware of what they 
already know. However, unlike transcendental philosophy, reconstructive theorems 
do not assume that such deep structures are ahistorical, non-evolving frameworks 
(Rasmussen 1990: 20-7). On the contrary, Habermas views such deep structures as 
patterns of rule competencies which evolve in the history of the individual and of 
the species. 
Social change cannot be observed from the standpoint of the observer 
alone. There are aspects of social evolution which must be viewed as sequences in 
a developmental logic and which can be reconstructed internally, that is, 
insightfully recapitulated from the perspective of the participants. Social 
development presupposes social learning: at any given stage, it must be possible to 
identify problems to which social agents respond in meaningful ways~ these 
responses subsequently may be institutionalised. Social innovation occurs through 
the answers that social agents give to the ever new· problems of their life-world. 
Through institutionalisation, the experiences leading to a specific answer set 
become part of the material and cultural history of society. These previous answers 
are available to social agents as the legacy of the past; they reproduce their life-
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world by recapitulating these already available answers while creating and seeking 
new ones. The concept of the reproduction of the lifeworld thus presupposes the 
related notion of a learning process as an internally reconstructable sequence 
meaningful to participants themselves. 
Habermas maintains that if it can be shown that criteria of communicative 
rationality are the results of learning processes that can be meaningfully 
reconstructed, then their quasi-transcendental status can be redeemed. They would 
then be shown to be deep structures underlying cognitive and interactive human 
competencies. These competencies are indeed changing and evolving but their 
evolution represents an internally compelling sequence. 
Since Kant, the goal of transcendental arguments has been to establish the 
necessity and uniqueness of certain conceptual presuppositions (e.g., the pure 
concepts of understanding) and structural conditions (e.g., the necessary synthetic 
unity of consciousness). Such necessity may be logical in nature, or it may be 
"quasi empirical", as for example when we claim that unless we can distinguish 
between subjective experiences and intersubjectively shared common ones, n~ 
human self-consciousness ascribable to a continuing self is possible. While 
arguments concerning logical necessity can be developed in a straightforward 
manner, the greatest difficulty faced by transcendental philosophies, and which 
have led many critics to question their viability altogether, is the claim that there 
can be such "quasi-empirical" necessity. 
Reconstructions in the sense suggested by Habermas can by no means meet 
the stringent requirements of transcendental arguments. First, since such 
reconstructions of action and speech competencies are developed by synthesising 
-
the conclusions of generative linguistics, genetic epistemology, and cognitive 
psychology, they are more empirical than transcendental. 
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There are three possible lines of response Habermas may provide in defense 
of the cogency of his rational reconstructions. The first claims that rational 
reconstructions are more empirical than transcendental; the second emphasises the 
form/content distinction and the third points to the empirical fiuitfulness of 
reconstructive studies. In fact the very concept of quasi-transcendental may be a 
misnomer. What distinguishes rational reconstructions from other accounts like 
hermeneutic and deconstructionist accounts is not their special philosophical status, 
but their empirical fiuitfulness in generating further research. 
Communicative action is not a novel theme in Habermas' work. In his 
earlier work Kllowledge alld Human Illterests (Habermas 1970b), Habermas 
attempted to follow the Kantian transcendental route, giving an analysis of the 
formal, universal and necessary conditions and structures of linguistic interaction. 
Such a transcendental analysis is supposed to reveal the basic universal norms 
underlying all possible speech. This analysis of universal and unavoidable 
conditions leads to the insight that speech is oriented to unconstrained consensus; 
as a norm, consensus functions both as a foundation and a regulative ideal, a basis. 
and a goal, for actual acts of communication. It can become the moral and 
epistemic basis for emancipatory interests in autonomy, beyond cognitive interests 
in control. In his latter formulation, Habermas rejected this philosophical and 
transcendental justification of communicative action. 
Habermas became increasingly skeptical of a purely transcendental 
justification of his claims about communication, although not about their content 
and political implications. He shifted to the second approach in order to transform 
the search for reflective transcendental foundations into the social scientific search 
-
for certain empirically universal processes of learning. While the claim to 'reason' 
made by Kant and the enlightenment needs to be defended, the transcendental role 
of philosophy itself as the final tribunal of reason cannot be. 
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In the broadest sense, Habermas's project is that of resolving what he takes 
to be the underlying problem of modem self consciousness which first emerged at 
the end of the eighteenth century, after the high water of the enlightenment. 
Modem consciousness is marked from this point on by a search for self-assurance, 
or a search for some standards which are both made available by that 
consciousness and yet can provide some normative guide for it in modem life. 
Modernity, in other words, "must create its normativity out of itself" (White 1988: 
91). And it is Habermas's intention to develop just those standards which will allow 
modernity to interpret itself in a way which is self-critical, but which gives some 
basis for normative self assurance. To achieve these aims he must, in all three 
discussions, succeed in persuading us that reason, rationality and truth, confront us 
in world views, in culture, in history, and in the norms and values that guide 
ordinary human action. 
McCarthy aptly describes Habermas' enterprise as constituting the 
idea of a critical social theory that would be empirical and scientific 
without being reducible to empirical-analytic science, philosophical in 
the sense of critique but not of presuppositionless 'first philosophy,' 
historical but without being historicist, and practical in the sense of 
being oriented to an emancipatory political practice but not to 
technological-administrative control (McCarthy 1979: vi). 
In its post-Kantian form, philosophical thought remains epistemological, 
insofar as it originates in reflection in reason as it is embodied in cognition, speech 
and action. But the only way to approach each of these human capacities, whose 
performance manifests the basic competences of human reason, is through a new 
relationship, to the human, and social' sciences. Epistemology can no longer be 
satisfied with second-order reflection, but must begin with first-order theoretical 
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statements of these abilities themselves, in the self-reflection of those sciences that 
try to understand and explain the products and structures of these abilities, as they 
are evidenced in their exercise and development in human societies. While such a 
critical theory does surrender the historical metaphysical claim to formulate a first 
philosophy, the epistemological claims for reason are now established, discovered 
and warranted in an empirical social inquiry. A foundationalist position in 
philosophy is one which claims that philosophy can, by some method, demonstrate 
the absolute, universal validity of some conception of knowledge or morality. This 
view that there are ahistorical conceptual or moral frameworks existing, as it were, 
above the heads of concrete historical actors, is one which has increasingly fallen 
into general disrepute. Habermas's work has often been suspected of harbouring 
some variant of foundationalism, and yet he has just as often claimed that his is a 
non-foundationalist position. 
Habermas focuses his attempt to retain the normative rather than the 
foundational status of epistemological notions like truth or reason in an empirical 
research program he calls 'the reconstructive sciences'. Their aim is to develop a. 
modest, fallibilistic, empirical and yet universal account of the rationality 
manifested in human activities. Habermas' attempt is to reconstruct the intuitive 
and pretheoretical know-how underlying practices and performances of basic 
human competence. Once the structure of these abilities is understood, their 
acquisition can be analysed as a learning process on both individual and social 
levels. These reconstructions yield universal knowledge about human competence, 
but yet are 'hypothetica1' instead of necessary, 'empirica1' rather than a priori; they 
raise universal, though defeasible, normative claims" to validity useful in social 
criticism of various practices. 
The" general result of Habermas' reconstructive SClences is a theory of 
social evolution, which organises and shows the interrelationships of the sub-
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theories of various individual competences in a general theory of species-wide 
learning. Such a theory is guided by two hypotheses: first, that learning is the basic 
evolutionary mechanism in culture; and second, that homologous patterns exist on 
ontogenetic (the sequence of events involved in the development of an individual 
being) and phylogenetic (the sequence of events involved in the evolution of 
species) levels for the cognitive development of individuals and of the species as a 
whole. Such development is not evolution in Darwinian sense. It is the 
competences and not societies which develop, so that we may count as 
evolutionary any cumulative learning process which has a direction and becomes 
embodied in individual members. Both social institutions and individual 
personalities are related to the current stages in the acquisition of various 
competences of cognition, speaking and acting. These same cognitive abilities can 
be shown, on the level of social theory, to be precisely the mechanisms for the 
reproduction and integration of society. Habermas' theory of social evolution is not 
about the teleological unfolding of a species subject, but rather about processes of 
rationalisation leading in the direction of some epistemic achievement. Haberma~' 
theory is multidimensional, and includes a cognitive dimension, a moral dimension 
and a subjective dimension. 
Habermas describes his theory of social evolution by way of a critique of 
the economic reductionism of historical materialism. His thesis is that 
developments in the sphere of social integration have their own independent logic: 
I am convinced that normative structures do not simply follow the path 
of development of reproductive processes ... but have an internal history 
of their own (Habermas 1979: 117). 
Invoking Aristotle, Habermas insists that praxis cannot be reduced to 
techne, nor rationality to purpOSive or instrumental rationality. Rationalisation 
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processes in the sphere of communicative action are neither identical with· nor an 
immediate consequence of rationalisation processes in the sphere of productive 
forces. The rationalisation of action takes effect not only on productive forces but 
also, and independently, on normative structures (moral representations, norms, 
worldviews, identity formation, law etc.). 
In this connection reconstruction means that one takes a theory apart and 
puts it back together in a new form, in order better to achieve that goal which it set 
for itself The reconstruction of historical materialism aims at a general theory of 
social evolution capable of explaining particular evolutionary developments - above 
all, the transition from primitive societies organised around kinship relations to 
civilisations organised as class societies with a differentiated political system, and 
the transition from developed premodern civilisations to liberal capitalist society, as 
well as the evolution of the latter to the stage of advanced capitalism. The term 
'evolution' implies a conception of cumulative learning processes in which a 
direction can be perceived. 
Habermas argues that 
development of productive forces depends on the application of 
technically useful knowledge~ and the basic institutions of a society 
embody moral-practical knowledge. Progress in these two dimensions 
is measured against the two universal validity claims we also use to 
measure the progress of empirical knowledge and of moral-practical 
insight namely, the truth of propositions and the rightness of norms 
(Habermas 1979: 142). 
Social evolution is conceived as a bidimensional learning process 
(cognitive/technical and moral/pra~tical), the stages of which can be 
described structurally and ordered in a developmental logic. The 
emphasis is not on the institutionalisation of particular contents, but on 
the "institutional embodiment of structures of rationality", which makes 
learning at new levels possible, that is, on learning applied to the 
structural conditions of learning. In one sense it is only socialised 
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individuals who leam~ but the learning ability of individuals provides a 
"resource" that can be drawn upon in the formation of new social 
structures (McCarthy 1979: xxii). 
The categorical distinction between purposive rational action and 
communicative action thus permits us to separate the aspects under 
which action can be rationalised. As learning processes take place not 
only in the dimension of objectivating thought but also in the dimension 
of moral-practical insight, the rationalisation of action is deposited not 
only in forces of production, but also - mediated through the dynamics 
of social movements - in forms of social integration. Rationality 
structures are embodied not only in amplifications of purposive-
rational action-that is, in technologies, strategies, organisations, and 
qualification - but also in mediations of communicative action- in the 
mechanisms for regulating conflict, in the worldviews, and in identity 
formation (Habermas 1979: 120). 
He defends the thesis that the development of these 'normative' structures 
is the pacemaker of social evolution, for new principles of organisation mean new 
forms of social integration and the latter, in turn, make it possible to implement 
available productive forces or to generate new ones, as well as a heightening of 
social complexity. Communicative action has to be understood to analyse the 
symbolic structures that underlie law and morality, an intersubjectively constituted 
world, and the identities of persons and collectivities. In working out the logic of 
development of normative structures, Habermas' strategy is to employ structural 
comparisons with the developmental logic worked out for ontogenetic processes in 
the framework of his theory of communicative competence. The fundamental 
question is, how does the evolutionary step to a new form of social integration 
come about? How is it possible? The descriptive answer of historical materialism is 
through social contradictions and conflicts, political struggle, and social 
movements. But a theory of social evolution requires an analytic response. The 
research program designed to carry through on this suggestion is sufficiently 
articulated to permit a sketch of its main outlines. Habermas proposes that 
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the species learns not only in the dimension of productive forces but 
also in the dimension of moral-practical consciousness decisive for 
structures of interaction. The rules of communicative action do 
develop in reaction to changes in the domain of instrumental and 
strategic action~ but in doing so they follow their own logic (Habermas 
1979: 148). 
The leading idea is that social evolution can be comprehended as a 
learning process, not in the sense of behaviouristic psychology - which 
is not complex enough to grasp more than peripheral learning 
mechanisms - but in the sense of cognitive developmental psychology. 
Central to this approach is the notion of a developmental logic that 
incorporates a distinction between formally characterised levels of 
learning and the learning processes that are possible at each level. 
Drawing on these ideas, Habermas construes organisational principles 
of society as sociocultural innovations that institutionalise 
developmental logic of learning~ they establish the structural conditions 
for technical and practical learning processes at particular stages of 
development. Principles of organisation circumscribe ranges of 
possibility within which institutional systems can vary, productive 
forces can be developed and utilised and system complexity and 
steering capacity can be increased. The concrete embodiments of these 
abstract principles are the institutional nuclei that function as relations 
of production and determine the dominant form of social integration 
(McCarthy 1978: ~46). 
Habermas draws on vanous sources to explain his theory of social 
evolution as constituting a learning process in the development of normative 
structures of social integration. Central to his theory of social evolution is the 
notion of developmental logic. Developmental studies are well underway in a 
number of different areas - psycho linguistics, cognitive psychology (including 
moral consciousness), psychoanalysis (including ego psychology), and social 
interactionism, among others. The task, as Habermas sees it, is to work out an 
integrated framework in which the different dimensions of development are not 
only analytically distinguished but their interconnections systematically taken into 
account. Habermas's proposals are to show the basis of his theory of 
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communication drawn among different dimensions in which an utterance can 
succeed or fail: 'comprehensibility', 'truth', 'rightness' and 'truthfulness'. 
Each of these specifies not only a dimension of communicative action, 
and thus of rationality, but a 'region' of reality - 'language', 'outer 
nature', 'society', and 'inner nature' - in relation to which the subject can 
attain varying degrees of autonomy (McCarthy 1979: xx). 
In both dimensions i.e., the structures of the ego and of worldviews, 
development apparently leads to a growing decentration of interpretive systems 
and to an ever clearer categorical demarcation of the 'subjectivity' of internal nature 
from the 'objectivity' of external nature, as well as from the 'normativity' of social 
reality and the 'intersubjectivity' oflinguistic reality. 
Using this universal-pragmatic classification of validity claims and 
corresponding 'regions' of reality as a guide, Habermas has advanced some 
tentative suggestions for unifYing developmental studies. 
Habermas' explication of the key notions of a developmental logic and of 
levels or stages of learning are adapted from the Piagetian tradition in cognitive 
psychology. The idea underlying ontogenetic studies of this type is that the various 
abilities of the adult subject are the result of an integration of a maturational and 
learning processes. These run through an irreversible sequence of discrete and 
increasingly complex developmental stages, whereby no stage can be passed over 
and each higher stage implies or presupposes the previous stages (child; youth and 
adolescent; adult). Stages are constructed wholes that differ qualitatively from one 
another and no later phase can be attained before earlier ones have been through, 
and elements of earlier phases are preserved, transformed, and reintegrated in the 
later. In short, the developmental logical approach requires the specification of a 
hierarchy of structured wholes in which the later, more complex, and more 
encompassing developmental stages presuppose and build upon the earlier. 
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Admittedly, ontogenetic (the sequences of events of involved in the 
development of an individual organism) and phylogenetic (the sequence of events 
involved in the evolution of a species) models of developmental processes cannot 
be transposed without problems to the domain of social evolution. However, the 
suggestion is that the learning ability of individuals is the basis of societal learning: 
ontogenetic learning processes provide a resource that can be drawn upon in the 
formation of a new social structures. At the same time, these processes are 
themselves conditioned by the developmental level of society. 
Under 'society' Habermas understands all systems which - through 
linguistically coordinated (instrumental and social) actions - appropriate outer 
nature in production processes and inner nature in socialisation processes. 
Accordingly a theory of evolution of the type Habermas envisages would have to 
construct a developmental logic for both dimensions: 'productive forces' and 'forms 
of social integration'. Habermas' argument is that the development of productive 
forces cannot be grasped independently of developments in the forms of social 
integration. In making the distinctions between labour/language; 
production/communication; material/symbolic, Habermas' aim is to sketch out the 
normative structures pertaining to processes of social integration. There are a 
number of different aspects to the evolution of forms of social integration that 
would have to be analytically distinguished and investigated before a unified 
account of their interrelations could be worked out. And his own work has been 
concerned primarily with the development of legal and moral systems. Habermas 
uses Kohlberg's schema for the development of moral consciousness (more 
precisely, of its cognitive side, the ability to make monu judgments) as a clue to the 
-
development of moral and legal systems, for these represent attempts to resolve 
morally relevant conflicts on a consensual basis and without resort to manifest 
violence (McCarthy 1978: 251) 
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Even if the tentative sketch could be worked out in satisfactory detail and 
in accord with available empirical evidence and even if it were possible to show 
that it represented a developmental logic (that is, to demonstrate the relevant 
hierarchical relations of dependence and interdependence among the different 
stages of morality and legality), it would clearly not yet be a theory of social 
evolution. Hierarchical structural patterns do not themselves supply an account of 
how and why developments actually come about. 
The explanation of a transition from one social formation or principle of 
social organisation to another requires - in addition to a structural description of 
the relevant levels of learning - recourse to systems problems (which overburden 
the capacities of the old social formation), to societal learning processes (in which 
the surplus learning capacities of individuals are exploited and institutionalised in a 
new form of social organisation), and to contingent initial and boundary conditions 
(which stimulate or prevent, support or hinder, further or limit these processes). 
The theory of social evolution is still left with the problem of explaining 
how what is learned by individuals or marginal social groups could eventually. 
become the basis for a new principle or organisation of a society as a whole. 
Habermas' suggestion is that the results of evolutionarily relevant learning 
processes find their way into the cultural tradition, the worldviews and interpretive 
systems of society; in the form of empirical knowledge and moral-practical 
insights, they comprise a kind of cognitive potential that can be drawn upon by 
social movements when irresolvable systems problems require a transformation of 
the basic form of social integration. 
In carrying this evolutionary model over to social development, Habermas 
calls for a word of caution. Its usefulness consists in its directing our attention to 
the evolutionary learning mechanism. The socio-cultural stages of developmental 
learning processes are socially organised from the start, so that the results of 
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learning can be handed down. Thus cultural tradition provides a medium through 
which variety-generating innovations can operate after the mechanism of natural 
evolution has come to rest. In the case of social evolution the learning process 
takes place not through changes in genetic makeup but through changes in 
knowledge potential. The identity of a society is normatively determined and 
depends on cultural values; on the other hand, these values can change as a result 
of learning processes. 
The cognitive developmental psychology has shown that in ontogenesis 
there are different stages of moral consciousness, stages that can be described in 
particular as preconventional, conventional and postconventional patterns l of 
problem solving. Habermas argues that the same patterns tum up again in the 
social evolution of moral and legal representations. 
Habermas argues that all three complexes (worklviews and collective 
identities and law and morality) lead back to structures of linguistically established 
intersubjectivity. 
a) Law and morality serve to regulate action conflicts consensually and 
thus to maintain an endangered intersubjectivity of understanding 
among speaking and acting subjects. 
b) The demarcation of different universal object domains - one of 
which appears in the propositional attitude of the observer as external 
nature, a second, in the performative attitude of the participant in 
interaction as normative social reality, and a third in the expressive 
attitude of one who expresses an intention as his own subjective nature 
- makes possible the differentiation of those validity claims (truth. 
rightness, truthfulness) that we implicitly tie to all speech actions. 
c) the construction of personal and corresponding collective identities 
is a necessary presupposition for taking on the general communication 
roles, which are provided for in every speaking and acting situation and 
which find. their expression in the employment of personal pronouns 
(Habermas 1979: 116). -
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Habermas considers the acquisition of interactive competence, the ability to take 
part in increasingly complex interactions, to be "the core of identity formation". 
Thus, with the advent of modernity, there is a differentiation of value spheres into 
cognitive-instmmental, moral-practical, aesthetic-expressive. Communicative 
action analyses the symbolic structures that underlie law and morality, an 
intersubjectively constituted world, and the identities of persons and collectivities. 
Communicative action is oriented to observing intersubjectively valid norms that 
link reciprocal expectations. In communicative action the validity basis of speech is 
presupposed. The universal validity claims (truth, rightness, truthfulness), which 
participants at least implicitly raise and reciprocally recognise, make possible the 
consensus that carries action in common. This forms the background consensus 
which is institutionalised. Institutionalisation again means the organisation of 
consensual action resting on intersubjectively recognised validity claims. It is in this 
sense that communicative action is seen as oriented toward reaching an agreement. 
Communicative action can be rationalised neither under the technical aspect 
of the means selected nor under the strategic aspect of the selection of means but. 
only under the moral-practical aspect of the responsibility of the acting subject and 
the justifiability of the action norm. 
Rationalisation .. means extirpating those relations of force that are 
inconspicuously set in the very structures of communication and that prevent 
conscious settlement of conflicts, and consensual regulation of conflicts, by means 
of interpersonal communication barriers. Rationalisation means overcoming such 
systematically distorted communication in which the action-supporting consensus 
concermng the . reciprocally raised validity claims:" especially the consensus 
concerrung the truthfulness of intentional expreSSIOns and the rightness of 
underlying norms - can be sustained counterfactually. 
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To the extent that action conflicts are not regulated through force or 
strategic means but on a consensual basis, structures emerge that mark the moral 
consciousness of the individual and the legal and moral system of society. They 
comprise the core domain of the aforementioned general action structures - the 
representations of justice crystallising around the reciprocity relation that underlies 
all interaction. Thus, Habermas elaborates communicative action as a moral-
practical insight. 
2.3 Strategic rationality and Communicative rationality - Habermas on 
Social Interaction 
Given this exposition of a critical theory of modernity based on the theory 
of communicative rationality, I shall now discuss Habermas' contrast of two 
different forms of social interaction: one is instrumental-strategic rationality and 
the other communicative rationality. 
As can be seen from the discussion of rationality, Habermas articulates an. 
expansive critical social theory anchoring his project in a comprehensive concept of 
communicative rationality intended to remedy the concept of cognitive-
instrumental rationality. 'In this section the focus is on the typology of action that 
he constructs around the concept of communicative rationality following from his 
larger question of the modernity. Although Habermas' work has been extensively 
discussed with reference to theoretical paradigms like hermeneutics, post-
structuralism, philosophies of science etc., unfortunately not much attention is 
given to the rational choice paradigm. 
One of the central lessons of Haber mas TTCA (vol. I 1984; vol. II 1986) is 
that unlike the rational choice model of instrumentally rational self-interested 
maximisation, critical theory expects individuals to act in different ways in different 
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circumstances. Their rationality has 'cognitive', 'moral' and 'aesthetic' aspects, not 
just instrumental ones. Thus it invokes different motivations to explain social 
interaction. The universality of communicative reason lies in the fact that it unifies 
all the three value spheres of life in devising argumentative procedures. From the 
standpoint of critical theorists, strategic rationality conceptualises action in a 
monological model of subjectivity. 
The discussion of rational action is the fulcrum for Habermas' broader 
empirical and normative concerns. Johnson (1991a) gives a critical account of this 
typology. Johnson's discussion centers on the place Habermas assigns to strategic 
action in his typology. This issue is typically neglected in treatments of Habermas' 
work. Before proceeding to a critical discussion of the typology, it is important to 
note that Habermas, unlike early Frankfurt school theorists, does not deny the role 
of strategic action in the social and political world. His objection is its claim to 
'universality'. Although Habermas himself has not engaged in discussion with 
rational choice theory, critical theorists under the banner of communicative action 
do, for example White (1988: 10-13,44-47). 
It is important to see how far Habermas is successful in accommodating 
both domains of action into his theory. Given their apparently divergent 
approaches to the questions of rationality, both critical and rational choice theory 
can be viewed as competing research traditions. It is my task to encourage 
constructive exchange between advocates of each tradition. There are three 
reasons for advancing such an enterprise. 
First, because both are preoccupied with determining what rationality can 
mean in the realm of social and political interaction. 
Second, Habermas' aims are not narrowly philosophical and are concerned 
explicitly wIth 'empirical usefulness' contributing to concept formation in the social 
sciences. He is thus engaged in a similar enterprise as rational choice theorists. 
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Third, rational choice theorists typically concentrate on interactions 
between rational actors within a pre specified context. Habermas also focuses on 
the efforts of agents to define the context within which their ongoing interactions 
will transpire. Habermas is addressing a conceptually notorious issue problematic 
for rational choice theory. 
Within the broad category of rational action Habermas differentiates 
between "action oriented to success" and "action oriented toward reaching 
understanding" (Habermas 1984: 286-87). Success is evaluated relative to states of 
affairs purposefully generated by intervention in the world, whereas reaching 
understanding is a process by which participants seek agreement concerning the 
nature of their interaction. Such an agreement defines the context within which 
actors pursue their individual plans. 
Habermas uses this basic distinction between orientations to generate a 
complex typology of action. He firsts sets off a range of social action from 
instrumental intervention in the physical environment. Instrumental action is 
oriented to success, but it is not unique in that regard. Strategic action is social. 
action oriented to success in influencing the actions of other rational actors. 
Communicative action consists of attempts by actors to co-operatively 
define the context of their interaction in such a way as to enable them to pursue 
their individual plans. It is the paradigmatic form of social action oriented toward 
reaching understanding. In norm-regulated action, participants conform to socially 
expected modes of behaviour. In dramaturgical action, agents constitute a public 
for one another before whom they can present their selves. 
It is to the experience of achieving mutual understanding in communication 
that is free from coercion that Habermas looks in developing his idea of rationality 
(Habermas 1984: x). 
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Habermas views all the above types of action as rational in a specific sense. 
To be rational action, an action minimally must be capable of being "defended 
against criticism" (Habermas 1984: 8, 16). Habermas argues that each type of 
action is tied to a characteristic "validity claim" in the light of which particular 
actions of that type, in principle, can be criticised, defended, and hence regarded as 
potentially rational. Moreover, he treats the connection between rational action and 
validity claims as a matter of conceptual necessity (Habermas 1984: 9, 19, 42, 38). 
Instrumental and strategic action raise claims to truth or effectiveness. Normative 
action raises a claim to rightness. Dramaturgical action raises a claim to sincerity or 
authenticity. Parties to communicative action can raise validity claims of each sort. 
Validity· claims are in turn grounded in what Habermas calls formal 
concepts. These concepts, shared by participants to an interaction, specify the 
character of the objective, social, and subjective world. Instrumental and strategic 
action presuppose only an objective world constituted by pre-existing states of 
affairs. In addition to this objective world, normative action relates to a social 
world of legitimately ordered relations. Dramaturgical action publicly expresses an. 
inner or subjective world of desires and feelings to which an agent has privileged 
access. Parties to communicative action potentially relate to all three worlds. The 
unity of rationality in the multiplicity of value spheres rationalised according to 
their inner logics is secured at the formal level of the argumentative redemption of 
validity claims. Habermas depicts communicative reason - embodied in validity 
claims to truth, rightness, and sincerity that are implicitly and necessarily raised in 
human speech - as an "unavoidable pragmatic presupposition" of language use and 
hence of social interaction. 
Communicative action involves participants in "the cooperative negotiation 
of common- definitions of the situation" in which they are interacting. In everyday 
communicative practice, this process of mutual interpretation remains implicit. In 
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more reflective forms of communicative action - what Habermas refers to as 
discourse or argument - it is made explicit. At both levels, participants in 
communicative action seek an argument which can admit of consensus. In doing 
so, they advance and respond to validity claims, using the formal world-concepts 
as a commonly supposed system of coordinates. 
Parties to communicative action seek to reach an understanding regarding 
the situation within which they pursue their individual plans in one or another 
direct operation on the objective, social, or subjective world. Actors have two 
options when the process of reciprocal interpretation implicit in everyday 
interaction deteriorates. They can have recourse to discourse or argument "as a 
court of appeal that makes it possible to continue communicative action with 
everyday routines. " 
Alternatively, they might resort to strategic action, abandoning in the 
process, their joint endeavour after consensus. The resulting 
interactions will be coordinated by quite distinct mechanisms - by 
consent in the case of communicative action and by influence, arbitrary 
choice or complementarity of interest in the case of strategic action 
(Habermas 1982: 237, 264-65). 
For Habermas, this contention is not just an academic issue but has grave political 
implications. He claims that 
to the degree that interactions cannot be coordinated through achieving 
. understanding, the only alternative that remains is force exercised by 
one against others (in a more or less refined, more or less latent 
manner). The typological distinction between communicative action 
and strategic action says nothing else than this (Habermas 1982: 269). 
Habermas aspires to articulate a comprehensive concept of rationality that 
will dislodge teleological action from the central role it traditionally is accorded by 
social and political theorists. He suggests that pre-eminent social scientific 
reflections on rational action are founded in the writings of Max Weber. But he 
criticises Weber for privileging teleological action, thereby classifying "all other 
actions... as specific deviations from this type. Habermas seeks to overcome this 
one-sidedness in his own typology of action. 
Habermas characterises reaching understanding as the inherent telos of 
human communication. Yet he also recognises that not all "linguistically mediated 
interaction" in fact manifests that telos. Theoretical commitments thus compel him 
to demonstrate that these other sorts of interaction are parasitic on the "original 
mode of language use". In attempting to surmount what he perceives to be the 
one-sidedness of traditional social and political theory, Habermas dislodges 
"teleological" action from its privileged theoretical position only to replace it with a 
similarly privileged concept of communicative action. 
But Habermas not only presents strategic action as derivative of 
communicative action, he is committed to vIewmg it as peripheral insofar as 
strategic action neither potentially relates to all three worlds nor operates. 
reflexively as does communicative action. It thus is difficult to see how he might 
incorporate it as other than a residual category in his typology of action. 
This shift in theoretical focus is not a major failing. It is problematic only if 
1) it produces conceptual distortions parallel to those Habermas decries in 
traditional accounts of rational action or 2) Habermas is unable to persuasively 
explain the force of the now privileged concept of communicative action. 
Habermas argues that social actions can be distinguished according to the 
mechanisms for co-ordinating individual actions, for in-stance according to whether 
a social relation is based on 'interest positions' alone or on 'normative agreements' 
as well. It -is in this way that Weber distinguishes the sheer facti city of an 
'economic' order from the 'social' validity of a legal order. In the one case, social 
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relations gain stability through the factual intermeshing of 'interest positions'; in the 
other, through an additional recognition of normative validity claims. A 
coordination of actions secured only through the complementarity of interests can 
be normatively restructured through the superaddition of validity based on 
agreement, that is through the "belief that a certain behaviour is required by law or 
convention". Weber elucidates this connection with the development of traditions 
through the transition from custom to convention: It is by way of conventional 
rules that merely factual regulations of action- that is, mere custom - are normally 
transformed into binding norms, guaranteed primarily by psychological coercion 
(Habermas 1984: 282-3). 
Interaction based on complementarity of interests exists not only in the 
form of custom - that is, of insensibly accepted habituation - but also at the level of 
rational competitive behaviour, for example in modem commerce, in which 
participants have formed a clear consciousness of the complementarity as well as 
of the contingency of their interest positions. On the other hand, interaction based 
on normative consensus does not only take the form of tradition-bound~ 
conventional action; the modem legal system is dependent on an enlightened belief 
in legitimation, which rational natural law - in the idea of a basic contract among 
free and equals - traces back to procedures of rational will-formation (Habermas 
1984: 283). Although appreciating Weber's typology of action, Habermas argues 
that Weber did not fully extend the typology of action for the problematic of 
societal rationalisation. If processes of societal rationalisation are to be investigated 
in their entire breadth, other action-theoretical foundations are required. Habermas 
employs the concept of communicative action to explicate the complex concept of 
rationality. 
Social actions are distinguished according to two action orientations -
corresponding to the coordination of action through interest positions and through 
. . 
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normative agreement (Habermas 1984: 285). The model of purposive rational 
action takes as its point of departure the view that the actor is primarily oriented to 
attaining an end, that he selects means that seem to him appropriate in the given 
situation, and that he calculates other foreseeable consequences of action as 
secondary conditions of success. Success is defined as the appearance in the world 
of a desired state, which can, in a given situation, be causally produced through 
goal oriented action or omission. 
Habermas argues that a categorical distinction needs to be made between 
the rationalisation of communicative action on the one hand, and of instrumental 
rationality (with regard to nature) and strategic rationality (with regard to social 
sphere) on the other. He calls an action oriented to success 'instrumental' when 
applied to non-social realm of activity. By contrast, he calls an action 'strategic' 
when understood in a social sphere wherein the interaction is coordinated in a two 
way process. Habermas speaks of communicative action as an action which is 
coordinated not through egocentric calculations of success but through acts of 
reaching understanding (Habermas 1984: 285-6). 
In communicative action participants are not primarily oriented to their 
own individual successes; Classifying these two actions as 'action oriented to 
success' and 'action oriented to reaching understanding', Habermas deploys Austin's 
speech act theory, in order to explicate the differences (Habermas 1984: 288:9) 
Strategic action is related to perlocutionary acts and communicative action is 
related to illocutionary acts. Social actions can be distinguished according to 
whether the participants adopt either a success-oriented attitude or one oriented to 
reaching understanding. 
A _ communicatively achieved agreement has a rational basis, it cannot be 
imposed on either party, whether instrumentally through intervention in the 
situation directly or strategically through influencing the decisions of opponents. 
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Agreement can indeed be objectively obtained by force, but what comes to pass 
manifestly through outside influence or the use of violence cannot count 
subjectively as agreement (Habermas 1984: 287). 
The unity of rationality in the multiplicity of value spheres rationalised 
according to their inner logics is secured precisely at the formal level of the 
argumentative redemption of validity claims (Habermas 1984: 249). 
This distinction between strategic action and communicative action 
parallels another similar problem discussed widely in his works which is 'labour' 
and 'interaction' or 'work' and 'politics' or 'production paradigm' and 'symbolic or 
language paradigm'. Habermas is critical of the orthodox political economist who 
tend to regard the domain of politics as a reflection of underlying material forces 
instead of recognising that values and norms shape the world. Politics is creative 
and it has been responsible for a reorganisation of relations among groups in 
society. 
Thus Habermas' typology of actions is a broad one. Communicative 
rationality is appropriate to the interactions of competent, reflective critical, and 
social individuals. Critical theory has no parsimonious paradigm of subjectivity but 
- . 
instead has cognitive, moral and subjective aspects, not just instrumental ones. In 
other words, the development of world views, ethical positions and identity 
contributes to and helps constitute an individual's rationality. Above all, rationality 
means the competence to decide when it is appropriate to act instrumentally, or in 
conformity with social norms, or dramaturgically as an expressive subject; and the 
ability to judge these qualities in others. Thus, from the standpoint of critical 
theory, public choice's model of subjectivity misses the richness of human 
motivations and appears impoverished and emblematic of instrumentally 
rationalised modernity. To Marcuse this is a "one-dimensional man". 
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Conclusion 
Habermas' alternative model of collective choice is conceived not as a 
process of preference aggregation, in which there is a mapping from a set of 
individual orderings to a social ordering, but as a process of dialogue in which 
reasons are exchanged between participants in a process that is perceived to be a 
joint search of consensus. Such a dialogic concept of collective choice would 
necessarily work not with fixed preferences to be amalgamated, but preferences 
that were altered or modified as competing reasons were advanced in the course of 
discussion. Such a dialogic exchange would not necessarily preclude occurrences 
of paradoxes of collective choice, since differences of judgement might remain 
after debate and dialogue, leaving voting as the only practicable way of 
overcoming disagreement. Yet, in this context, the paradoxes would be seen not as 
the proof that the popular will was a meaningless concept, but as revealing the as 
yet unresolved imperfections of a process of discussion that characterised an 
adequate concept of collective choice. 
In !his chapter, I have shown how collective choice is conceJ?tualised from 
a communicative action perspective. In the next chapter, I shall discuss the internal 
critiques of rational choice theories and make way for a critical engagement 
between critical theory and rational choice theory. 
The contention from the critical theorists' point of view is that public choice 
theories are reductionist in the sense of treating individual behaviour in all realms 
on the basis of homo ecollomicus principle. Unlike the reductionist variants of 
political theory, it is important to recognise that values and norms also shape the 
world. Politics is a creative and dynamic process in so far as the aim is to deliberate 
over norms and rules which regulate the social conduct of everyday lives of the 
individuals. This is the concern which Habermas addresses by bringing back to life 
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Aristotelian distinction between praxis and theoria. Habermas is concerned with 
generating a consensus in social interaction of individuals through dialogue. 
Moreover his enterprise is aimed at providing a reference point to unravel 
questions of power, domination and coercion. On his account, the rational choice 
enterprise evades the question of ideology, power, domination in social interaction. 
Critical theory is largely an external critique and so is uninformed by the 
theoretical developments in the rational choice paradigm. In the next chapter, I 
shall consider the internal critiques of rational choice who have come to recognise 
the limits of instrumental reason. I shall return to the discussion of strategic and 
communicative action in the light of internal critiques. My aim is to encourage a 
productive conversation between the two discordant traditions in the light of these 
critiques. 
Notes 
I These stages are associated with Lawrence Kohlberg' stages of moral consciousness: 
Preconventional: It means the responsiveness to cultural labels of good and bad and are 
interpreted in terms of physical consequences of action (punishment). 
Conventional: In this stage, allegiance to a group e.g. family or nation is perceived as valuable in 
its own right. Here the attitude of the individuals is conformity to existing norms. 
Post-conventional: At this level the moral values and principles are defined indGpendent of any 
authority of the groups. This stage includes a free and equal persons corning to an agreement on 
moral norms. 
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Chapter 3 
Contract or Discourse: Modes of Collective Choice 
Introduction 
In chapter 1, I discussed two problems of rational choice: one is the problem of 
preference aggregation and the other collective action problem. Here, I am 
primarily concerned with the first problem i.e. the inadequacy of "majority rule" as 
a fair procedure for resolving conflict of interests. Rational choice findings about 
the logic of majority rule have prompted new reflections on the normative 
foundations of democracy (Green and Shapiro 1994: 4). One such attempt came 
from Buchanan who developed a contractarian model of constitutional choice. 
Interestingly, even critical theorists are critical of democratic institutional 
arrangements that rely solely or even primarily on electoral mechanisms, that is, on 
ways of aggregating individual interests or preferences. They argue that the results 
underscore the inadequacy of purely aggregative notions of democracy in ways 
that can sharpen and ultimately sustain the case for deliberation. 
In this chapter, I shall contrast two normative theories of collective choice: 
contract and discourse ethics. 1 The discussion is centered on the normative 
problem of "agreement" which is the central concern of both contract theories and 
discourse ethics. In the first section, I explicate the central tenets of discourse 
ethics. And in the second section, I compare and contrast discourse and contract as 
two modes of agreement. And finally in the third, I argue, following Benhabib, that 
dialogue and contract are no way different if interpreted as procedural ideals. The 
significance of discourse ethics is realised only when interpreted as a moral-
transformatory process as opposed to a mere legal-juridical idea. 
3.1 The Idea of Justification of Discourse Ethics 
3.2 Discourse ethics and Contract: Modes of Agreement 
3.3 Interpreting Discourse Ethics 
3.1 The Idea of Justification of Discourse Ethics 
The program of discourse ethics forms the anticipatory-utopian dimension 
of Habermas' critical social theory. The most ambitious and original feature of 
Habermas's whole work is his attempt to recast the study of society in a theory of 
communication. As Benhabib (1986: 225) argues, the task of critical social theory 
is not to develop Kantian imperatives, but to show the potential for rationality and 
emancipation implicit in the present. Communicative ethics constitutes what is 
called the normative aspect of critique. It is aimed at projecting the counterfactual 
historical possibilities of conceptualising interaction differently. The program of 
communicative ethics belongs to the anticipatory-utopian aspect. 
I shall outline the fundamental features of Habermas' theory of 
communicative competence and provide a clarification of the normative grounds 
on which the practice of justifying and/or criticising social norms and institutions 
rests, at least within a democratic regime. This will make sense only if Habermas' 
single aim is kept in mind. He wants to develop a model that will show how 
rationality is manifested in ordinary social interaction, that is to say, in ordinary 
communication between speaking and acting subjects. 
The two key notions that are central to Habermas' (1979: 26) theory are: 
-
one, the notion of the ideal speech situation, and the second, his concept of 
communicative competence. Both are closely intertwined. Communicative action is 
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intrinsically dialogical. The starting point for an analysis of the pragmatics of 
speech is the situation of a speaker and a hearer who are oriented to mutual 
reciprocal understanding; a speaker and hearer who have the capacity to take an 
affirmative or negative stance when a validity claim is challenged. 
In the context of Habermas' theory of universal pragmatics (Habermas 
1979: 1-69), the concepts of an "ideal speech situation" and "unconstrained 
dialogue" define the formal properties of argumentations named 'discourses.' 
According to this theory, anyone engaging in communication, performing a speech 
act, raises four validity claims and presupposes that they can be vindicated or 
justified when challenged. In discourses, the background consensus which we 
'always already' naively assume is constituted by the recognition of these four 
validity claims: the comprehensibility of our utterances, the truth of their 
propositional component, the correctness or appropriateness of their performative 
aspect, and the truthfulness or authenticity of the speaking subject (Habermas 
1984: 23). 
Habermas names discourses through which 'truth' and 'normative' claims are 
thematised :theoretical" and "practical" ones (Habermas 1984: 19).2, The aim of 
discourses is to generate a "rationally motivated consensus" on controversial 
claims. The concept of the ideal speech situation is introduced in this context. The 
ideal speech situation specifies the formal properties that discursive argumentations 
would have to possess if the consensus thus attained were to be distinguished from 
a mere compromise or agreement of convenience. The ideal speech situation is a 
'meta-norm' that applies to theoretical as well as to practical reason. It serves to 
delineate those aspects of an argumentation process which would lead to a 
"rationally motivated" as opposed to a false or apparent consensus. 
The four conditions of the ideal speech situation are: first, each participant 
must have an equal chance to initiate and to continue communication; second, each 
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must have an equal chance to make assertions, recommendations and explanation 
and to challenge justifications. Together they are called "symmetry conditions". 
Third, all must have an equal chance as actors to express their wishes, feelings, and 
intentions; and fourth, the speakers must act 'as if in contexts of action there is an 
equal distribution of chances to order and resist orders, to promise and to refuse, 
to be accountable for one's conduct and to demand accountability from others. 
This can be called the "reciprocity condition". While the symmetry stipulation of 
the ideal speech situation refers to speech acts alone and to conditions governing 
their employment, the reciprocity condition refers to existing action contexts, and 
requires a suspension of situations of untruthfulness and duplicity on the one hand, 
and of inequality and subordination on the other. 
Thus, the ideal speech situation is a 'counterfactual' ideal of organising 
social action around talk. It describes a set of rules which participants in a 
discourse would have to follow (symmetry condition), and a set of relations (the 
reciprocity condition) which would have to obtain between them, if we were to say 
of the agreement they reach that it was rationally motivated, dependent on the 
force of the better argument alone. One of the preconditions of the 'ideal speech 
situation' is that "the speakers should deceive neither themselves nor others about 
their intentions. " 
Habermas' discourse ethics is a defense of 'moral universalism'. He claims 
that not only those who choose to participate in an argumentation situation, but all 
those capable of speech and action, as competent subjects, dispose of a certain 
intuitive know-how. The task of universal pragmatics is to render this know-how 
into a know-that, and to reconstruct the explicit rules governing the implicit 
knowledge of competent speakers and actors. Such a universal-pragmatic 
reconstruction of communicative action reveals the four validity claims to be 
counterfactually assumed. 
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Such a reconstruction also shows that once these validity claims are no 
longer taken for granted, consensus can only be established via discourses aimed at 
the redemption of truth and rightness claims. Whereas the earlier justification 
strategy3 sought to establish a deductive relation between conditions of 
argumentative speech and the norms of a communicative ethic, it is now argued 
that a subject who engages in argumentation presupposes a certain moral principle 
which he or she can only deny at the risk of a performative self-contradiction 
(Habermas 1990: 88-9). The following points provide a broad sketch of the 
essentials ofHabermas' program of communicative ethics (Benhabib 1986: 295-6). 
First, the concept of an 'ideal speech situation' serves to summarise the rules of 
argumentation to yield a rational consensus. Habermas insists on his original claim 
that in argumentative exchange, the structures of a speech situation, especially 
immunised against repression and inequality, show themselves. 
Second, the motivating principle of the discourses lies in the fact that the self-
explanatory character of the life-world requires clarification and mutual 
interpretation. Thus the rational kernel of discourses lies in questioning, puzzling, 
explaining, interpreting, negotiating and clarifying the everyday interactions in the 
social life-world. 
Third, the task of universal pragmatics is to reconstruct the presuppositions of 
communicative action and argumentation. Reconstructions continue the task of 
transcendental philosophy with altered means. Discourse ethics is a "reconstructive 
science." The progra~ implies a special division of labour between moral theory 
and moral psychology. Discursive ethics conceives of moral theory as a theory of 
moral argumentation. In doi~g so, it finds indirect support from the findings of 
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developmental psychology, which provide rational reconstructions of the 
pretheoretical knowledge of competent subjects. 
Fourth, the basic principle of a discourse ethic is that only those norms can claim 
validity which are agreed upon by all the concerned participants. 
Fifth, the moral principle which belongs to the presuppositions of argumentation in 
a discourse ethic is that everyone who participates in a practical discourse must 
also implicitly and indeed at the cost of getting involved in a performative 
contradiction, recognise that normative validity claims can only be justified if the 
following is respected: the consequences and side effects which would foreseeably 
result from the universal implementation of a controversial norm, and as they 
would affect the satisfaction of the interests of each single individual, would be 
accepted by all without compulsion. Habermas names this the principle of 
universalisability. 
Sixth, to complete this account of the program of a communicative ethics, we must 
identify the object domain of such a theory. The phenomena which need 
explanation and clarification are the normative (obligating and binding) validity of 
norms and of validity claims which arise in relation to norm-regulated (or 
regulated) speech acts. 
Like Kant, Habermas describes the moral point of view as a position of 
impartiality, distinct from other personal and self-interested perspectives. The 
central task of moral theory thus becomes that of clarifying and justifying what it 
means to adopt a moral point of view or impartial standpoint. The further 
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similarities between Habermas' project and Kant's moral theory can be descnbed 
under four headings (Habermas 1990: 196-7): 
First. discourse ethics is a universalistic moral theory. Its basic principle (U) is not 
restricted to a particular time period or culture, nor does it merely represent the 
moral beliefs of, say, liberal, white, males. Habermas attempts to establish its 
universality by deriving this principle from the quasi-transcendental presuppositions 
of argumentation: Anyone who seriously enters into argument with others 
presupposes certain pragmatic rules from which the principle of universalisability 
can be inferred. Habermas also argues that the rules and structure of argumentation 
are not a contingent feature of advanced capitalist societies, but belong to the 
evolutionary development of species-wide competencies. In this sense, the claim to 
universality of discourse ethics is defended by means of a revised transcendental 
argument. Still it rejects the stronger claim to a priori status; it is fallibilistic and 
depends upon the empirical validity of its reconstruction of specific human 
competencies. 
Second, discourse ethics is formalistic moral theory. Like' Kant's categorical 
imperative, the principle of universalisability is introduced as a procedure for 
testing norms. It does not by itself generate any substantive moral norms; rather, it 
specifies an argumentative procedure that any norm must satisfy if it is to be 
morally acceptable. Since Hegel's critique of Kant, the distinction between a formal 
principle and normative content has been difficult to defend and I will consider it in 
more detail below. Still, in another sense, Hegel's critique missed its target since 
the categorical imperativ(! was not intended by Kant to generate moral norms, but 
" 
rather to specify a test procedure for existing maxims of action. Similarly, 
discourse ethics assumes the existence of a social world of norms; the validity of 
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these norms can only be established by way of real discourses actually taking place. 
To expect that substantial moral norms can be immediately inferred from a 
clarification of the moral point of view (in the way that Rawls hopes to derive his 
two principles) is, according to Habermas, to ask for too much from a moral 
theory. 
Third, discourse ethics is a cognitivist moral theory. This position is shared by 
Kant, Rawls and Habermas. Cognitivism maintains that in moral discourse we can 
critically assess the validity of norms by reason and argument. Voluntarism, by 
contrast, is the view that moral norms and judgments are based in preferences or 
expressions of the will that are beyond the reach of rational assessment. Of course, 
preferences can be assessed in terms of their compatibility or incompatibility with 
other preferences, but our basic preferences cannot be rationally criticised; they can 
at most be decided upon. According to Hobbesian contractarians, like Buchanan, 
morality is the search for a compromise or mutual advantage between competing 
preferences; preferences themselves, however, are generally accepted as 'given'. 
Habermas attempts to preserve Kantian connection between reason and morality 
by linking the acceptability of norms to the validity claims. Norms no less than 
assertions can be contested, and the validity of both depends upon their capacity to 
be redeemed through discursive argumentation. 
Baynes (1992: 1-5) interprets Habermas' discourse ethics as mediating 
between the extremes of foundationalism and relativism by developing what can be 
called a Kantian constructivist defense of the grounds of social criticism. 
Constructivism parts with stronger foundationalist projects which assume that the 
grounds of social criticis~ must consist of self evident principles that are absolute 
and immune to revision. It also parts with those foundationalist strategies that seek 
to establish an objective standpoint by appealing to a morally neutral notion of 
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rational self interest. Kantian constructivism attempts to account for the objectivity 
of our normative assessments by relating ideals and principles employed in our 
critical practices to an expressly normative conception of practical reason or, what 
can be argued, to a conception of ourselves as free and equal moral persons. There 
is no further claim that these principles or ideals correspond to a prior moral order 
that exists independently of this conception of practical reason or that these 
principles cannot be revised in the light of subsequent criticism and renewed 
argument. Rather, the justification of this normative ground is ultimately reflexive 
or recursive in the sense that there can be no higher appeal to something beyond 
the idea of that to which free and equal persons can rationally agree. 
Habermas' claim is that an analysis and reconstruction of the conditions of 
mutual understanding can provide a normative foundation for social criticism. In 
this sense, he pursues by different means Kant's attempt to develop normative 
principles for criticism from a notion of practical communicative reason. 
Finally, discourse ethics is a deontoiogicai moral theory. The basic moral principle 
must be specified in a way that does not presuppose a specific cOEception of the 
good life since that would amount to a disregard for the ethical pluralism that 
characterises modern societies. The distinction is defended in terms of a notion of 
practical reason or moral autonomy. Discourse ethics differs from Kant in several 
important respects. Habermas rejects Kant's two-world metaphysics and seeks to 
reconstruct a Kantian perspective freed from its assumptions. For Habermas, this 
especially means an attempt to reconstruct the notions of reason and autonomy in 
such a way that they do not presuppose a distinction between a noumenal and a 
phenomenal world, or between a transcendental and an empirical ego. Reason no 
.. 
longer stands in sharp opposition to needs and interests; rather, reason is defined 
procedurally in terms of the structure of argumentation and process of 
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communication and the question becomes what interpretations of needs can best 
withstand discursive vindication. Similarly, autonomy no longer signals the 
exclusion or repression of interests and desires, but rather the capacity to reflect 
critically upon them and the willingness to redeem them discursively if their 
interpretation is contested. 
Discourse ethics abandons Kant's monological version of the categorical 
imperative in favour of an intersubjective or communicative version of the principle 
of universalisability. Kant's categorical imperative - especially the "kingdom of 
ends" formulation - already has an intersubjective dimension to it. It seems clear 
that Kant is only able to equate what one person can consistently and rationally will 
with what everyone could consistently and rationally agree to because of his two 
world metaphysics. Only because interests, desires, and inclinations are set over 
against reason and purged from the "Kingdom of Ends" can Kant assume a 
harmony between the individual and the collective rational will. In discourse ethics, 
by contrast, such simulated 'thought experiments' should ideally be replaced by 
actual practical discourses. 
Kant formulated the rational procedure to be employed by· judgment 10 
logic, science, aesthetics and ethics. One could interpret categorical imperative 
either as a procedure for generating obligatory moral principles or for testing 
existing ones. According to Kant, the general rules to be followed in thinking 
consistently are: 
1. To think for oneself 
2. in communication with men, to imagine oneself in the place of every other 
person. 
3. always to think in agreement with one self. 
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Most contemporary neo-Kantian ethical theories take their bearings from 
this formula, and define "universalisability" as a procedure that would entail 
considering the viewpoint of all. The "moral point of view" is identified with that 
perspective which would be acceptable for all. Again, most contemporary ethical 
theories differ from one another in specifying the procedure which best articulates 
the moral point of view. John Rawls maintains that his theory of justice as fairness 
and the procedural device of a collective bargaining game behind a "veil of 
ignorance" best articulate Kant's view of autonomy. 
From the standpoint of communicative ethics, the contemporary theories 
merely repeat the traditional Kantian mistake. Kant thought that, through solitary 
reflection, a single rational self could come to define a standpoint which would be 
acceptable to all qua rational agents. The Kantian moral self was a pure rational 
agent, identical to all others in this respect. Having abstracted from the differences 
among concrete moral selves, the Kantian 'thought experiment' in moral theory 
would proceed by asking what each could, without self-contradiction, consider to 
( 
be a universal law for all. In attempting to define the consent of the moral point of 
view, contemporary moral philosophers repeat the same mistake: they assume that 
the solitary moral thinker can define a relevant moral content for all. In 
communicative ethics, by contrast, the requirement to articulate the moral point of 
view amounts to the formula: only those norms can claim validity which meet (or 
could meet) with the consensus of all concerned as participants in a practical 
discourse. 
From the standpoint of Habermas, Kantian ethics is monological, for it 
proceeds from the standpoint of the rational person, defined in such a way that 
differences among concrete selves become quite irrelevant. Communicative ethics 
defends a dialogical model of moral reasoning, according to which real actors 
engage in actual processes of deliberation on moral questions. It seems surprising 
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that a discourse or communicative ethic need appeal to the universalisability 
principle. F or, as has been correctly observed, Habermas' discourse model 
represents a procedural reinterpretation of Kant's categorical imperative: rather 
than ascribing as valid to all others any maxim that I can will to be a universal law, 
I must submit my maxim to all others for purposes of discursively testing its claim 
to universality. The emphasis shifts from what each can will without contradiction 
to be a general law, to what all can will in agreement to be a universal norm. 
The Status and Derivatioll of the PrinCiple of Ulliversalisability (Habermas 1990: 
51-76) 
As a rule of argumentation that is constitutive for a practical discourse, the 
principle of Universalisability (U) may be regarded as a communicative or 
intersubjective reconstruction of Kant's categorical imperative. It stipulates that a 
social norm is morally justified only if the foreseeable consequences that would 
follow from its general observance could be accepted by everyone affected as in 
their own .. interest. Presuppositions of argumentation refer to those pragmatic 
conditions that speakers implicitly assume whenever they enter into serious 
argumentation. These presuppositions have a transcendental status in the sense that 
they are unavoidable: anyone who denies them and yet wants to argue seriously 
involves himself in some form of a performative contradiction. Their unavoidability 
is thus demonstrated by showing that skeptical critics must presuppose them in the 
very attempt to deny their existence. Further these presuppositions are of a 
pragmatic nature. It is not the more narrowly conceived conventional meaning of 
terms that yields these pr~suppositions, but rather the connection between the 
meaning of utterances and the pragmatic conditions of their validity as this was 
.. 
developed in the theory of formal pragmatics. 
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Habermas' rules represent those formal pragmatic conditions necessary to 
understanding or communicative agreement. Habermas (1990: 89) offers the 
following three rules: 
1. Every speaker with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a 
discourse. 
2. a) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. 
b) Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse. 
c) Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs. 
3. No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising 
his rights as laid down in 1 and 2. 
Taken together, these rules of argumentation can be seen to represent an 
"ideal speech situation" or "ideal communication community" and, as a 
representation of the unavoidable presuppositions of argumentation, this ideal is 
actually assumed whenever anyone argues seriously. However, this ideal speech 
situation also functions as a regulative idea that can be used to criticise actual 
discourses. Habermas defends both of these aspects of the ideal speech situation at 
once. On the one hand, it is not merely a counterfactual ideal, but a real 
presupposition of all argumentation that, to a greater or lesser extent, is 
approximated in discursive practices and embodied in social institutions within the 
life world. We actually make such idealising suppositions in our discursive 
practices to the extent that ~e are open to relevant information, listen to who are 
concerned, and are ready to be persuaded only by the force of the better argument. 
117 
On the other hand, no single discourse can completely fulfil the conditions 
of an ideal speech situation. Although discourses involve validity claims that 
transcend the spatial and temporal horizons of their own embodiment, the practice 
of justifying a claim must always draw upon resources (knowledge, interpretation 
of needs etc.) from within the lifeworld (Habermas 1990: 135). In this sense 
discourses are islands in a sea of praxis. Moreover, any agreement reached today 
about the validity of a claim does not rule out the possibility that tomorrow-in the 
light of a new information, changed social conditions, or reinterpreted need - it will 
be necessary to enter again into a discourse about the claim's validity. Thus the 
transcendent character that belongs to the notion of ideal speech situation does 
not rule Ollt the immanence (and fallibility) of Ollr discursive practices (Baynes 
1990: 114). 
To turn now to the second step in the justification of a principle of 
universalisability, Habermas does not claim that the principle specified in discourse 
ethics can be derived solely from an analysis of the presuppositions of 
argumentation. To arrive at a distinctively moral principle of universalisability, 
these presuppositions must also be combined with the idea of what it means to 
justify a norm of action. The rules of argumentation, of course, possess a 
normative content, but they do not yet constitute a specifically moral principle, 
where this is understood as defining a category of moral oughtness or obligation. 
As Baynes (1990: 114) argues, Habermas insists upon this point for two 
reasons: First, the rules of argumentation state the necessary conditions for those 
who want to engage in a particular social practice, namely argumentation. In this 
sense they are analogous to the rules of a game: they are constitutive for a practice, 
but it is not impossible to imagine rejecting the practice as a whole. There also 
does not seem to be any reason why the normative character of these constitutive 
rules must be interpreted in moral terms. 
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Second, Habermas associates moral phenomena with communicative action in 
general, rather than with its more demanding form as argumentation. Our moral 
intuitions center around the basic ideas of individual well-being and compassion or 
sympathy for others that may themselves have arisen from a sense of the fragility 
and vulnerability of our common life. In any case, Habermas seeks to clarify both 
of these ideas with reference to the supposition of mutual reciprocity that is already 
contained in communicative interactions and that is so crucial for the formation of 
both individual and group identities. In this sense the often contrasted notion of 
autonomy and solidarity have a common root in our communicative interactions, 
and it is from this model of communicative action that the distinctively moral 
character of norms and obligations arise. There is thus no attempt to derive a moral 
obligation from the constraints of rational argumentation alone. Rather the claim is 
that if a general notion of what it means to justify one's action to others- the 
notion; that is, of what it means to regulate conflicts of interest in light of the 
norm of reciprocity implicit in the idea of communicative action- is combined with 
the more demanding rules gleaned from the analysis of the presuppositions of 
argumentation, then one can derive a rule of argument constitutive for a practical 
discourse, namely, Principle U. 
Habermas' basic intention in developing the theory of communicative 
competence was to provide normative-theoretical foundations for social inquiry. 
Habermas' moral theory is a post conventional one in the sense that there is a clear 
effort to define moral values and principles which have validity and application 
apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles, and 
apart from individual's own identification with these groups. 
Benhabib (1986: 30~) says that, the more the standpoint of a practic~~ 
discourse is articulated in theoretical terms, the less is it possible to distinguish 
between cOrOmunicative ethics and other rival accounts of the moral point of view 
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on procedural grounds. According to the theory of practical discourse as well, a 
certain procedure is presented to moral agents as the "privileged description" 
corresponding to the moral point of view. This generates a 'dialectic of form and 
content' in communicative ethics. 
Discursive argumentation IS the new procedure replacing the 
universalisability test in Kantian ethics. More precisely, universalisability itself is 
interpreted discursively, as what "all can will in agreement to be a universal norm". 
So the question arises as to why then Habermas appeals to 'universalisability 
principle'? 
In his essay Discourse Ethics: Notes 011 a Program of Philosophical 
Justification (Habermas 1990: 56-76), Habermas claims that the principle of 
universalisability belongs among the pragmatic presuppositions of argumentative 
speech, which can only be denied at the risk of performative self-contradiction. It is 
maintained that the Universalisability principle (U) is not a meta-norm or a 
substantive norm, but a rule of argumentation which belongs to the very logic of 
practical discourses. Every valid norm has to fulfill the following condition: 
All affected can accept the consequences and the side-effects its 
general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of 
everyone's interests (Habermas 1990: 65). 
The argument which leads to the justification of U is in tum summarised as 
follows: 
Every person who accepts the universal and necessary communicative 
presuppositions of argumentative speech, and who knows what it 
means to justify a norm of action must implicitly presuppose as valid 
the principle of universal is at ion (Habermas 1990: 86). 
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3.2 Discourse ethics or Contract: Modes of Agreement 
Given this interpretation of discourse ethics, it is interesting to contrast with 
contractarian model articulated by Buchanan and Tullock (1962). Buchanan and 
Tullock develop what is called contractarian public choice. It is aimed at devising 
procedures for arriving at an agreement. 
Buchanan and Vanberg (1989) contrast two interpretations of the role of 
agreement in politics: a 'social contract notion' and a 'dialogue notion'. It is argued 
that the two notions can be seen as complementing each other if one explicitly 
separates two components in human choice that in rational choice theory are often 
inseparably blended in the concept of preferences - an interest component and a 
theory component. Buchanan argues that the contractarian agreement notion 
primarily focuses on the interest-component and the dialogue notion on the theory-
component in constitutional choice. For the present purposes, I shall concentrate 
exclusively on Buchanan's version of contractarianism, the reason being that his 
version of contractarianism employs a model of individual as homo economiclis as 
opposed to Rawls' Kantian notion of a person. 
The notion of agreement is the fundamental principle by which the 
legitimacy of a community's basic constitutional order is assured and it is widely 
shared across a broad range of otherwise quite different intellectual traditions. But 
it takes different meanings in different theories and there exist systematically 
different interpretations as to what kind of agreement actually carries with it 
legitimising force. 
The distinction between the two organised components of choice, the 
interest component and the theory component is of particular importance for the 
.. 
study of constitutional choice in rational choice theories. In the rational choice 
.' 
tradition, the standard interpretation of choice behaviour is in terms of preferences 
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and constraints. Preferences are considered to be reflected in a utility function over 
which a rational actor maximises within certain constraints. As commonly 
understood, the concept of preference is purely about subjective values. It refers to 
an actor's evaluations of potential objects of choice. However, the concept 
typically has more than just an evaluative dimension. It is typically used in a way 
that blends evaluative and cognitive components, or to put differently blends 
person's evaluations of - or interests in - potential outcomes of choice and his 
theories about the world, in particular his theories about what these outcomes are 
likely to be. 
Buchanan and Vanberg (1989: 50) argue although it may be convenient to 
use the notion of preferences in a way that does not explicitly separate the 
genuinely "evaluative" components from the "cognitive" components, for some 
analytical purposes it may be useful to separate interests and theories as distinct 
elements in the choice process. How a person chooses among potential alternatives 
is not only a matter of 'what he wants' but also of 'what he believes', and for some 
kinds of choices an actor's beliefs or theories may play a most crucial role. 
Buchanan and Vanberg (1989: 51) suggests that the second element is particularly 
important for constitutional choices, that is, for choices among rules. It follows 
that constitutional analysis can profit from explicitly distinguishing between the 
evaluative and the cognitive dimension of constitutional choice. 
In any choice, there is an interest-component and a theory-component, 
from the choice among ice-cream flavours to the choice of a dress, though, of 
course the relative importance of the two components may dramatically vary over 
different categories. 
On the constitutional level, it should be obvious that people's theories 
about the working properties of alternative rules and rule-systems, and 
not just their interests iri expected outcomes, are of crucial relevance to 
their choice behaviour (Buchanan and Vanberg 1989: 51). 
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Constitutional choices are concerned with the choice of rules for a 
community or group. By their very nature the rules that are to be chosen are 
'public' in the sense that they define the terms under which actions and transactions 
within the respective community may be carried out. Rules constrain the actions of 
everybody in the community, though not necessarily everybody in the same way. In 
addition to their publicness, constitutional choices are clearly of an instrumental 
nature. The term 'constitutional preferences' refers to a person's preferences over 
alternative rules or sets of rules. Buchanan and Vanberg argue that 
constitutional preferences can be analytically decomposed into two 
components: constitutional theories and constitutional interests. A 
person's constitutional theories are about matters of fact. They are his 
predictions about what the factual outcomes of alternative rules will be. 
These predictions may be arranged in a true or false, correct or 
incorrect scalar. His constitutional interests, on the other hand, are his 
own, subjective evaluations of expected outcomes, evaluations to 
which attributes like true or false, correct or incorrect cannot be 
meaningfully applied (Buchanan and Vanberg 1989: 52). 
The 'cognitive' and 'evaluative' components of a person's constitutional preferences 
are critically different in this regard, and so they argue that the question of how . 
constitutional agreement may be reached raises different issues with regard to 
'constitutional interests' as opposed to 'constitutional theories'. 
The contractarian notion of agreement focuses attention on the interest 
component in constitutional choice. Social contract theories typically concern 
themselves with the issue of how agreement on rules can be achieved among 
persons with potentially conflicting constitutional interests. One characteristic way 
in how a social contract theory may approach this issue is paradigmatic ally 
exemplified by John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1971). In Rawls' construction, the 
prospect of agreement is secured by defining certain ideal conditions under which 
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constitutional choices are hypothetically made. The choosers are assumed to be 
placed behind a 'veil of ignorance', that makes it impossible for them to know 
anything specific about how they will be personally affected by alternative rules. 
Ignorant about their prospective specific interests in particular outcomes, they are 
induced to judge rules 'impartially'. Potential conflict in constitutional interests is 
not eliminated, but the veil of ignorance transforms potential interpersonal conflicts 
into intrapersonal ones. It is important to mention a second essential feature of the 
Rawlsian construction. While the persons behind the veil of ignorance are assumed 
to be totally ignorant about their prospective specific interests in particular rules, 
they are, at the same time, assumed to be perfectly knowledgeable about the 
working properties of alternative rules. So their constitutional theories are 
supposed to be perfect and non-controversial. Informational problems with regard 
to the general workings of rules do exist. 
Buchanan's approach differs from that of Rawls. A standard objection 
against the Rawlsian type of contractarianism is that the conceptual reconstruction 
of some hypothetical agreement under ideal conditions carried little normative and 
explanatory significance with regard to actual constitutional choices that are made 
in a world where people are neither totally ignorant about their identifiable 
constitutional interests nor perfectly knowledgeable as far as their constitutional 
theories are concerned. Buchanan's interest is in part about how the social contract 
notion may be employed in the analysis of constitutional choices that occur under 
much more realistic conditions. 
Buchanan claims that his efforts are much less ambitious than that of 
Rawls~ Rawls identifies the principles of justice that he predicts to emerge from his 
idealised contractual setting. These principles may become the basis of proposals 
for specific institutional changes, which may then be debated in the pragmatically 
oriented arena of day to day politics. By contrast Buchanan does not identify any 
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set of principles that might be used as fundamental. Buchanan advocates in Gray's 
(1993: 47) words 'indeterminate contractarianism'. His contractarianism is 
'indeterministic' insofar as it does not prescribe any a priori principles of justice 
(Gray 1993: 48-9). 
Both the contractarian and the dialogue notions of agreement imply a 
procedural criterion - as opposed to an outcome criterion - of legitimacy. From 
both perspectives the legitimacy of basic constitutional principles is judged not 
against some predefined ideal system but in terms of the process from which these 
principles emerge. The normative focus is on the characteristics of the process of 
constitutional choice and not on characteristics of choice of outcomes as such. 
Furthermore, in both perspectives a good or proper process is defined as one that 
assures fairness or impartiality in the rules that emerge. 
The difference between the two constructions lies in their somewhat 
different understanding of the procedural characteristics that are to assure fairness. 
And it lies in their somewhat different interpretation of 'fairness' itself To the 
contr~ctarian notion, the individuals' interests are the basi~ inputs into the 
constitutional process. The choice process is expected to reflect these interests, 
whatever that may be. It is not considered a process in which these interests 
themselves are judged or rated in anyway. Fairness is considered a matter of the 
constraints under which constitutional choices are made, not as a matter of the 
quality of interests that enter into such choices. In particular, it is the voluntariness 
of choice that, from a contractarian perspective, constitutes the essential 
prerequisite offairness. Fairness and voluntariness of agreement are, in a sense, the 
same. Fairness is not defined independently of that upon which persons voluntarily 
agree. So agreement is viewed in a social contract dimension as defining what is 
mutually acceptable to voluntarily choosing persons. 
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By contrast, within the dialogue or discourse theory framework the notions 
of agreement and fairness tend to carry a characteristically more 'objectivist' or 
cognitive meaning in the sense of implying more than just the notion of intersecting 
or coinciding individual interests. Within this framework, constitutional agreement 
is not simply - as in the contractarian context - a matter of compromise among 
separate individual interests. Individuals' interests are not simply viewed as the 
basic inputs that the process of constitutional agreement is supposed properly to 
reflect. These interests are themselves to be evaluated and possibly transformed in 
the process of constitutional discourse. Whether this idea is stated in terms of a 
distinction between 'brute motivations' and 'refined motivations' - where the former 
are to be transformed into the latter through 'purging of bias and indoctrination'; or 
whether it is as Habermas (1983: 78) invokes through the notion of an impartial 
evaluation of the interests of all who are concerned: what is implied is a critical 
shift towards a 'truth-judgement' interpretation of constitutional agreement. Stated 
differently, agreement is viewed as a discovery process, a process by which persons 
not simply reach a compromise but discover what - in some obje~tive sense - is fair 
or just. 
For the contractualists, the only viable procedure is to search for consensus 
based on voluntary agreement. Truth, in the final analysis, is tested by agreement. 
In its purest form agreement is unanimous agreement; if one person dissents from a 
value proposition then, strictly speaking, it has no truth value what so ever. This 
thorough going subjectivism would seem to put a straight jacket on political and 
moral argument (as Buchanan himself does not strictly adhere to the principle of 
unanimity for all issues) since the likelihood of a universal consensus is extremely 
-
remote. Yet the concept of agreement cannot be dismissed entirely from the liberal 
political vocabulary. 
126 
Within the contractarian framework, agreement carnes normative 
significance in and by itself Agreed-on principles are considered legitimate simply 
because they are the ones that command agreement, not because agreement is 
indicative of some other quality that distinguishes these principles. Observed 
agreement may be normatively qualified in terms of its voluntariness, i.e. in terms 
of the constraints under which the parties involved express their agreement. But, in 
its contractarian sense, it cannot be meaningfully qualified in terms of a standard 
that goes beyond agreement itself The claim to such qualification is apparently 
inherent in the dialogue construction. According to Habermas (1990), valid or 
legitimate norms are not simply those on which persons under specified conditions 
happen to agree, it is those norms that deserve to be intersubjectively 
acknowledged because they embody some interest that is recognisably common to 
all persons concerned. And whether they deserve such recognition has to be 
examined in practical discourse. Constitutional agreement that emerges from 
ethical discourse has legitimising force not simply because it is agreement, but 
because it indicates that the agreed-on rules deserve to be classified as equally 
good for everybody involved. 
Buchanan and Vanberg (1989) argue that Habermas's style of reasoning 
typically leaves considerable room for interpretation, and one might argue that 
some of his statements can well be read in a way that is much less in contrast to a 
contractarian conception. The contractarian and the dialogue notion represent 
alternative and opposing views: agreement as compromise versus agreement as 
truth-judgement. Buchanan and Vanberg's (1989: 58) interest in Habermas's 
discourse ethics is not in the authenticity of interpretation. Instead their interest is 
in exploring the potential for fruitful integration. And for them, the potential clearly 
exists if the two constructions are interpreted in the context of the distinction 
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between constitutional interests and constitutional theories as analytically separable 
components in constitutional preference and constitutional choice. 
Constitutional choice involves both individuals' genuine evaluations of 
alternative rules as well as predictions about the working properties of such rules. 
Observed constitutional disagreement may reflect disagreement in either one or 
both of these components. And the process of reaching agreement can, 
conceptually, be discussed in different terms depending on which one of the two 
components is concerned. Buchanan and Vanberg are of the view that 
to the extent that disagreement over the rules reflects genuine 
differences of interests, reaching constitutional agreement is clearly a 
matter of compromise, of finding terms that are acceptable to 
everybody, and definitely not a matter of 'discovering the truth'. To the 
extent, that disagreement is a matter of differences in constitutional 
theories, the process of reaching agreement clearly is about truth-
judgements and it can be properly compared to scientific discourse, to 
controversy over alternative theories in science (Buchanan and 
Vanberg 1989: 59). 
Though "interest" component and "theory" component are conceptually separable 
-
inputs into constitutional preferences, there is no practical way of strictly 
separating them in actual constitutional choice. One cannot know with any degree 
of certainty whether, or to what extent, observed disagreement reflects 'merely' 
differences in constitutional theories, or whether they are based on genuinely 
different evaluations. In this sense, acknowledgement of the legitimate role of 
potentially conflicting individual evaluations in constitutional choice clearly 
excludes an interpretation that assigns, as Habermas does, a truth-judgement 
function to the constitutional process. Failure to reach agreement in actual 
constitutional discourse- may, but not necessarily, reflect disagreement in theories. 
Even with perfect agreement in the theoretical dimension, potential for 
disagreement in evaluations may persist. And respect for such potential 
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disagreement commands that the limits of 'discourse' and the ultimate role and the 
need for compromise in constitutional matters be recognised. 
So for Buchanan and Vanberg (1989), within the limits specified above, 
there is an obvious role for 'reason' in constitutional choice. Compared to ordinary 
market-choice, there seems to be dramatic shift in relevance from the interest 
component to the theory component when choices among alternative rules are 
concerned. Persons' preferences over alternatives rules or systems of rules do not 
simply reflect 'basic values', they are largely a product of their constitutional 
theories, and, therefore, may be changed through information that impacts on their 
theories. To the extent that persons' revealed constitutional preferences are 
informed by their predictions of the working properties of the rules that are under 
consideration, constitutional agreement can be facilitated by a process that 
systematically encourages critical examination and discussion of alternative 
theoretical constructions, separate from and independent of any procedural devices 
that aim at facilitating agreement in the interest dimension. 
The dialogue or discourse notion can be fruitfully interpreted as drawing 
attention to the importance of the informational dimension choice in constitutional 
choice, even though advocates might not agree to such limited interpretation. 
Rational actors to whom efficiency as well as fairness are relevant attributes of a 
constitutional contract have reasons to be concerned not only about the interest 
dimension but also about the theory dimension in constitutional choice. Both 
concerns have certain implications for the kinds of procedural constraints that can 
be expected to facilitate actual agreement, implications that need not be in perfect 
accordance. 
-
So far as the interest dimension is concerned, agreement is facilitated by 
whatever increases persons' uncertainty about the particular effects that alternative 
rules can be expected to have on them. In the interest of facilitating agreement, 
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rational actors may, therefore deliberately choose to increase uncertainty. So far as 
the theory dimension is concerned, prospects of agreement on desirable rules are 
enhanced not by creating uncertainty but, on the contrary, by raising the level of 
mutually shared information on the general working properties of alternative rules. 
The fact that the public discourse on rules - as political debates in general -
IS typically carried out by reasoning arguments but can be supposed to be 
motivated by interests, is sometimes taken as evidence that the political rhetoric is 
mere camouflage, concealing real interests. And there is a tendency - e.g. in parts 
of the rent seeking literature - to conclude from this that it is ultimately only 
interests and the power behind interests that count in the political process, while 
arguments and reason lack any power 'of their own'. Such interpretation disregards 
the relevance of the genuine theoretical component in all political and in all 
constitutional preferences. And it ignores the fact that winning the support for 
one's own visions and theories is an important part of the political process. The 
very fact that political discourse is carried out in terms of reasoning argument 
rather than simple declaration of interests, by itself imposes certain constraints on 
how one may seek support for one's own proposals. 
To conclude, to the extent that persons share a common subset of non-
conflicting interests that can be met instrumentally through constitutional rules, the 
argument over alternative rules reduces to argument over theories. If the interests 
cannot be factored down into a commonly shared set, while, at the same time, the 
rules must be public in the sense of imposing constraints on all members of the 
community, divergent interests must be reconciled. At this level, the function of 
discussion, dialogue, reason, cannot be to generate agreement on the 'correctness' 
-
of alternative theories. Cooperation can replace conflict only if the differing 
interests, held with varying intensities by persons, can be traded off or 
compromised, actually or symbolically, in a social contract. 
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But Buchanan and Vanberg fail to recogruse that Habermas himself 
explicitly notes the critical difference between his discourse notion and a 
compromise notion of agreement, emphasising the cognitive claims of his own 
construction (Habermas 1975a: 111-17). He characterises his discourse 
construction as being critically dependent on the assumption that claims concerning 
the validity of norms carry a cognitive meaning and can be treated like truth-
judgements. And he strongly rejects the skeptical premise that the validity of norms 
cannot be analogous to the validity of truth-judgements. 
I shall argue in the next section that what distinguishes Habermas' theory 
from the contractarians is that discourse ethics cannot be merely seen as procedural 
. theory but is a moral-transformatory theory having practical consequences. 
3.3 Interpreting Discourse Ethics 
In this section, I shall discuss Benhabib's interpretation of discourse ethics 
mainly to highlight the significant differences between contract and discourse 
ethics. In her view, discourse ethics has to be seen as a "moral-transformatory" 
idea entailing a view of democratic-participatory public life rather than purely a 
"procedural" idea claiming for "legal-juridical" conception of public life. The 
significance of the separation of legal-juridical and participatory~democratic 
conceptions of public life is made precisely to distance discourse ethics from the 
contractarian approach (Moon 1991: 217-222). 
Discourse ethics relates specifically to the moralisation of the social world 
that occurs when the normativity of existing institutions is brought into question. 
Discourses are very specialised modes of argumentation. They derive ·their 
particular normative force from the fact that individuals are willing to settle a 
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controversial and contlictual matter without recourse to force, violence, false 
compromise, or silent acquiescence. 
Discourse ethics requires that controversies over the validity of 
contested norms be settled through an argumentative process in which 
the consensus of all concerned decides upon the legitimacy of the 
controversial norm (Benhabib 1986: 315). 
For such a consensus to emerge, Benhabib argues, practical discourse would have 
to be viewed as a moral-transformative process. If the origins of the concept of a 
discourse free from domination lie in the search for a democratic public ethos in 
late-capitalist societies, then it should hardly be surprising that relations of justice 
would be defined as the privileged object domain of this moral theory. Benhabib 
argues that there is a significant distinction between legalistic or juridical 
conception of public life and a democratic-participatory ethos, and the theory of 
communicative ethics sits uneasily between these two versions. This can be seen, 
as she says, with a clarification of the concept of 'interests' in communicative 
ethics. 
Discursive argumentation is viewed as being continuous with everyday life-
contexts in which real actors contend with one another over the validity of norms. 
The interests that participants in a discourse bring with them to the argumentation 
situation are ones that they already have as actors in the life-world. It can be 
assumed then that in the formula of 'universalisability', the concept of 'interests' is 
used in a sense that is continuous with such everyday life-world definitions and 
interpretations. Participation in discourses implies no stipulations regarding the 
ordinary, everyday understanding of interests. 
If participants in discourses bring with them their own interpretation of 
their own interests, then the question immediately suggests itself: given that the 
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satisfaction of the interests of each is to be viewed as a legitimate and reasonable 
criterion in establishing the universality of norms, then is it not the case that 
universality can only result when a corresponding "compatibility" or even harmony 
of interests really exists in the life-world? 
Consensual agreement reached in discourses would imply the existence of a 
harmony of interests in the life-world. Now if one were to assume that such a 
harmony of interests does indeed exist, then it is hard to see why the need for 
discourses would arise in the first place, since discourses aim to settle validity 
claims the controversial nature of which implies the presence of conflicting 
interests in the life-world. Yet if no such harmony exists in the life-world, then it is 
questionable whether discourses can create consensus around such conflictual 
interests without the participants in them coming to change their interpretation of 
their own interests, and perhaps even the life-forms in which they are anchored. If 
participants in a discourse have conflicting interests, then they could reach 
consensual agreement either by foregoing some of these interests or by changing 
the life-forms that generate them. 
Discourse ethics is a procedure for distinguishing universalisable from non-
universalisable interests (Benhabib 1986: 311). Norms are legitimate only when 
they correspond to the universalisable or general interest. This claim is also made 
in the contractarian tradition. 
There are three ways of interpreting the concept of general interest. 
1. In the contractarian paradigm the general interest minimally means "not taking 
interest in each other's interests. " 
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2. One can also interpret the "general interest" as describing not merely a set of 
procedures but an actual social situation in which conflict of interests among 
individuals disappears. This would imply the reconciliation of the individual and the 
universal, the private and the public, the empirical and the rational. 
3. Finally, one can regard the concept of "general interest" critically in order to 
reveal the partial and ideological biases of interests claimed to be universal or 
general. According to this third model, the very concept of a general interest 
would signify a test procedure. 
Since Legitimation Crisis (Habermas 1975a), Habermas intends discourse 
or communicative ethics to be interpreted in this third way as providing a critical 
test for uncovering non-generalisable interests. 
Since all those affected have, in principle, at least the chance to 
participate in practical deliberation, the "rationality" of the discursively 
formed will consists in the fact that the reciprocal behavioural 
expectations raised to normative status afford validity to a common 
interest ascertained without deception. The interest is common because 
the constraint-free consensus permits only what all ca!1 want; it is free 
of deception because even the interpretation of needs in which each 
individual must be able to recognise what he wants becomes the object 
of discursive will-formation (Habermas 1975a: 108). 
The latter half of this claim could be interpreted in two ways. Either it 
means that when individuals stop deceiving themselves and others, and discover 
what their "true" needs are, they will discover them to be identical with those of 
others, or at least in harmony with them. Or it could mean that through discourses 
individuals come to realise aO certain truth about their needs and interests and 
change their previously held beliefs about them. The first model is uncomfortably 
reminiscent of Rousseau's argument that if only each were to look inside one's 
heart and listen to its voice, he or she would discover the true "general interest." 
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According to the second interpretation, however, discourses would have to be 
viewed as moral transformative processes. 
This "moral-transformative" moment of practical discourse would serve to 
distinguish the Habermasian model of the "suppressed generalisable interest" from 
the position of contractarians. Benhabib argues that without the explicit 
acknowledgement of this dimension, this model cannot be distinguished from 
, 
others at all. Habermas has explicitly distanced himself from identifying practical 
discourse with any kind of collective bargaining or negotiating model. 
A compromise can be justified as a compromise only if both conditions 
are met; a balance of power among the parties involved and the non-
generalisability of the negotiated interests exist. If even one of these 
general conditions of compromise formation is not fulfilled, we are 
dealing with a pseudo-compromise. In complex societies pseudo-
compromises are an important form of legitimation (Habermas 1975a: 
112 ). 
In the light of this argument, the contractarian theories appear as a model of 
pseudo-compromise on the general interest for they fail to meet the second 
condition. The contention is that the discourse model would fall into 'legalism' if its 
moral transformatory aspect, entailing not compromise on interests but the real 
transformation of certain interests, were underplayed, and the theory were 
presented as a more refined version of a 'universalisability formula' in neo-Kantian 
ethics (Benhabib 1986: 313-315). 
If Habermas assumes that, in discourses individuals preserve the same need 
and interest interpretations as they had in ordinary, everyday contexts, then a 
consensual acceptance of norms reflecting the general interests of each can hardly 
follow. For this to be the case, either one must assume that a preestablished 
harmony of interests exists - clearly an unacceptable premise for a critical social 
theory - or one must interpret this process minimalistically as aiming at the 
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establishment of the lowest common interest, while leaving substantive conflict of 
interests untouched. This could consist in the formation of a legal system, a 
constitution embodying the two principles of justice and like. The content of a 
universalist ethical position would then be exhausted by a legalistic or juridical 
construction. But if neither alternatives is accepted, then one must assume that 
discourses are processes through which new needs and interests emerge which 
could lead to a consensus among participants. 
Benhabib argues that needs and interests cannot be taken as given but must 
be seen as a result of the processes of socialisation and the life experiences of 
individuals in particular social formations (Moon 1991: 217). Discourse should not 
be confined to finding rules which bridge the differences among given constellation 
of interests and identities but should call into question the conflicting interests, 
needs and aspirations which lead to conflict. Habermas himself argues that in 
discourses actors share as a background a lifeworld that forms the context for 
communication while at the same time providing the resources that the actors need 
to engage in this process. 
The moral transformative conception of discourse holds out the possibility 
that people can come to discover new needs and interests, whose satisfaction for 
one person is compatible with their satisfaction for others. For Benhabib such a 
discourse would be oriented not to the "generalised other" but to the "concrete 
other" - to specific individuals with particular identities and aspirations with whom 
we would seek to establish a genuine community (Moon 1991: 217). Benhabib 
(1986: 340) argues that the standpoint of the "generalised other" requires us to 
view each and every individual as a rational being entitled to the same rights and 
duties we would want to ascribe to ourselves. In assuming this perspe~tive, we 
abstract from the individuality and concrete identity of the other. By contrarst, the 
standpoint of the "concrete other" requires us to view each and every rational 
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being as an individual with a concrete history, identity, and affective-emotional 
constitution. 
Although the conception of 'subject' is empirically rooted in the learning 
process of the cultural evolution of modernity, Habermas, at the same time 
abstracts from it for normative purposes. The purpose of this abstraction is two 
fold: one is the individual's reflective ability to question the interpretive framework 
fixed by the cultural tradition. Secondly, such reflective questioning is accompanied 
by an ability to articulate one's needs linguistically, by an ability to communicate 
with others about them. 
Thus, in both instances, the assumption is that agents adopt a critical 
reflective distance toward the lifeworld instead of merely adhering to the norms 
governing everyday life. Communicative ethics shares with Kantian moral theory 
the emphasis on the role of reason in ethics, and the necessity of viewing rationality 
as universally binding. 
Benhabib's (1986: 298) contention is that communicative ethics runs the 
risk of falling into a certain "rationalistic fallacy" of the Kantian sort, in that it 
ignores the contingent, historical, and affective circumstances which made 
individuals adopt a universalist-ethical standpoint in the first place. A 
contemporary reformulation of the Hegelian objection to Kantian moral theory as 
applied to communicative ethics would be: does the cognitivist bias of 
communicative ethics also lead to the rationalistic fallacy, namely, to a view of 
reason as a self-generating faculty, determining both the conditions of its own 
genesis and application? (Benhabib 1986: 317). Such an ideal of the total self-
determination of reason· is essential to the idealist concept of reflection. Critical 
-
theory, by contrast, began with the insight that the total self-reflection of reason 
amounts to the impossible demand to transcend the human situatedness of reason, 
but the requirement that reason engage in self-reflection was also justified by 
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critical theorists, insofar as they argued that reason which is incapable of becoming 
aware of its own contingent origins and applications in society would tum into an 
instrument of domination. The rationalistic fallacy arises when the continuing 
critical self-reflection upon the conditions of the possibility of reason, conditions 
which reason never wholly determines, is minimised and reason is viewed as self-
generative. 
In my view, this objection is not a valid one since as discussed in chapter 2, 
Habermas himself has moved away from the strict Kantian defense of 
communicative ethics. The ideal speech situation is procedural but this does not 
mean totally disconnected from the life-world. Proceduralism does not imply 
formalism and ahistoricism, as it is usually thought to do. There is no reason why a 
procedural theory cannot be part of a more general theory of self, historical change 
and social structure. Agents form their opinions and views in the life-world but at 
the same time are rationally detached in order to adopt a critical reflexive 
standpoint. 
This question is concretised by turning to t~e beginnings of discourse. 
Habermas comments: 
Anyone who does not participate, or is not ready to participate in 
argumentation stands nevertheless "already" in contexts· of 
communicative action. In doing so, he has already naively recognised 
the validity claims - however counterfactually raised - that are 
contained in speech acts and which can be redeemed only the 
communicatively. Otherwise he would have to detach himself from the 
communicatively established language game of everyday practice 
(Habermas 1975a: 159). 
In Discourse Ethics: Towards a Justification Program (Ijabermas 1990: 
43-116) Habermasutilises this argument in the context of the refutation of 
. skepticism. The moral skeptic can indeed refuse argumentation; but 'through 
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argumentation he cannot indirectly deny that he· shares a sociocultural form of life, 
that he has been raised in contexts of communicative action, and that he 
reproduces his life in them. In a word, he can deny morality but not the ethical 
content of lived relations in which he abides, so to speak, day by day. Otherwise he 
must take flight in suicide or in a deep psychosis. Skepticism is the refusal to share 
a common way of life. 
Habermas admits that the commitment to consider all individuals as 
potential participants in discourse presupposes a universalistic commitment to the 
equality, autonomy, and rationality ofindividuals. 
Neither the willingness nor the ability to consider moral questions from 
the hypothetical and disinterested perspective of a participant in 
practical discourse falls from heaven; they result from interests that are 
formed only under social conditions, as well as from learning processes 
and experiences that are open to social groups only in certain 
situations. The interest in rational discourse is itself one which precedes 
rational discourse, and it is embedded in the contingency of individual 
life histories and in collective patterns of memory, learning, and 
experience. This interest can be enabled or frustrated in the life of the 
individual; just as available patterns of political culture and traditions in 
society may encourage or hinder the development of discursive 
rationality (Habermas 1982: 253). 
The purpose of TTCA (Habermas 1984) is precisely to make visible those 
processes of rationalisation of the life-world which constitute the tradition of the 
moderns for us, and which first make the ideal of discourse possible. It might be 
questioned whether the specificity of the cultural, political and institutional 
configurations which would enable the ideal of discourse embodiment can be 
. captured via a general theory of rationalisation which radically distinguishes 
between the rational reconstruction of logic of development and the narrative 
unfolding of historical traditions. 
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Communicative ethics demands from its participants a willingness and an 
ability to consider normative questions from a universalist standpoint and to regard 
every being as an equal regardless of the actual constellation of relations in real life. 
The necessity of discursive argumentation arises when, through conflict and crises, 
social and political agents challenge an established background consensus. 
Discourses arise when the intersubjectivity of ethical life is endangered; but the 
very project of discursive argumentation presupposes the ongoing validity of a 
reconciled intersubjectivity (Benhabib 1986: 321). For those who feel that the 
reconciliation in social life has been achieved at their expense, it might be morally 
justified to refuse participating. This does not imply resorting to violence or to 
force, but simply the refusal to engage in dialogue since the mutuality of shared 
existence is indeed endangered by the existing configuration of power. 
There are some situations where the nature of the conflict between the 
parties is such that there can be no dialogue, for the preconditions of dialogue -
namely, the mutual recognition of each other as discursive partners - simply do not 
obtain. Structural inequalities between the parties, s.uch as those pertaining to 
wealth, power, or status may be such that reciprocal recognition does not exist. 
Social conflicts may resist being cast into the discourse model of conflict 
resolution. 
This means that communicative ethics is contingent on both ends: the 
willingness and capacity of individuals and the culture at large to adopt such an 
ethical standpoint in the first place as well as the moral sagacity and political 
insight necessary to concretise the principles of such ethics in action. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I contrasted two normative theories of collective choice: 
contractarian public choice and discourse ethics. From the standpoint of Buchanan, 
both discourse ethics and contract can be complementary if the former limits itself 
to the theory-component in choice and the latter to the interest-component of 
constitutional choice. 
Unlike Habermas, Buchanan's view is that moral controversies cannot be 
decided with 'reason' because the value premises from which we infer moral 
assumptions are irrational. By contrast, I argued, following Benhabib, that 
Habermas' theory cannot be merely seen as procedural but more importantly 
should be seen as a moral-transformatory theory. 
Notes 
1 There are many different theories of conflict resolution. Within contract theories. there are 
Hobbesian contractarians like Buchanan (1962) and Kantian contractarians like Rawls (1971). 
Secondly, liberals like Ackerman (1980) articulate a liberal model of dialogue. And finally, 
Habermas provides a critical theory of discursive legitimation. In this chapter. I am concerned 
with Buchanan and Habermas because the former represents public choice theory and the latter 
critical theory. 
2 Theoretical discourse is the form of argumentation in which controversial truth claims are 
thematised. Practical discourse is the form of argumentation in which claims to normative 
rightness are made thematic. Here persons are rational who canjustify·their actions with 
reference to existing normative contexts. This is particularly true of those who, in cases of 
normative conflict, act judiciously, that is, neither give in to their effects nor pursue their 
immediate interests but are concerned to judge the dispute from a moral point of view and to 
settle it in a consensual manner. The medium in which we can hypothetically test whether a norm 
of action. be it actually recognised or not. can be impartially justified is practical discourse 
(Habermas 1984: 19). 
3 In his earlier work Knowledge and Human Interests (1970b: postscript) Habermas develops the 
theory of cognitive interests (or knowledge-constitutive interests). The theory of cognitive 
interests is concerned with uncovering the conditions of the possibility of knowledge. It is 
Habermas' contention that the human species organises its experience in terms of a priori 
interests, or cognitive interests. That there is a 'basis of interests' follows from an understanding 
of humans as both labouring and language-using animals: they must produce from nature what is 
needed for material existence through the manipulation and control of objects and communicate 
with others through the use of intersubjectively understood symbols within the context for rule-
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governed institutions. Besides these two interests, there is also, according to Habermas a third 
one which is the reflective character of knowledge. This is an interest in reason, in the human 
capacity to be self- reflective and self determining, to act rationally. Thus the interests are the 
technicaL practical and emancipatory (empirical-analytic; historical-hermeneutic and critical). 
Habermas accords to the category of cognitive interests a some what problematic status 
as quasi-transcendental. Here he takes psychoanalysis. particularly its insights into the 
significance of self reflection, as the prototype of a critical science and transposes the model to 
the realm of social analysis and political practice. In his latter work, Habermas redefines critical 
theory. Instead of constructing an a priori based theory of cognitive interests. Habermas argues 
that critical theory needs to be more empirical. 
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Chapter 4 
The Problem of Cooperation - Strategic Action and Communicative Action 
Introduction 
While Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Riker (1982) were concerned with 
the normative task of aggregating preferences, the problem addressed by both 
Downs (1957) and Olson (1965) was to use micro economic tools to explore the 
provision of public goods and collective action. In this chapter I shall discuss the 
problem of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma. Rational choice theorists have 
explored the problems of cooperation in a game theoretic framework. 
As discussed in chapter 1, public choice theories rely on a 'thin' version of 
instrumental rationality based on the notion of homo ecollomicliS. This model of 
rationality conceptualises the structure of social interaction as 'parametric' in that 
agents have 'fixed' or 'given' preferences. Game theory is essentially a critique of it. 
In section 4.1, I discuss the prisoner's dilemma prqblem and the problem of 
indeterminacy in strategic interaction in game theory and then move on, in section 
4.2, to discuss the possible alternatives. And Finally, in section 4.3, I shall show the 
meeting points for productive conversation between rational choice and critical 
theory. 
4.1 The Problem of Indeterminacy - Limits of Strategic Rationality 
4.2 Rational Cooperation - Interests and Social Norms 
4.3 Norms and Interests - Strategic Action and Communicative Action 
4.1 The Problem of Indeterminacy - Limits of Strategic Rationality 
The paradox which public choice theories exposed is the conflict of 
individual and social rationality. The disanalogy arises in the process of preference 
aggregation (voting: majority rule) and in the problem of collective action (free-
rider's problem) or prisoner's dilemma. The significant contribution of game 
theorists comes through demonstrating the limits of a particular form of 
individualism in social science: one based exclusively on the model of persons as 
preference satisfiers principally associated with public choice theory literature 
(Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Downs 1957; Riker 1982; and Olson 1965). The 
structure of instrumental rationality used in these theories has been explained in 
chapter 1. In rational choice theories the individual is modelled as a homo 
economiclls who is essentially concerned with his preferences acting in a 
predominantly parametric environment. 
Critiques challenged the methodological assumptions of rational choice 
theories. In Pathologies of Rational Choice Theories (.1994), Green and Shapiro 
provide a critical appraisal that would assess rational choice scholarship on its own 
terms. They argue that practitioners of rational choice theory operate within the 
confines of an esoteric technical vocabulary that is seldom understood by anyone 
else, while and on the other hand, critics tend to ignore the rational choice 
paradigm without understanding it fully. 
Green and Shapiro (1994: 33) identify a list of 'methodological pathologies' 
in rational choice theories and locate much of the responsibility for this explanatory 
inadequacy in a "syndrome of fundamental and recurrent methodological failings 
rooted in its universalist aspirations". They are as follows: 
1. Post-hoc theory development 
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2. Search for confirming evidence 
3. Projecting evidence from theory 
4. Arbitrary domain restriction 
The first of these pathologies is 'post hoc theory development'. Green and 
Shapiro contend that rational choice theories are "method driven" rather than 
"problem driven" and that, as a result, rational choice theorists look only for 
evidence that is consistent with their theory - sometimes to the point of fitting the 
data to the theory. Rather than formulating bold predictions that are falsifiable by 
empirical evidence, rational choice theorists tend first to look at empirical 
evidence, then design a rational choice model that fits it. On their view, rational 
choice theorists allegedly engage in "arbitrary domain restriction". This means that 
rational choice theory is applicable wherever the theory seems to work (Green and 
Shapiro 1994: 45). 
Game theorists have been quick enough to recognise these difficulties and 
attempted to redefine the notion of rationality in explaining social and political 
interaction. 
Let me briefly recapitulate the problem of collective action. The problem of 
collective action arises when social action is likely to be distorted by the private 
interests of the agents who are to carry them out. This problem is associated with 
public goods and explored by Olson (1965) and Downs (1957). The collective 
action problems are the most pervasive probiems in everyday life situations. They 
fascinate social scientists because they involve interaction where the individual 
pursuit of what seems rational produced a collectively self-defeating result, in 
regard to e.g. disarmament, joining a trade union, corruption and why do we stand 
when we can all sit. The non-coincidence of self-interest behaviour and socially co-
operative outcomes has been a key factor in the way game theory has evolved. 
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Likewise, many times social interactions can also have unintended consequences 
(Elster 1989b: 94-95). Jean Paul Sartre referred this to 'counterfinality'. For 
example, when farmers try to get more land by felling trees, they can end up losing 
land because large-scale deforestation leads to soil erosion. When everyone gets to 
his feet to get a better view of the game, no one succeeds and all get tired from 
standing up. But unintended consequences can also make everybody better off. 
This is Adam Smith's 'invisible hand': the pursuit of self interest serves the common 
interest. For example, people paint their houses in order to protect them from bad 
weather, but in doing so they may also offer others benefit of a pleasant sight. The 
analytical structure of the collective action problem is similar to that of the 
prisoner's dilemma. 
Let me start with the prisoner's dilemma. There are innumerable examples 
in social life of this perverse tendency of individual rationality generating collective 
disaster. For example, it is better for all commuters if all go by bus than if all go by 
car, but for each it is always better to go by car. It is better for everybody if 
nobody litters in the park, but individuals have no incentive to abstain form 
littering. Likewise, voting, reporting one's income correctly, supporting public 
radio stations and joining a revolutionary movement conform to a similar pattern. 
The prisoner's dilemma was discovered around 1950 by Merrill Flood and 
Melvin Desher. Its greatest strength is that it makes the strategic aspects of such 
interaction explicit. In its simplest form, the prisoner's dilemma involves two 
players in interaction, each facing two possible strategies. Since each player can 
choose independently of the other, their two pairs of strategies produce four 
possible outcomes. 
~ 
• 
Cooperate 
Cooperate 
1,1 
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Defect 
-1,3 
I Defect 13,-1 10,0 . 
Each outcome is a payoff pair such as the lower left outcome (3, -1) in 
which the first payoff goes to Rowand the second to Column. In a prisoner's 
dilemma situation, there are two players, Rowand Column, each facing two 
strategy choices, cooperate and defect. If both cooperate, they receive positive 
payoffs of 1 each. If both defect, they receive payoffs of ° each. If one cooperates 
and the other defects, the cooperator receives an even worse pay-off, -1, while the 
defector does very well with a positive pay-off of 3. There is therefore a strong 
incentive to defect. Thus defection is the dominant strategy for each player: if 
Row's choice does not influence Column'S, then Row is better off defecting 110 
matter what Column does. As is clear from the representation, Row gets more in 
each column from choosing defection than from choosing cooperation. To sum up, 
both Olson's free-rider problem and the prisoner' dilemma suggest a discouraging 
perspective on the problems of cooperation and coordination. However, the most 
dismal aspects of both problems reflect the static nature of the analysis and the fact 
that it is a one-shot game, i.e., when the prisoner's dilemma game is played only 
once, it is a dominant strategy for players to defect and therefore not to achieve 
what would be an efficient outcome with respect to the aggregate well being of the 
players. 
The so-called prisoner's dilemma has been the mainstay of game theory. 
However, in recent years game theorists have found that defection is not 
necessarily the dominant strategy if the situation is repeated over and over again. 
, 
Many social interactions are repeated either with the same person or with people 
who are drawn from the social group. Since one-off encounters typically occur 
. only between strangers, the analysis of repeated games promises to extend the 
scope of game theory considerably. 
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I intend to explicate the abstract reasoning of strategic interaction by way 
of discussing some of the central ideas in game theory. Game theory is rapidly 
becoming established as one of the cornerstones of the social sciences. Its claims 
go beyond the domain of economics representing an opportunity to unify the social 
sciences by providing a foundation for a rational theory of society. Some argue that 
Game theory may be viewed as a sort of umbrella or unified theory for 
the rational side of social science .... (it) does not use different, ad hoc 
constructs... it develops methodologies that apply in principle to all 
interactive situations (Aumann and Hart 1992: 4). 
If one accepts that interaction is the essence of social life, then game 
theory provides solid micro foundations for the study of social 
structure and social change (Elster 1983b: 77). 
In discussing game theory, I shall confine myself exclusively to four 
themes: first is the distinction between 'parametric' and 'strategic' actions. Second is 
the problem of 'indeterminacy'. Third is the importance of the notion of belief-
.. formation in strategic settings. And finally, the notion of preference formation. All 
four themes illuminate the limitations of rational choice theory. 
Game theorists model individuals not as isolated and atomistic but as 
strategic agents engaged in forming beliefs about each other. The fundamental idea 
is that game theorists attribute to actors a unique human 'capacity for strategic 
behaviour (Elster 1979: 2, 9-18). They populate their models with actors who are 
strategically competent, who are capable of engaging in strategic rather than 
merely instrumental or parametric action. In a parametric decision the agent faces 
external constraints that are in some sense given or parametric. First he estimates 
them all and decides what to do. A strategic situation, on the contrary, is 
characterised by interdependence of decisions. Each agent has to anticipate what 
others are likely to do, which may require an estimate of what they anticipate that 
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he will do. His decision enters as part-determinant of the constraints that shape his 
decision. Likewise, game theorists also presume that social actors can 1. 
understand that their environment partly consists of other 'intentional' beings and 2. 
recognise those others as 'equally' rational. A game is defined as any interaction 
between agents that is governed by a set of outcomes for each possible 
combination of moves. 
Because, for each agent, the context of interaction is constituted partly by 
other intentional agents, it cannot be treated as a parameter. As a result, the 
apparently straightforward idea of rationality no longer provides solid theoretical 
moorings. In strategic settings the concept of rationality itself calls out for scrutiny. 
Thus a theory of games promises to apply to any social interaction. The key 
assumptions of game theory are: common knowledge of rationality (CKR) and 
actors' knowledge the rules of the game. The assumption of common knowledge of 
rationality implies that players are in agreement about the rules of the game that is 
being played. Moreover, agents regard each other as rational in the interacting 
setting. Game theorists demonstrate that strategic rationality can coordinate social 
and political interaction. The theory of games attempts to determine what'rational' 
can mean when an individual is confronted with the problem of optimal behaviour 
in games and equivalent situations. 
The analytical rigour of game theory is employed to model social 
interaction in everyday life. As said before, game theorists conceptualise social 
interaction as consisting of other intentional agents and recognise those others as 
equally rational. This assumption of mutual recognition of rational individuals has 
enriched the scope of the explanation in social interaction. In a strategic interaction 
individuals need to take other rational beings whose actions affect .each other into 
consideration. So in an interactive setting 'belief formation' assumes an important 
. role since agents have to form expectations regarding other agents. This means, 
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your beliefs about others affect their behaviour when those beliefs lead them to 
expect that you will act in particular ways. 
So the question is what is the source of beliefs? (Elster 1983a: 4-6; 16-17) 
Where do they come from? To put it differently, most game theorists agree on one 
aspect of the belief formation in the social world: how to update beliefs in the 
presence of new information? In the absence of evidence, how do agents form 
probability assessments governing events like the behaviour of others? One answer 
is that we can use previous experience to generate expectations i.e. experience with 
other people provides a basis for belief formation. 
Beliefs are treated as purely subjective assessments. They are only revealed 
ex post by the choices people make. But the disadvantage of this is that it might 
license almost any kind of action and so could render the model close to vacuous. 
So in order to overcome this, game theorists supplement the assumption of 
instrumental rationality with the assumption of common knowledge of rationality 
(CKR). The purpose of the latter is to place constraints on people's subjective 
expectations regarding the actions of others. 
Thus expectations regarding what others will do are likely to influence 
what it is instrumentally rational for you to do. Thus fixing the beliefs that rational 
agents hold about each other is likely to provide the key to the analysis of rational 
action in games. If you want to form an expectation about what somebody does, 
what could be more natural than to model what determines their behaviour and 
then use the model to predict what they will do in the circumstances that interest 
you? You could assume that the person is an idiot or a robot or whatever, but most 
of the time you will be playing games with people who are instrumentally rational 
like yourself and so it will make sense to model your opponent as instrumentally 
. rational. This is the idea that is built into the game theory to cover how players 
form expectations. 
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In game theory, a solution consists of a definite prediction regarding what 
strategically rational players will do in the situation being modelled. The 
conception of equilibrium in game theory is influenced greatly by the work of John 
Nash. A Nash equilibrium occurs if there is a potentially self-reinforcing agreement 
whereby each actor does what is best for him/her given what others do. It call be 
understood intuitively as all agreement from which no party has an incentive to 
defect (Johnson 1993: 79-80). Harsanyi defines it more exactly: A given strategy of 
a certain player is called a best reply to the other players' strategies if it maximises 
this player's payoff so long as the other players' strategies are kept constant. So a 
given combination of strategies is called an equilibrium point if every player's 
strategy is a best reply to all other players' strategies. Thus when people can enter 
into binding agreements with others, "an equilibrium corresponds to an outcome in 
which no coalition has the incentive or the means for unilaterally insuring an 
improvement in the welfare of all of its members". 
The concept of Nash equilibrium employs a powerful idea of 'mutual 
rationality', This idea is essentially concerned with 'respecting the mental 
capacities' of every individual participating in the game. The presupposition of 
mutual rationality enriches its search for equilibria in a strategic game. Thus game 
theorists argue that given CKR and consistently aligned beliefs (CAB) Nash 
equilibrium is possible. For game theorists, the formulation of social interaction in 
this way can overcome the disputes surrounding the problems of indeterminacy. 
The recognition of mutual rationality makes the prediction of individual strategies 
possible in any game and arrived at a Nash equilibrium. 
The Nash equilibrium is attractive because as time goes by and agents 
adjust their expectations of what others will do in the light of experience, then they 
. will seem naturally drawn to a Nash equilibrium because it is the resting place for 
beliefs (Heap and Varoufakis 1995: 192). Since many social interactions are 
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repeated either with the same person or with people who are drawn from the same 
social group and since one-off encounters typically occur only between strangers, 
the analysis of repeated games promises to extend the scope of game theory 
considerably. In dynamic settings players learn things about their opponents from 
the way they have behaved in the past. Such learning can be exploited by players 
behaving in particular ways to develop 'reputations' for playing the game in 
particular ways (Heap and Varoufakis 1995: 167). 
The strength of the concept of equilibrium lies in its predictive power. 
What must be balanced is choices of actions i.e., intentions, which are thus 
analogous to physical forces. Social equilibria occur when actors choose in the 
most advantageous way, given the choices of others, and reach an outcome they 
would not wish to depart from. That is, they would not wish to have chosen 
differently because the outcome reached is the best they can achieve under the 
circumstances. 
If a single equilibrium point exists for a given configuration of actors' 
preferences and a set of institutional rules, then it is possible to derive predictive 
hypotheses about what actual agents will do, assuming that people behave 
rationally. If there are many possible equilibria, then rational choice models become 
, more indeterminate; if there are no equilibria, then the political world threatens to 
be chaotic and inherently unpredictable in its basic structure: Thus predictions 
made using Nash equilibrium concept can be either non-existent or indeterminate. 
That is why so much of the theoretical rational choice literature revolves around 
trying to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of 
equilibria. 
The thinking behind the Nash equilibrium is quite brilliant. It cuts through 
the knot of webs of beliefs and arrives at a simple respect of everyone's mental 
capacities. Nash argues that because players are rational and respect each other's 
152 
rationality, they are naturally drawn to the Nash equilibrium since the latter is the 
only one that respects equally every one's rationality. Internal consistency of each 
player, as assumed by rational choice theorists, is not enough when the game is 
played under CKR, mutual respect requires that beliefs should also be mutually 
consistent. It means that no instrumentally rational person can expect another 
similarly rational person who has the same information to develop different thought 
processes (Heap and Varoufakis 1995: 25). If a person knows your plans he would 
not want to change the beliefs he holds about you and which support his own 
planned actions. Players must also form the same probabilistic assessment of what 
is likely to happen when they go to work with the same information. When this is 
made clear, it will touch on the matters of uncertainty (Elster 1989a: 4-10). Nash 
is undeniably at the heart of game theory and the existence of multiple Nash 
equilibria in many games has set an agenda of refining Nash. 
The point of the refinement project is to reduce the number of Nash 
equilibria where possible so that prediction of Nash is not rendered vacuous by the 
presence of multiple equilibria. Game theorists explored in various ways to 
overcome the problem of multiple Nash equilibria but were unsuccessful. Let me 
bring in together some of the arguments which have surfaced over the Nash 
Equilibrium. Firstly, it is not clear that the consistent alignment of beliefs (CAB), 
which is necessary for Nash, can be justified by appeals to the assumptions of 
rationality CKR. Something else seems to be required and the best game theory has 
come up with so far is the Harsanyi doctrine (and its defense by Robert Aumann). 
This has the effect of making rational players believe that there is a unique rational 
way to play a game because rational players must draw the same inferences from 
the same information. Once this is conceded then it follows from the assumptions 
of instrumental rationality and CKR that the way to play must constitute a Nash 
equilibrium. It is the status of the Harsanyi-Aumann argument which is in dispute. 
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According to Harsanyi, the argument is that when two rational individuals 
have the same information, they must draw the same inferences and come, 
independently, to the same conclusion (Heap and Varoufakis 1995: 58). This 
would still leave it open for different agents to entertain different expectations 
since it only requires that rational agents draw the same inferences from the same 
information but they need not enjoy the same in/ormation. Robert Aumann, in 
defence of Harsanyi, discounts this possibility stating that two rational players 
could not 'agree to disagree' in such a manner, since the moment rational agents 
discover that they are holding inconsistent expectations each has a reason to revise 
their beliefs until they converge and become consistent. Thus the Harsanyi-Aumann 
argument implies that rational agents, when faced by the same information with 
respect to the game should hold the same beliefs about how the game will be 
played by rational agents. 
Here again it is difficult to see Aumann's defence without a problem. Such a 
defence of CAB is plausible only when the idea of an explicit 'dialogue' in real (i.e. 
historical) time is considered. But Aumann does not appeal to any notion of 
dialogue and without such a process there cannot be any agreement. Following 
Habermas who thought that agreement can be arrived at through dialogue, we 
assume that an opposition of incompatible positions will give way to consensus 
acceptable to both sides once differences are resolved in communication. This 
would seem to create a problem for Aumann's argument at least as far as one shot 
games are concerned, that is, interactions which occur between the game once and 
then you might discover ex post that you must have been holding some divergent 
expectationS. 
To sum up, whatever the case, the basic method of game theory is to argue 
that individuals try to predict what others will do in reply to their own actions. 
Thus game theory provides a particular although not uncontentious perspective on 
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social action: individuals are both optimisers and perfectly rational. Whether this 
view of social interaction is descriptive of how people actually do behave, or is 
prescriptive of how rational people would, or even should behave, is· interesting. 
Despite its tremendous success in applying the model of calculating rationality in 
social interactions predicting human behaviour in economic, political, social realms, 
it still has serious failings (Lyons: 94). Although Nash equilibrium is championed 
by game theorists as the most effective tool to analyse situations of cooperative 
outcome, it still needs to confront the question of 'equilibrium selection'. 
An equilibrium point is only a necessary - not a sufficient - condition for the 
existence of a solution. This is because a game might admit either of no equilibrium 
or several (Elster 1989a: 7-17). The problem is best illustrated in Elster's work. His 
works (Elster 1983a) and (Elster 1989a) are an internal critique of instrumental 
reason. Elster argues that rational choice theories rely on intentional explanations. 
Briefly put, an intentional explanation has the following structure. Elster argues 
that the thick theory of rational action can be defined as the choice of actions 
. 
which best satisfies a person's preferences (Elster 1986a: 1-18). He describes 
rational action as involving three 'optimising' operations: 
I. finding the best action, for given beliefs and desires; 
2. forming the best grounded belief, for given evidence; 
3. collecting the right amount of evidence, for given desires and beliefs. 
Ideally, then, a rational choice explanation of an action would satisfy three 
sets of requirements. First, there are optimality conditions whi?h underlies the 
principle of utility maximisation. Second, there is a set of consistency conditions. 
Finally, there is a set of causal conditions which means the action must not only be 
rationalised by the desire and the belief; it must also be caused by them and 
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moreover, caused 'in the right way'. In all this, the elementary unit of explanation is 
that individual action is guided by some intention. Rationality, then, is understood 
as a variety of intentionality. For something to be rational, it has to be within the 
scope of conscious, deliberate action or reflection. Intentional explanation forms 
the basis of rational choice explanation and it is also the feature that distinguishes 
the social sciences from the natural sciences. Explanation in terms of optimisation 
remains the paradigm case of intentional explanation in social sciences. To put it in 
a nutshell, instrumental rationality equates the rational action with the choice of the 
means most likely to satisfy a given set. 
Now given this sketch of rational action, Elster argues that it can go wrong 
at all three different levels and in each case the failure may be due to either 
'indeterminacy' or 'irrationality' (Elster 1989a: 5). To the extent that rationality 
fails to give unambiguous prescriptions, it is indeterminate and to the extent that 
people fail to follow its prescriptions - that they behave irrationally - the theory is 
inadequate. What distinguishes Elster's critique from game theorists is that the 
. 
latter only recognise the problem of 'indeterminacy' at the level of actions. 
Elucidating the triadic relation of beliefs and desires; evidence and action, Elster 
gives a powerful exposition of the nature of preference formation. 
The problem of indeterminacy in rational choice theory arises in two forms: 
one is the problem of multiple optima and the other is non-existence of rational 
choice. This problem is best illustrated in non co-operative game theory. And game 
theory provides scant assistance in coming to terms with the indeterminacy it 
generates. The implication is that there are a number of equilibria on which players 
might potentially converge. With respect to belief formation, E~~ter argues that 
'uncertainty' and 'strategic interaction' create problems. Uncertainty is defined as 
'radical ignorance', the lack of ability to assign numerical probabilities to the 
possible . outcomes associated with the various options. Next consider strategic 
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interaction as an obstacle to rational belief formation. Rational choice requires 
beliefs about choices to be made by other people. These beliefs, to be rational, 
must take account of the fact that these others are similarly forming beliefs about 
oneself and about each other. In the absence of enforcement and commitment 
devices, there is no way in which a player can form a rational belief about what the 
other will do. Problems of indeterminacy also arise with respect to the optimal 
amount of information one should collect before forming an opinion. 
The central argument is that rationality itself requires us to recognise the 
limitation of our rational powers, and that the belief in the omnipotence of reason 
is just another form of irrationality. Similarly, the notion of preference formation 
includes beliefs, desires and actions. Individual rationality based on mere 'given' 
preferences is a fragile foundation for rational choice theory. Preferences can be 
distorted and individual rationality itself can run into problems. There are any 
number ways for preferences to be distorted. For example, weakness of will and 
excess of will, cognitive dissonance reduction, adaptive preference formation, 
preference reversals, intrapersonal problems of preference aggregation and other 
forms of cognitive compartmentalisation like self-deception and wishful thinking 
(Elster 1983a~ 89a 89b). 
By conceptualising interaction in strategic terms, rational choice theorists 
appear to capture some of the elemental features of social interactions. In other 
words, how much can be said about the outcome of games will tell us much about 
how much of the social world can be explained in instrumentally rational, 
. individualist terms. As discussed earlier, in prisoner's dilemma game the stark 
prediction is 'mutual defection'. The existence of this type of interaction together 
with the inference that both will arm has provided one of the strongest arguments 
for the creation of the state. The aim of rational choice theorists is to study the 
ability of human beings to devise co-operative solutions to resolve problems in a 
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decentralised settings without the intervention of a coerclve state. The 
investigation of this problem - how is spontaneous order possible - is sometimes 
referred to as the Hayekian programme. Attempts to implement the Hayek 
programme include Taylor (1987); Axelrod (1984). 
So in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game, one that is repeated, there is no 
dominant strategy. In a famous tournament, Robert Axelrod found that the winning 
strategy under these conditions of continuous repeated play is a strategy of tit-for-
tat, one in which a player responds in kind to the action of the other player. This is 
the central theme of Axelrod's celebrated work The Evolution of Cooperation 
(1984). 
One of the main reasons for looking at repeated games is to explore the 
intuition of linking repetition with co-operation. In repeated games one alternative 
is to adopt a 'tit-for-tat' strategy rationally. Recall that the problem in one-shot 
games arose because the obvious remedy of making an agreement to co-operate 
failed in the absence of an enforcement mechanism. The point of repetition is that it 
allows the players themselves to enforce an agreement. Players are able to do this 
by being able to threaten to punish their opponents in future plays of the game if 
they transgress now. The tit-for-tat strategy (Axelrod tournament) embodies 
precisely this type of behaviour. It offers implicitly to cooperate by co-operating 
first and it enforces co-operation by threatening to punish an opponent who defects 
on co-operation by defecting until that person co-operates again. To put it 
differently, playing this strategy allows your opponent to develop a reputation for 
co-operation simply by playing cooperatively in the previous play of the game. Co-
operation is possible if the interaction is provided sufficiently often to make the 
. long term benefits outweigh the short-term gains. Axelrod invited professional 
game theorists to enter programs for playing a computer based repeated, round 
robin, version of the prisoner's dilemma game. Under the tournament rules, each 
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entrant (program) was paired with another once in a random ordering, and in each 
of these contests the game was repeated 200 times. In fact 14 people responded 
and the round robin tournament was actually played five times to produce an 
average score for each program. Tit-for-tat, submitted by Anatol Rapoport won 
the tournament. So in the indefinitely iterated prisoner's dilemma game, each player 
can choose among various reaction functions, each of which tells him what to do in 
any given game as a function of the history of choices of both players. One such 
function is "always defect". Another is "conditional co-operation", tit-for-tat is 
defined as follows: Always co-operate in the first game. In each subsequent game, 
co-operate if and only if the other player co-operated in the previous game. Thus 
under certain conditions, the use of tit-for-tat by both players is an equilibrium of 
the game. Here co-operation is maintained by the shared knowledge that it will be 
permanently unravelled by a single defection. Elster says that intuitively, the 
requirement of unanimity may to be too strong and that conditional co-operation of 
this kind can be sustained by a norm of fairness (Elster 1989c: 44). Moreover, tit-
for-tat is not fully conditional, since in addition to the conditional injunction to 
cooperate if others cooperate previously, it also includes the 'unconditional 
.. instruction' to cooperate in the first round. 
Axelrod (1984: 5) chooses the United States Senate as the typical case of 
the emergence of cooperation. Here each senator has an incentive to appear 
effective to his or her constituents, even at the expense of conflicting with other 
senators, who are trying to appear effective to their constituents. There are many 
opportunities for mutually rewarding activities by two senators. These mutually 
rewarding actions have led to the creation of an elaborate set of norms, or 
folkways, in the Senate. Among the most important of these is the norm of 
reciprocity - a folkway which involves helping out a colleague and getting repaid in 
kind. It includes vote trading but extends to so many types of mutually rewarding 
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activities that it is not an exaggeration to say that reciprocity is a way of life in the 
Senate. 
The end story is that cooperation, once established on the basis of 
reciprocity, can protect itself from invasion by less cooperative strategies. 
To sum up, it is plausible to treat the pervasive indeterminacy generated in 
game theoretic models as a negative result (Johnson 1993: 80; Heap and 
Varoufakis 1995: 2). More specifically it is possible to interpret the problem of 
indeterminacy as identifYing the limits of strategic rationality as a mechanism for 
coordinating social and political interaction. The point here is not that actual social 
and political practices generate indeterminate outcomes but that in the austere 
world captured by formal game theoretic models, unembellished strategic 
rationality does so (Bohman 1991; Elster 1989: 85). The unintended upshot of this 
effort is to demonstrate systematically what critical theorists suspect, namely, that 
in many settings strategic rationality alone does not suffice to sustain social 
relations. In fact, normal game theoretic results show that in dynamic settings, 
strategic interaction generates widespread indeterminacy in the form of multiple 
equilibria and attendant coordination problems (Johnson 1993: 80). 
Although tit-for-tat is one response, there are other responses. Elster 
appeals to norms for explaining action (Elster 1989c). Tit-for-tatcan be interpreted 
as a norm but it is a norm which presupposes strategic talents among the players. 
Thus rational prudence still underlies the tit-for-tat strategy. Elster, on the other 
hand, takes a broader interpretation of norms. Critical theorists might advance a 
distinctive interpretation of game theoretic results by identifYing what beyond 
strategic rationality is at work in coordinating social and political" interaction. 
Critical theorists identify the mechanism - the binding force of validity claims raised 
in communicative action. This is the juncture where a conversation between critical 
theory and game rational choice theory can begin. However, game theorists might 
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counter that insofar as their theory begins to specify its own limits, they need not 
rely on critical theory to perform that task (Johnson 1993: 80). 
In his theory of communicative action, Habermas seeks to reconstruct 
"institutionally unbound" speech acts. That means, utterances derive force as 
mechanisms for coordinating social interaction solely from universal validity claims 
rather than from the contingent normative or institutional context in which they are 
advanced (Habermas 1979: 38-40; 1984: 295). So too, game theory reconstructs 
institutionally unbound strategic actions. It aspires to identify equilibrium outcomes 
sustained solely by the choices of strategically rational actors. It standardly treats 
institutions, culture as incidental and inessential detail and relegates them to the 
boundary conditions that tie the modelled structure to its unmodeled environment. 
In the next section, I shall discuss Elster on social norms and then move on 
to discuss the comprehensiveness of discourse ethics. 
4.2 Rational Co-operation: Interests and Social Norms 
The problem of indeterminacy led some rational choice theorists to move away 
from the strict postulates of the theory. Theorists like Elster have appealed to 
'norms' to supplement 'interests'. Elster's analysis differs from other rational choice 
theorists in the sense he appeals to a broader typology of human motivations. 
The literature on the problem of cooperation can be divided into two parts: 
centralised and decentralised solutions. Centralised solutions include State and 
. selective incentives. Both State and selective incentives argument presuppose the 
presence of a-centralised coercive agent (Olson 1965). Decentralised solutions 
include altruism (Margolis 1982), spontaneous solutions like Tit-for-Tat (Axelrod 
.. 1984), anarchical order (Taylor 1987) and social norms (Elster 1989c). Excepting 
Elster, in all these solutions there is a tacit acceptance of "rational prudence" as a 
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motivational principle for resolving cooperative problems. All these works in one 
way or another are interested in the political-modelling process in studying the 
conditions under which cooperation can be sustained. I argue that mere rational 
self-interest cannot be a helpful guide in modelling cooperation. Even game 
theorists like rational choice theorists stipulate that no explanation of successful 
collective action should ever appeal to more than 'rational prudence'. This is for 
the reason that they fear that a broader concept of motivation would rob the theory 
of any explanatory power. Typical cases of cooperation in the absence of central 
authority include international politics or trade barriers between two industrial 
nations. 
Collective action can be defined as the choice by all or most individuals of 
the course of action that, when chosen by all or most individuals, leads to the 
collectively best outcome. This course of action can also be referred to as co-
operative behaviour. Despite the fact of free-rider problems and prisoner's dilemma 
situations, it is an empirical fact that people do cooperate on many occasions. 
Public choice theories fail to explain much of the cooperative behaviour that occurs 
in the real world. They limit the scope of theory to suit the theoretical postulates, 
thereby arbitrarily restricting the domain of inquiry. A better way of approaching 
the problem of cooperation is to pose the question differently. Why do people co-
operate? In order to explain this problem rational choice theorists need to go 
beyond the assumption of self interest and appeal to a richer and more diverse 
account of motivational assumptions. 
The task of social sciences is not just to explain the failure of co-operation 
but also to explain 1. why we are not in a state of nature and 2. how societies do 
have a modicum of order. Elster discusses the conditions for order in the social 
. world by posing the question: what is it that glues societies together and prevents 
them from disintegrating into chaos and war? (Elster 1989c: 1). He argues that 
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much of social and public choice literature seems to be out of touch with the real 
world, in which there is a great deal of 'honesty' and sense of 'duty' (Elster 1989a: 
179). Elster disputes the view of public, choice theories that civilised society 
depends on having institutions that make it in people's rational self-interest to 
speak the truth, keep their promises and help others - not on people's having good 
motivations (Elster 1989b: 52). The most common criticism against public choice 
theories is that they fail to explain high baseline rates of cooperative behaviour in 
many spheres of social and political life like voting, voluntary associations, 
environmental movements etc. Elster argues that decentralised solutions are more 
fundamental than centralised ones, since compliance with central directives is itself 
a collective action problem. 
In discussing the problem of cooperation, Elster employs two conceptual 
tools. One is rational choice theory and the other is the theory of social norms. 
Elster firmly believes that social norms provide an important kind of motivation for 
action that is irreducible to rationality or indeed any other form of optimising 
mechanism. Elster recognises the limitations of modelling collective action on 
purely instrumental grounds. The problem of collective action which was discussed 
extensively in chapter 1 implies that the rational self-interest of individuals may 
lead them to behave in ways that are collectively disastrous. Elster considers 
spontaneous mechanisms for coordination and cooperation. Voting, cleaning up 
the environment and abstaining from polluting it are classical collective action 
problems. 
Elster appeals to social norms such as the "norm of fairness" and the "norm 
of everyday Kantianism" (Elster 1989b: 113-23, 131-34) to supplement rational 
choice. And within everyday Kantianism, Elster identifies a specific type of 
irrationality called 'magical thinking' which plays an important role in motivating 
people to cooperate (Elster 1989c: 186). For norms to be social, they must be 
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shared by other people and partly sustained by their approval and disapproval. 
Some norms, like norms against cannibalism or incest, are shared by all members of 
society. The other respect in which norms are social is that other people are 
important for enforcing them, by expressing their approval or disapproval. These 
sanctions can be strong. In addition to being supported by the attitudes of other 
people, norms are sustained by the feelings of embarrassment, anxiety, guilt, shame 
etc. that a person suffers at the prospect of violating them or at the prospect of 
being caught violating them. Elster gives an 'individualist' defense of social norms. 
A norm is a propensity to feel shame and to anticipate sanctions by others at the 
thought of behaving in a certain, forbidden way. He argues that social norms have 
a grip on the mind (Elster 1989b: 61) that is due to the strong emotions their 
violations can trigger. He believes that the emotive aspect of norms is a more 
fundamental feature than the more frequently cited cognitive aspects. If norms can 
coordinate expectations, it is only because the violation of norms is known to 
trigger strong emotions, in the violator himself and in other people. The operation 
of norms is to a large extent blind, compulsive, mechanical or even unconscious. 
The force of norms - the feature that makes manipulation and interpretation 
worthwhile - is that they do have a grip on the mind; otherwise, there would be 
nothing to manipulate. Thus Elster defines social norms mairiIy by their intrinsic 
nature. Elster also distinguishes social norms from other related phenomena like 
moral norms;·· legal norms; convention equilibria; private norms; habits and 
compulsive neuroses; tradition; cognitive phenomena. And, finally, norms have 
independent motivating power and are irreducible to optimisation. The task is to 
identify the precise mix of motivations - selfish and normative," rational and 
irrational - that make interaction possible. 
Elster argues that there exist distinct norms that may induce people to co-
operate. These include the "norm offairness" and "everyday Kantianism". Both are 
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non-selfish motivations. Kantianism says individuals want to do what would be 
best if all did it. It is not sensitive to what others do. The norm of fairness says 
individuals do not want to take a free-ride on the co-operation of others, but 
neither do they want to cooperate when few others do. 
Norm of everyday Kalltiallism (Elster 1985: 148): This says that one should 
cooperate if and only if universal co-operation is better for everybody than 
universal defection. There are two reasons why the principle is called everyday 
Kantianism rather than simply Kantianism. First, Kant's own formulation of the 
principle does not refer to what would happen if everyone acted in a certain way. 
Rather it asks whether one can 'will' that every one will act in that way. One reason 
one cannot 'will' that all will act in a certain way might appear to be that it would 
be worse for all if all did so. This is not Kant's view. Rather he argued that one 
cannot 'will' x if the notion of all doing x harbours a logical or pragmatical 
contradiction. If breaking promises, for instance, were to be made into universal 
principle, the concept of promising would lose its meaning. Second, the arguments 
made below presuppose a naive form of Kantianism which excludes the use of 
mixed strategies. Some of the paradoxes of everyday Kantianism would disappear 
if the agents were allowed to randomise between cooperating and not cooperating. 
The everyday Kantian does not consider the costs to himself of 
cooperating. Like people motivated by fairness, everyday Kantians are usually 
outcome insensitive with respect to benefits but not with respect to costs. Roughly 
. speaking, they proceed in two steps. First, they use something like the categorical 
imperative to -decide where their duty lies. Then before acting,,, they consider 
whether the costs are prohibitive, which, on a given occasion, they may well be. 
"The trade-off will differ across people. Some Kantians pay virtually no attention to 
costs, while in others the voice of duty is reduced to a whisper that is easily offset 
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by considerations of cost. For that reason, even everyday Kantians might be 
sensitive to the number of other cooperators, namely if these increased the costs of 
co-operation above the point where they offset the call of duty. In cases of low 
cost or constant cost cooperation (like voting), this complicating factor can largely 
be ignored, but in other cases it could be important. 
Furthermore, in practice the everyday Kantian is somewhat sensitive to 
benefits. Although he does not consider the likely impact of his cooperation except 
by asking, "what if everyone did that?" he does consider the impact of universal 
cooperation. It seems plausible that the strength of his feeling of , duty' depends on 
the difference between universal cooperation and universal noncooperation. The 
smaller the difference, the lower the voice of conscience and the more likely it is to 
be offset by considerations of cost. Once again, this dependence will vary across 
people. However, everyday Kantianism is not without problems. Consider a 
situation in which unilateral cooperation is harmful to other people. Everyday 
Kantianism prescribes the cooperative strategy in such cases, regardless of the 
disastrous consequences that might ensue if few others follow suit. Unilateral 
disarmament could under certain circumstances increase the risk of war. Unilateral 
acts of heroism or sacrifice can give authorities or employers an excuse to crack 
down on non participants as well as participants. 
Two questions that embody the principle of everyday Kantianism and that 
have strong emotional appeal are: If not me, who? and But what if everyone did 
that? Both questions suggest that there are only two possible states of the world, 
one in which everyone cooperates and one in which no one does so. It hints that it 
is up to me which of these states will come about. If I am in a sufficiently confused 
state of mind, I may indeed be persuaded to believe, to act as if I believed, that 
everything turns upon my behaviour. Psychologically, if not logically, there is a 
short step from the thought 'if I don't do it, why should anyone?' to the thought 'if I 
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don't do it, nobody will'. Elster elaborates on this point, which is of fundamental 
importance. 
To put it differently, everyday Kantianism rests on a form of 'magical 
thinking' - a specific type of 'irrationality' that plays an important role in many 
decisions to cooperate. Magical thinking is the confusion of 'causal' and 'diagnostic' 
efficacy, . or the belief that is as if one could change the 'cause' by acting on the 
'symptoms'. This phenomenon is illustrated in an experiment by George Quattrone 
and Amos Tversky in which two groups of subjects were told that people with a 
certain kind of heart have a longer life expectancy and greater tolerance to cold 
water after exercise than people with a different type of heart. When later asked to 
keep their arm in cold water after an exercise task, they endured it for a longer 
time than they had done before they were exposed to the information. The subjects 
acted as if by modifying the symptoms they could, magically, alter the cause. In a 
similar fashion, the form of magical thinking also works in the prisoner's dilemma. 
Consider two persons in the prisoner's dilemma who have to make their decisions 
independently of each other. If they are sufficiently alike, each of them may reason 
in the following manner. If I cooperate, there is a good chance that the other will 
cooperate too. Being like me, he will act like me. Let me cooperate to bring it 
about that he does too. Once again, the behaviour that is diagnostic of the other's 
cooperation is chosen as if it could have causal efficacy. 
Norm of Fairness (Elster 1989c: 187): The norm offaimess1 tells an individual to 
cooperate if and only if everybody else, at least a substantial number of others, 
cooperate. Although all members of a group may share this norm, they may have 
. different thresholds of cooperation. For some people, the norm takes effect with a 
relatively small number of other cooperators. Others may require nearly universal 
cooperation before they join. Among the other cooperators whose presence 
167 
triggers the nonn of fairness for a gIVen person, some may themselves be 
motivated by the same nonn, with a smaller number of other cooperators required. 
Among the latter, some may also be motivated by the nonn of fairness, but as we 
descend the chain we shall eventually meet some people who cooperate for other 
reasons. Cooperation could never arise in a population in which everybody was 
motivated by the nonn of fairness. It is interesting to see why. 
Although the nonn of fairness is not in itself consequentialist, it can coexist 
with consequentialist considerations. People motivated by fairness may be sensitive 
to costs of cooperation even if they do not consider the benefits. A person's own 
conscience and social pressure tells him to cooperate when most other people do. 
The nonn of 'fairness' makes cooperation conditional upon the actual 
cooperative behaviour of others, not on their anticipated cooperation. Elster is 
concerned with conditional cooperation generated by 'conformism' rather than by 
rational prudence. In this respect it differs crucially from conditional cooperation in 
iterated games. In these games, all group members can be conditional cooperators 
who converge on cooperation because everybody expects everybody to do so. But 
the nonn of 'fairness' does not work in the same way. Consider families in a 
peasant community who are led, by individual rationality, to have more children 
than is collectively rational. If there were a social nonn against large families, all 
would benefit from it. Could such a nonn - that is, a behavioural package that 
involved having smaller families punishing defectors, punishing nonpunishers and 
so on - be represented as the solution? Elster thinks not. Social nonns cannot be 
sustained by instrumental rationality of this kind. To be effective, they must be 
internalised, so -that violating them in the presence of others is felt to be shameful 
. and wrong, not simply a mistake or a lapse from rationality. The emotion of shame 
is not within the scope of rational willing. 
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The obligation created by the norm of fairness does not derive from 
outcomes. The norm tells us to defect when there are few cooperators. There 
might be social norm against cooperating in such cases. The general norm against 
sticking one's neck out could easily lead to sanctions against unilateral cooperators. 
Conversely the norm of fairness tells us to cooperate when many others do so. In 
such cases, the norm of fairness might prevent them from taking a free ride. This 
problem is not that serious. There is too much cooperation, but not because the 
excessive cooperators actually harm anyone. Their contribution simply is not worth 
the effort. More serious problems arise when the last act of cooperation harms 
everybody, contributors and non contributors. Here is an example. Joining the 
army in wartime is a more substantial example. Those who stay home to work in 
vital industries may feel that they are violating the norm of fairness. In some 
situations that lack of coercive institution, the norm of fairness could drive co-
operation beyond the optimal point. 
It might even happen that universal cooperatio!l is inferior to universal 
noncooperation. For example, consider the problem of cleaning up the lawn after a 
fete. If everybody joins in, the lawn will be trampled to destruction. It is better for 
all to have a lawn that is green but littered than to have it destroyed as a result of 
"misguided solidarity". Or consider again the problem of organising war. Suppose 
that the country in question initiated that war, so that universal noncooperation 
meant peace rather than defeat. It could then be worse for all if all joined the war 
effort than if nobody did, assuming that universal cooperation is so inefficient as to 
bring about defeat. 
Thus collective action is defined by the feature that contributions have 
diffuse benefits and precise costs. In the standard theory, this provides individuals 
with a reason to abstain from cooperating. Turning the argument on its head, one 
can see that it is precisely because contributions are easily identifiable that they can 
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become the object of a social norm to cooperate. The fact that an additional 
contribution may actually bring about a slight decrease in the benefits from 
collective action has little motivating power. 
All societies and groups face collective action problems. In all, at least 
some of the dilemmas are overcome and cooperation is achieved, frequently by 
coercion. Elster considers non coercive, voluntary cooperation. But in any given 
case we will observe that the individuals who make a voluntary contribution have 
different motives and not just instrumental ones. A successful campaign, strike, 
lobbying effort or election cannot be traced to a single homogeneous motive that 
animates all the contributors. Different motivations, building up on one another, 
can add up to a high rate of participation. Elster (l989c: 203) classifies broadly 
three motivational types in social interaction: 
1. Selfish outcome-oriented rational individuals care exclusively about the output 
of collective action. Non cooperation is their dominant str~tegy. 
2. Everyday Kantians cooperate under all circumstances. Strictly speaking this 
need not be true. If the costs of cooperation depend on the number of cooperators, 
even Kantians may make their cooperation conditional on that of others. Since 
Kantians are insensitive to the costs of cooperation, cooperation is a dominant 
strategy. 
3. People motivated by the· norm of fairness would not take a free ride on the 
cooperation of others, but neither do they want to cooperate when few others do. 
Here cooperation is viewed as conditional depending on the number of other 
cooperators. 
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To illustrate his case of collective action from a mixed motive perspective 
Elster (1989c: 206) takes the example of 'voting'. Unlike Downs' (1957: 38-50) 
analysis of voting (as argued in chapter 1), Elster focuses on the interplay between 
'selfishness', 'fairness' and 'everyday Kantianism' (Elster 1989c: 206). Voting is seen 
as an expressive act. Consider the decision to vote in a large anonymous election. 
Self-interested rationality dictates abstention at least in the absence of selective 
incentives. Other attempts to demonstrate with high tum-outs of selfish voters 
have invariably failed. Hence most writers invoke the notion of 'civic duty' or see 
voting as an expressive act. But these concepts are rarely given specific content. At 
the individual level, tum-out is explained by individual properties of voters: age, 
sex, marital status, income, occupation, and education and so on. In addition turn-
out is also explained by three variables: 
1. direct costs of voting, 
2. expected closeness of the election and 
3. perceived differences among the major alternatives. 
The importance of the these variables shows that 'civic duty' does not exclude 
some sensitivity to outcomes. 
The first step towards a better understanding of tum-out rates must be to 
refine the notion of 'civic duty'. In the present framework, the notion can be 
understood in two ways, corresponding to 'Kantian duty' and 'fairness'. The 
motivations of duty and fairness are not outcome oriented as far as the benefits of 
voting are concerned, although they can be sensitive to costs. The fact that the 
costs of voting are a major part of the explanation of low tum-outs is consistent 
with an interpretation of civic duty in terms of fairness or everyday Kantianism. 
The influence of the other two external variables is consistent with everyday 
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Kantianism but not with the norm of fairness. Because of its roots in magical 
thinking, everyday Kantianism becomes stronger the smaller the reference group to 
which it is applied. The more other people are like oneself, the more plausibly (in a 
psychological rather than logical sense) one can infer that they will behave like 
oneself Therefore, if the election is expected to be close, the more plausible is the 
notion that my voting will be pivotal. Also the smaller the perceived difference 
between the outcomes~ the weaker is the voice of conscience. There are no similar 
reasons that the norm of fairness should be sensitive to the expected closeness or 
to the perceived difference. 
Now the question is to ascertain which proportions of the electorate were 
motivated by which varieties of civic duty. Part of the explanation of voter tum-out 
also lies in changes in individual attributes. Demographic trends increase the 
number of young unmarried voters who are relatively unlikely to vote. Part of the 
explanation may lie in changes in the external variables. The effort and efficacy of 
the major parties in mobilising their supporters obviously also matter. Also, 
.alienation from the political system may be a factor of some importance (Elster 
1989c: 208). 
It can also be argued that the steady decrease in voter tum-out can also be 
due to increasing political apathy and alienation from the political system. But the 
notion of alienation must be disambiguated. It could mean that people are less 
likely to vote because they feel less committed to a political system that fails to 
remove poverty and racial conflict. And political alienation could also be 
understood as a self-reinforcing erosion of civic duty, quite independent of 
substantive issues and failures. 
Unlike rational choice theory, critical theory's humans are never social 
isolates. Their rationality has cognitive, moral and subjective aspects not just 
instrumental ones. Rationality means the competence to decide when it is 
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appropriate to act instrumentally, or in conformity with social norms, or 
dramaturgically, as an expressive subject, the ability to judge these qualities in 
other. This communicative competence is a matter of intersubjectivity, not just 
isolated subjectivity. But the perplexing problem critical theorists face is how to 
institutionalise discourses. 
No doubt strategic calculation is one explanatory variable to explain action, 
but there will be many others, ranging from traditions, norms and cultures to 
differences of people' capacities and the contingencies of historical circumstances. 
Failure of theories to be empirically informed can result in irrelevant theorising and 
the mushrooming of controversies driven by little more than the theoretical 
conjectures out of which they emerged. Moreover rational choice theories presume 
uniform strategic capacity of all the members. The theoretical prediction is highly 
contingent on actors' strategic talents. Rational choice predictions run afoul when 
faced with asymmetrical game-playing capacities of the actors. Even tit-for-tat 
assumes that actors have uniform strategic talents. 
4.3 Norms and Interests: Communicative and Strategic Action 
The relevance of Habermas' work in the present context lies in his insistence that 
strategic rationality cannot by itself successfully coordinate social and political 
interaction (White 1988: 25). Taking strategic rationality as a counterpoint, 
Habermas depicts communicative reason - embodied in validity claims to truth, 
rightness, and sincerity that are implicitly and necessarily raised in human speech -
as an unavoidab!e pragmatic presupposition of language use and hence of social 
interaction. He casts his theoretical enterprise as a research program intended to 
contribute to an empirically oriented critical social theory (Habermas 1984: xxix, 
274). In this way he aspires to take seriously the theoretical contributions of the 
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social sciences, suitably disencumbered of what he considers misplaced positivist 
pretensions. 
Habermas as we have discussed anchors his entire theoretical project in a 
categorical distinction between two sorts of social interaction. I do not want to 
repeat the contrast which has been extensively examined in chapter 2. Here I shall 
merely elucidate some of the problems it encompasses. Habermas seems to 
subscribe to a minimalist conception of strategic action. When first discussing 
strategic action, he suggests that it incorporates into the individual decision making 
"the anticipation of decisions on the part of at least one additional goal oriented 
actor (Habermas 1984: 94-95). Yet he also almost immediately begins to include 
'egoism' and 'atomism' as intrinsic features of strategic action. These features are 
largely artefacts of his own theoretical apparatus and are not essential to the 
concept of strategic actors. He also observes that game theory employs the 
concept of self-interest and that individuals are solely motivated by egocentric 
calculations of utility (Habermas 1984: 88,94-95, 101). And finally, he also depicts 
~trategic action as atomistic and the actors as isolated; solitary and atomistic 
(Habermas 1984: 10,85,273-74). 
Communicative action operates in the medium of language and is oriented 
toward reaching understanding. It coordinates interaction via consent or rational 
agreement. Parties to communicative action aim to cooperatively negotiate shared 
understandings of the nature of their interactions. Communicative action derives its 
force from the potential for rational agreement embodied in validity claims. This 
guarantee represents the "telos of mutual understanding" that Habermas claims is 
inherent in human communication. Moreover he insists the process of raising the 
validity claims is not a contingent aspect of language use but constitutes the 
unavoidable presupposition of communicative interaction. Consequently to deny 
that his or her utterances raise validity claims means ending up in a "performative 
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contradiction". Given this brief sketch it seems that validity claims are central to 
Habermas' idea of communicative action. The question arises of what sort of 
argument Habermas advances for the existence of validity claims His theory is 
plausible to the extent that he can demonstrate how rational agreement or consent, 
operating in the medium of language, coordinates social interaction. And 
agreement or consent in tum emerge because speakers mutually recognise the 
binding force of the validity claims raised in speech acts. 
The difficulty is that Habermas' analysis of speech acts is not itself an 
argument for validity claims. Instead, it presumes that validity claims exist and 
function to co-ordinate social interaction: validity claims give the illocutionary act 
a rationally motivating force (Habermas 1979: 65). Habermas presumes - but does 
not show - that there is a telos of understanding built into the validity basis of 
human speech. 
Given their apparently divergent approaches to the question of rationality, 
it is useful to view critical theory and rational choice as competing research 
traditions. The substantive point of contact between rational choice and critical 
theory is that game theorists typically concentrate on interactions between rational 
actors within a pre specified context. Habermas on the other hand focuses on a 
conceptually prior level of analysis. He focuses on the efforts of agents to define 
the context within which their ongoing interactions will transpire. Habermas, as we 
have seen, characterises strategic interactions as coordinated by influence, arbitrary 
choice or complementarity of interest. He says that if the interactions are not 
coordinated through achieving understanding the only alternative is force. But 
precisely because strategic actors mutually recognise one another as equally 
rational and goal oriented they can grasp that the pursuit of their individual plans is 
entangled in a web of social interdependencies. 
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Habennas seeks to constrain the nongeneralisable interests that provide 
players with incentives to dissemble or misrepresent. But he also presumes that 
they are communicatively competent. He insists that they are capable not only of 
producing comprehensible utterances but of embedding their utterances, however 
unanticipated they maybe, in a system of criticisable validity claims of truth, 
rightness, and sincerity (Habennas 1979: 26-27). This competence sustains 
processes of contesting and redeeming validity claims that impose pragmatic 
constraints on the ability of players to make utterances that solely express their 
nongeneralisable interests. Here Habennas identifies what game theorists lack - a 
mechanism that might compellingly account for the binding force of language in 
strategic interaction. 
Habennas dissociates the force of rationally motivated agreement from 
both the standard model of social nonns and strategic action. For him, social nonns 
operate as prior constraints on action (Habennas 1984: 35, 287, 296-97). 
Habennas largely confonns to the way in which rational choice theorists 
.distinguish between nonnative behaviour and rational action (Elster 1989c: 97-
107). An alternative way of conceptualising the indeterminacy problem is to look 
to Habennas for solutions. It is interesting to see whether problems of collective 
action can be unlocked by appealing to notions like morality,. social nonns and 
discourse. The strength of discourse ethics lies in its validity claims. What 
constitutes a just and fair equilibrium solution can be decided dialogically. Since in 
dialogue competing reasons are exchanged in an attempt to reach an agreement, 
the morality of preferences can be challenged in the public sphere. 
The prob!em of cooperation can appeal to a Kantian sense of rationality 
which requires that we should act upon rules which can be acted upon by 
everyone. In this context, the best reply to another's action rule is one which 
generalises to fonn a Nash equilibrium when the best is understood in an 
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instrumentally rational fashion. Of course, there many be other demands which 
Kantian reason makes, but taken in isolation, the 'universalisability' condition might 
provide an alternative foundation for Nash. 
Kant's practical reason demands that we should undertake those actions 
which when generalised yield best outcomes. It does not matter whether others 
perform the same calculation and actually undertake the same action as you. The 
morality is deontological and it is rational for the agent to be guided by a 
categorical imperative. Consequently in the free rider problem, the application of 
the categorical imperative will instruct Kantian agents to follow the cooperative 
action, thus enabling rationality to solve the problem when there are sufficient 
numbers of Kantian agents. This is perhaps the most radical departure from the 
conventional instrumental understanding of what is entailed by rationality because, 
while accepting the pay-offs, it suggests that agents should act in a different way 
upon them. Kantian morality refers to any kind of impersonal evaluation -
explicated in the notion of impartiality or categorical imperative. The notion of 
.rationality is no longer understood in the means-ends framework as the selection of 
means most likely to satisfy given ends. 
Of course there is a tricky question concerning whether these rather weaker 
moral motivations (acting on what is 'fair' or what is 'right') mark a deep breach 
with the instrumental model of action. It might be argued that such ethical 
concerns can be represented in this model by introducing the concept of ethical 
preferences. Thus the influence transforms the pay-offs in the game. So even 
though people still act instrumentally, the game ceases to be a prisoner's dilemma 
after the transformation. There is some evidence that the prisoner's dil~~a can be 
unlocked when individuals are suitably morally motivated. However, as discussed 
in chapter 3, the strength of Habermas' theory of discursive rationality is that it 
goes beyond Kant in the sense it subjects all moral claims to dialogue. 
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For Habermas, Kantian morality is rooted in a monological model of 
subject-object dualism. Habermas contends that issues concerning 'fairness' will 
have to be resolved dialogically. The justification of Habermas' procedure of moral 
argumentation as universally valid takes as its starting point the unavoidable 
presuppositions of communicative action. Habermas insists that an impartial 
assessment of claims can only proceed dialogically, in terms of a real 
argumentation where the individuals concerned reach an agreement co-operatively. 
As discussed earlier (Chapter 2), according to Habermas communicative action is 
action oriented towards reaching understanding. The interaction will be 
coordinated by quite distinct mechanisms - by consent in the case of 
communicative action and by influence, arbitrary choice, or complementarity of 
interest in the case of strategic action. Language forms the medium of interaction. 
Communicative ethics can direct us only to a particular way of thinking about fair 
procedures for adjudicating normative claims. 
It is often argued by liberal critiques like Ackerman (1989: 7-8) that the 
postconventional ethics like Habermas's which incorporate very strong criteria of 
fairness, is unrealistic to the point of being somehow illegitimate. 'Strong' here 
means simply that a given agent may find that there is a substantial gap between 
what the criteria require and what he/she initially perceives to be in his/her interest. 
The proposed criteria of rules of discourse are so strong as to constitute an 
illegitimate imposition on individual identity by placing unwarranted constraints on 
what one can rightly hold onto as one's basic interests or undertake a as part of 
one's ground project in life. 
The specific interpretation Habermas gives to the postconvent~onal, post-
metaphysical criterion of reciprocity or fairness must be understood in relation to 
his notions of 'generalisable interests' and real discourse. Arguments based on 
interests common to the group - "generalisable interests" in the language of critical 
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theory or "public goods" in the language of public choice - are normally more 
acceptable than arguments based on self-interest. The point is that discussion can 
invoke different kinds of 'motivations' than one finds in isolated individual 
behaviour. From the standpoint ofHabermas, in cases of normative conflict, actors 
must act judiciously, that is, they should not pursue their immediate interests but 
must be concerned to judge the dispute from a moral point of view and settle in a 
consensual manner (Habermas 1984: 19). 
One important issue which needs clarification is what exactly is required of 
individuals when they agree to follow the discursively interpreted demands of 
'fairness' (White 1988: 75). When one tries to justify a normative claim, one is 
obligated to show that the interests underlying it are 'generalisable' rather than 
merely 'particular'. In some cases this demonstration and an ensuing agreement 
might come easily. For example, traffic rules and laws against murder can be seen 
as resting on generalisable interests in the safety and sanctity of persons. But of 
course most questions in ethics and politics are not so amenable to simple solution. 
What does communicative ethics require agents to do whtm agreement is not so 
easily reached? The rules of discourse require that agents sincerely reflect upon the 
different 'need' interpretations which underlie their respective, but conflicting, 
concepts of what are generalisable. This means that they must· exhibit a sort of 
ongoing critical flexibility: a willingness to reconsider and possibly modify their 
need interpretations, when they appear to manifest weaker claims to universality 
than alternative ones (White 1988: 75). At this point the only thing which it is 
necessary to emphasise is that the result of such discursive reflections on needs is 
not necessarily any consensus. 
However the criterion of flexibility provides no guarantee that agents will 
come up with generalisable interests. If this is so, what guidance does 
communicative ethics offer when agents appear to have exhibited such flexibility 
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and yet still fail to come to a consensus on interests? Compromise appears to be 
the only possible solution. According to Habermas (1975a: 112) when interests 
continue to conflict - that is, they do not prove susceptible to generalisation -
resort must be made to compromise. This assumption needs some clarification. 
Habermas's position here is usually misunderstood in one way or another. 
Many social theorists view his reference to compromise with suspicion given his 
apparently contradictory claim that he can show us a way out of an impenetrable 
pluralism of conflicting values, needs and interests. This claim has led critics to 
infer that Habermas, although he speaks of compromise, actually has a deep 
contempt for it, seeing it as an "eliminable imperfection" resulting from the flaws of 
existing individuals who have not yet developed the genuine human needs which 
members of an emancipated society would have. But critical theorists like White 
(1988: 75) argue that there is no such hidden agenda in communicative ethics on 
the question of genuine needs. So this interpretation of Habermas is simply wrong. 
The question is how can a discursive perspective get us beyond an ethics 
of simple contractarianism, which relies only on the strategy of bargaining between 
conflicting interests? Such an alternative may seem to be the only direction in 
which to go if one abandons the strong minimal universal criteria for dealing with 
normative disputes. 
Rejecting strong criteria for fair agreements, rational choice theorists 
contend that we must be more modest and simply seek compromises which prove 
acceptable to whatever different actual points of view and interests are involved. 
This position is articulated by the contractarian theorists like Rawls (1985: 223-
251) and Buchanan (1989: 49-62). Although this argument is attractive, it is 
nevertheless achieved at the cost of a tacit endorsement of whatever structures of 
inequality might exist in a given society. Such an ethics will assign an unqualified 
legitimacy to compromises which solidify initially unequal bargaining positions. It 
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ignored the operation of power in social and political relations. This is because it 
has no way of distinguishing compromises which are acceptable but illegitimate 
from ones which are acceptable and legitimate. An example of the former would be 
an agreement which a disadvantaged person accepts on prudential grounds, even 
though that acceptance occurs under conditions of constraint. The problem with a 
perspective like this is that it cannot adequately differentiate "validity claims from 
power claims" (White 1988: 76). It fails to give useful standards for unravelling 
hidden power relationships in a apparently consensual arrangement. This is a 
crucial ethical aspect of a critical approach to the theory and practice of politics. 
From a Habermasian perspective the basic guidelines for compromise 
construction must themselves be justified in discursive terms. This alone can supply 
a standard for separating 'legitimate' from 'illegitimate' compromises (Habermas 
1975a: 112). In particular, the discursive emphasis on procedural equality, 
participation, non-deception and non-manipulation provide criteria in relation to 
which compromises must be called to account. These discursive constraints on 
compromise do not give us a precise formula or method for unambiguously 
separating legitimate from illegitimate compromises. In other words, although one 
can say that a given compromise must not rest on one-sided manipulation or 
advantages derived from an unequal bargaining position, these prescriptions must 
always be interpreted and applied by actors operating within a particular cultural 
tradition. Thus, for example, one cannot categorically assert that, because 
normative claims must be evaluated from a perspective of equality, actors cannot 
ever accept claims which entail social relationships permitting different sorts of 
inequalities. What the constrained indeterminism does allow us to do, hgwever, is 
to shift the burden of proof in normative argumentation. And in shifting the burden 
of proof, communicative ethics shifts the responsibility for abandoning reason in 
favour of force. In some cases where inequality between agents exists, a 
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framework like rational choice will confront the disadvantaged agent with the 
choice of accepting a legitimate bargain which confirms his inequality or breaking 
off reasoned dialogue and using force - that is, a choice which renounces the claim 
to moral legitimacy. 
According to Habermas arguments about compromise come into play in 
situations where sincere reflection by participants in discourse does not lead to 
their discovering generalisable interests. The criterion of sincere reflection on needs 
actually entails an ethical orientation. The rules of discourse require a reflective 
elucidation of the need interpretations underlying disputed norms. And each agent 
takes up this critical, reflective attitude toward the norms proposed by another 
agent, he/she forces the other to be self-critically reflective about his/her own needs 
and their universality. As needs are examined in the undistorted, dialogical light of 
discourse, agents have the possibility of reaching more truthful interpretations of 
their own particular needs as well as those which can be communicatively shared. 
In other words, Habermas' model of the subject has moral implications. Habermas' 
emphasis on a minimal moral orientation gives priority to the questions to be asked 
in situations in conflict. 
It is interesting to compare discourse ethics and other neo-Kantian 
approaches like Rawls's. According to the Rawlsian view, the principles of justice 
most compatible with the value of the autonomous personality can be specified via 
a model of collective choice constrained by certain procedural rules. These are 
deemed to be reasonable limitations on choice, defining the circumstances of 
justice. Although procedural, this Rawlsian model of legitimacy is not dialogic. The 
choice of the principles of justice is not thought to result from any kind .~f dialogue 
among the parties to the original position. However contract has its relevance in 
the realm of the political. This can be seen in Habermas' own agreement with the 
Rawlsian notion of 'overlapping consensus'. 
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In one of his interviews, Habermas (1995: 20) expresses sympathy with the 
contractarian construction in so far as it identifies a case for grounding 
universalistic norms. Habermas cites Rawls' conception of "overlapping consensus" 
(Rawls 1985: 224) as a good case for the nonpartisan adjudication of international 
conflicts. It relies on the case that universal world religions converge in some core 
condition of moral intuition that can be interpreted as equal respect for all, equal 
respect for the need to promote the integrity of each individual person. For 
Habermas this assumption forms the normative basis for consensus within world 
perspectives and religious interpretations of deep moral feelings which could 
support the norms of peaceful coexistence. Although this is compromise it is a 
compromise which is based on universal norms. The only difference between 
Rawls and Habermas is that the former wants differences to be resolved through 
mutual identification of universal norms which can form a normative basis for 
consensus putting aside differences2 and the latter sees consensus on norms to be 
arrived at in dialogue. 
The idea of egalitarian reciprocity is at the heart cif Habermas' theory. As 
argued in chapter 3, interpreting discourse ethics as a moral transformatory idea, 
Benhabib (1989: 148) argues that discourse ethics can also be part of a more 
general theory of self, historical change, and social structures. Her contention is 
that proceduralism does not imply formalism and ahistoricism. As Benhabib argues, 
Habermas himself notes that norms are generated not by philosophy but by real life 
(Habermas 1990: 204). Thus the validity of disputed norms emerges in everyday 
communicative practice. Discourse ethics is susceptible to the problems of 
indeterminacy. Critical theorists argue that 
the purpose of discourse theory is not to draw a blueprint for a well-
ordered society. Rather, the purpose is to develop a model of public 
dialogue such as to demystify existing power relations (Benhabib 1989: 
154). . 
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This involves: identifying those issues which are prevented from 
becoming public because of existing power constellations; identifying 
those groups that have not had access to means of public expression 
and advocating their inclusion in the discourse of legitimacy; 
distinguishing agreement and pseudo-compromises based on the 
intractability of power relations; saying what is in the public interest as 
opposed to the universalisation of what is only the interest of a 
particular group (Benhabib 1989: 154). 
On this interpretation, critical theory need not take a stand on all issues in 
everyday social and political life. It is not indeterministic in so far as it addresses 
the more substantive issues like power and domination (White 1988: 86). But at 
the same time there are weaknesses of communicative action. Critical theorists 
need to provide a more precise idea of the conditions under which language can be 
expected to coordinate social and political interaction. For example, 
communicative action rematns susceptible to pressures of nongeneralisable 
interests. This is the clearest in pure-conflict, zero-sum interactions where 
~ommunication has no force. More fundamentally, suggesting that the validity basis 
of language works to coordinate social interaction is not the same as establishing 
how it does so. One of the perplexing problems is how to institutionalise discourse 
·ethics. Rational choice theorists argue that Habermas' ideal speech situation is so 
idealistic that it is far removed from reality which is a messy one and that social 
choice problems are not that simple to be resolved by mere dialogue. 
Although mutually hostile intellectual traditions, rational choice and critical 
theory are engaged in determining what rationality can mean in the realm of social 
and political interaction. Habermas' enterprise can help rational choice theory move 
beyond instrumental rationality. As argued by James Johnson (1993:" 74), game 
theory extends and deepens the critical theorists' basic intuition that unembellished 
strategic rationality cannot adequately sustain social and political interaction. 
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Critical theorists, on the other hand fail to recognise the multiplicity of theories 
present in rational choice paradigm. As James Johnson (1991: 113-114) argues, the 
problem with the external critics of rational choice theories such as 'interpretive' 
and 'critical theories' is that they subscribe to the orthodox view of rational choice 
as "positive" science. This could be for two reasons: one is that they rarely 
demonstrate close familiarity with economic or rational choice models and 
consequently have a fuzzy and uncritical picture of this theoretical programme. The 
other reason is that they tend to adopt the standard economist's assumption of 
"given" preferences (and subsequent neglect of the literature on preference 
formation) as the platform to press their point. By contrast, rational choice 
theorists readily admit that the assumption of 'exogenously' determined preferences 
is a lacuna in their technical edifice. Consequently, critical theorists' accusation that 
rational choice accounts provide a monocausal explanation is not a valid one in the 
light of the internal revisions. Critical theorists dismiss Elster's works as another 
attempt to build a naturalist social science (White 1989: 11). Critical theorists need 
. to abandon their positivistic interpretation of rational choice theory. 
Conclusion 
I conclude with a general observation that rational choice theorists on their 
own terms have begun realising the weakness of strategic action. Both critical 
theory and rational choice theory can gain from engagement. As Dryzek (1992: 
397) says 
by deploying an expanded communicative conception of rationality, 
critical theory can help move public choice beyond several impasses. In 
turn critical theory benefits from this encounter by gaining content for 
its currently rather abstract critique of politics. 
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In dealing with these problems of aggregation game theorists approach it 
from a pragmatic angle in seeking to find solutions in realistic settings. Critical 
theory on the other hand idealises social interaction and finds itself miserable when 
it comes to the problem of institutionalising discourses. To put it differently, 
rational choice theories have explored the structures of social interaction 
predominantly in the institutional setting of a democratic polity. Their main 
concern is with institutional design. On the other hand, for most of its history 
critical theory has ignored issues of institutional analysis and design of the sort that 
have preoccupied rational choice. And this is for two reasons: The first is 
revolutionary heritage. The second is, critical theory has operated for too long on 
. an abstract and metatheoretical plane. 
Much of the social choice and public choice literature seems completely out 
of touch with the reality wherein a great deal of honesty and norm governed 
behaviour is present and not simply opportunistic self-interest behaviour. In the 
next chapter I draw attention to the political arguments for democracy. I 
- sympathise with both critical theorists and internal critiques of rational choice like 
Elster's that the task of politics is not just to devise institutions that can harness 
opportunistic self-interest to socially useful purposes. But an equally important 
task is to create institutions that embody a valid conception of justice. 
Notes 
1 This idea is used more in hermeneutic or interpretive sense. Interpretive theorists argue that all 
social encounters rely on a web of shared beliefs (derived from rules) which enable to be 
remarkably powerful in sending non-verbal messages. The norms are shaped in tradition. history, 
language and culture. So they are culture-specific and history specific and thus differ from society 
to society. The power of these norIns lies in their dictation of the everyday actions of individuals 
in a society. In this sense norms are noninstrumental and the choices of individuals are 
determined by them. Interpretive theory is exemplified by thinkers like Charles Taylor, Clifford 
Geertz. The theory focuses inquiry on the "web of language, symbol and institutions" that are the 
tangible vehicles of cultural significance. And they self consciously reject rational choice 
theorist's ambition to explain and predict. 
186 
2 This idea can also be found in Ackerman (1989) and Holmes (1988). Ackerman presents a 
pragmatic-political as opposed to moral justification of the idea of a public dialogue based on the 
conversational constraint of neutrality. The question Ackerman poses is how different primary 
groups can resolve the problem of coexistence in a reasonable way. For him. the way out is the 
path of conversational restraint. It means "When you and I learn that we disagree about one or 
another dimension of the moral truth. we should not search for some common value that will 
trump this disagreement, nor should we try to translate our moral disagreement into some 
putatively neutral framework; nor should we seek to transcend our disagreement by talking about 
how some hypothetical creature would resolve it" (Ackerman 1989: 16-7). What Ackerman 
suggests is that we should simply say nothing at all about this disagreement and try to solve our 
problem by invoking premises that we do agree upon. 
Having constrained the conversation in this way, we may instead use dialogue for 
pragmatically productive purposes: to identify normative premises all political participants find 
reasonable (Ackerman 1989: 16-7). 
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Chapter 5 
Conceptualising the Political: Non-cognitive Vs Moral-cognitive 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I shall tum to the political implications of the two 
theoretical paradigms. The best way of characterising the politics of the two 
traditions is that public choice theorists, especially Buchanan and Tullock (1962) 
and Riker (1982) are committed to classical liberalism's tradition of limited 
government, constitutional constraints and the free market as opposed to populist 
notion of democracy. Riker (1982) is critical of populist theories that, inspired by 
Rousseau, see the outcomes produced by democratic practices as corresponding to 
something like the popular will. Public choice theorists see 'liberalism' as the only 
alternative to populism. Critical theory in its Habermasian form claims to represent 
discursive democracy. 
From the standpoint of critical theory, the choice between liberal and 
populist interpretations of democracy is miscast and does not exhaust the 
constitution of democracy. In other words, Schumpeter and Rousseau do not 
exhaust the options available to democratic theory. The analytical results of public 
choice and social choice theories underscore the inadequacy of purely aggregative 
notions of democracy in ways that can sharpen the case for deliberation. In the 
eyes of public choice theorists like Buchanan (1991: 217), however, discursive 
democracy is another ideology committed to esoteric participatory democracy i.e. 
Just another prisoner of romantic illusion'. For him, any attempt to go beyond the 
behavioural postulate of homo economicus is considered as idealistic, romantic and 
illusory (Buchanan 1986). 
One significant difference between rational choice and critical theory is that 
the former discredited the notion of 'popular will' whereas in the latter the crucial 
question is what might underpin the development and recognition of a truly general 
interest. In other words, the aim is to examine the possible normative justification 
of democratic institutions. 
In section 5.1, I shall discuss the competing conceptions of politics within 
rational choice theories (mainly public choice and Jon Elster) and in section 5.2, I 
turn to discuss Habermas' moral-cognitivist interpretation of democracy. 
5. I Rational Choice and Democratic Politics 
5.2 Conceptualising Politics: Towards a Moral-Cognitivist View 
5.1 Rational Choice and Democratic Politics 
Concept of Preferellce-formatioll 
The concept of preference-formation has been the central concept of rational 
choice theories. Rational Choice findings about the logic of. majority rule and 
collective action problem have initiated new reflections on the normative 
foundations of democracy (Buchanan and Tullock 1962: 85, Green and Shapiro 
1994: 4). Buchanan and Tullock develop a normative theory of collective choice 
grounding in contractarianism (chapter 3). And similarly rational choice theorists 
have come up with solutions regarding collective action problems (chapter 4) . 
.. 
Here, in this section, I shall examine diverse views within rational choice theory on 
democratic politics. 
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Public choice theories see the political process as instrumental rather than 
an end in itself Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Riker (1982) see the decisive 
political act as a private rather than a public action viz. the individual and the secret 
vote. With these usually goes the idea that the goal of politics is the optimal 
compromise between given, and irreducibly opposed, private interests. Using his 
recent writings on preference formation, internal critics like Elster (1979; 1983a; 
1983b; 1989a) argue that public choice theories have an undeveloped conception 
of preference formation. Preferences are seen as static, fixed and unchanging in the 
political realm. On the contrary, for Elster (1986b: 112), the purpose of politics is 
not simply to implement preferences, but following Habermas, to select them, in a 
forum in which various distortions may be discussed and brought to light - not by a 
political elite but by the public binding itself, outlawing certain preferences or 
ensuring the availability of a range of choices. The distinction between market and 
politics thus depends in part on a belief that preferences should not be taken as 
exogenous variables. This view is closely associated with a conception of 
individual freedom that understands the term to refer tb selection rather than 
implementation of ends. The associated understanding of political freedom 
understands the term to refer to a deliberative process in which the citizenry in 
general select social ends (Sunstein 1988: 348). 
As we have seen, rational choice theorists are critical of aggregation 
mechanisms which attempt to generate a general will. But there are significant 
differences in their responses. Elster (1986b: 111) argues that the notion of 
consumer sovereignty is acceptable in the market because the consumer chooses 
between courses of action that differ only in the way they affect him. In political 
choice situations, the citizen is asked to express his preference over states that also 
differ in the way in which they affect other people. 
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Elster (1983a: 33) argues that the social choice mechanism is capable of 
resolving the market failures that would result from unbridled consumer 
sovereignty but as a way of redistributing welfare it is hopelessly inadequate. If 
people affected each other only by tripping over each other's feet, or by dumping 
their garbage into one another's backyards, a social choice mechanism might cope. 
However, the task of politics is not only to eliminate inefficiency, but also to create 
justice - a goal to which the aggregation of prepolitical preferences is a quite 
incongruous means (Elster 1991: 120). 
So the internal critics like Elster argue that principles of the market must 
differ from principles of the forum. The political process is not merely a means of 
serving persons' interests by satisfying their preferences. It is also a process which 
changes people's preferences. People are socialised and democracy helps to create 
a new human being, more tolerant, less selfish, better educated, and capable of 
cherishing the new values of the era of the enlightenment. Politics is the study of 
the ways of transcending the prisoner's dilemma problems (Elster 1976: 248-49). 
Rational choice theories have shown in a series of impossibility theorems 
that there is no specific method for preference aggregation. Consequently, on the 
basis of the thin theory of individual rationality, they articulated a thin theory of 
collective rationality. The task of politics is seen as the question of devising rules 
and institutions for co-ordinating individual preferences. Buchanan and Tullock 
(1962) make unanimity a condition for political decisions. They argue for 
unanimity on the libertarian grounds that anything short of it will violate the rights 
of the minority, unlike the ~onsensus theorists who believe that unanimity will 
emerge in rational discussion. 
In this approach to rationality, preferences are assumed to be 'given'. The 
substantive rationality of the agents is never made into an issue, nor is the morality 
of their preferences. As Elster (1989a: 5-8) says, preferences can be distorted by 
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multiplicity of mechanisms. I Consequently, preferences as a basis for deriving 
collective mechanisms are a fragile foundation for social choice. One reason for not 
drawing practical political conclusion of limited government from the incoherency 
of "majority rule" is that one can question the adequacy of the model of 
preferences that is built into the approach when one is considering matters of 
political choice. People offer reasons for favouring their preferred alternatives. 
The logic of advancing political preference must be understood in the light 
of these underlying reasons, and not simply as claims to have one's preferences 
satisfied whatever they happen to be. So the alternative model of collective choice 
would be not a process of preference aggregation, which there is a mapping from a 
set of individual orderings to a social ordering, but a process of dialogue in which 
reasons are exchanged between participants in a process that is perceived to be a 
joint search for consensus. 
Elster (1983 a; 86b) sympathises with Habermas' discourse ethics seeing the 
expression of preferences as an action. According to Elster the preferences people 
act upon may not be a guide to what they really prefer because of 'weakness of will' 
or 'excess of will'. And moreover an individual should not be able, by 
misrepresenting his preferences, to bring about an outcome which is better 
according to his true preferences than the one that would be brought about if he 
expressed these true preferences (Elster 1989a: 178). So even if we require that the 
social preferences be collectively rational with respect to the expressed 
preferences, they might not be so with respect to the real preferences (Elster 
1983a: 32). 
Elster argues that the political system could be geared to the task of 
changing preferences rather than aggregating them. Both in theory and practice, 
the idea is that the central concern of politics should be the transformation of 
preferences rather than their aggregation (Elster I 986a: 112). On this view the 
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core of the political process is public and rational discussion about the common 
good, not the isolated act of voting according to the private preferences. Elster 
relies on Habermas' notion of discourse ethics for this idea. Against the prepolitical 
nature of preferences, Elster associates with Habermas's writings for which the 
input of the social choice mechanism is not raw, quite selfish or irrational 
preferences that operate in the market, but informed and other regarding 
preferences (Elster 1986b: 119). 
Knight and Johnson (1994: 279) insist that aggregation needs to be 
supplemented by institutional arrangements that embody and enhance democratic 
deliberation. In their view, aggregative arrangements lack the 'moral resources' 
required to generate and sustain legitimate collective solutions to politically 
contentious issues. The primary concern here seems to be that electoral outcomes 
are susceptible to influence by various arbitrary, exogenous, social, cultural or 
economic asymmetries (Knight and Johnson 1994: 278). 
Elster's writings on preference formation convey a disillusionment with 
instrumental rationality. He considers several non-instrumental grounds for 
explaining action. With respect to individual choice, socia/norms can supplement 
rationality in explaining action and with respect to political choices, Elster argues, 
justice offers a guide to reform. Elster's contention is that in the present state, 
social sciences cannot aspire to be having a theory of social equilibrium. Social 
sciences as of now can at best be satisfied with uncovering mechanisms i.e. causal 
mechanisms (Elster 1989c: 250) in explaining social reality. In other words, it is 
important to recognise the inherent by contingent nature of social reality. Instead 
of arguing that society is to be understood on the model of the unitary actor, one 
might argue that the individual should be understood on the model of the 
fragmented polity. As said before, intrapersonal problems of preference 
aggregation, self-deception and other forms of cognitive compartmentalisation, 
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weakness of will, distort in complex ways in determining individual actions. This 
means, although Elster is suspicious of any grand planning, he is defensive of 
micro-level short term planning. 
Distancing himself from the Marxists, in his essay Self-realisation in work 
and politics: the Marxist conception of the good life (Elster 1989c: 127-158), 
Elster expresses sympathy with Habermas' discourse-based model of politics 
wherein preferences get challenged and transformed in dialogue. However, Elster 
is apprehensive that it might be rejected as utopian (Elster 1986b: 103-29). Even 
so, Elster views politics as a vehicle for self-realisation and not just preference 
aggregation (Elster 1989d: 147). 
Elster distances himself from the Marxists who did not believe that there 
would be room or need for contlictual politics in communism; a fortiori Marx 
could not promote politics as a channel for individual self-realisation (Elster 1989d: 
147). Later Marxists have thought differently, notably Jurgen Habermas. Habermas 
suggests that Marx simply ignored the development of normative structures of 
interaction and concentrated exclusively on production paradigm. Elster is 
sympathetic to the view that the development of moral competence through 
rational discussion is a form of self-realisation that ought to be valued as highly as 
self-realisation at the "work place" (Elster 1989d: 147). Elster is sympathetic to 
analytical Marxists like Roemer and Cohen (K ymlicka 1991: 177-184) who stress 
the importance of the "access to social goods" and the intluence it has on to the 
individuals. 
Spontaneous Order or Social Constructivism 
The second issue which remains contentious is the ideological divide between 
spontaneous order and social constructivism. One of the concerns of the political 
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theory of liberal individualism is to pass judgement on the legitimacy of particular 
institutions. Institutions, in this view, are to be regarded as legitimate insofar as all 
individuals who are governed by them would have broadly 'agreed' to their 
creation. Naturally much will turn on how agreement is to be judged because 
people in desperate situations will often agree to the most desperate outcomes. 
Thus there are disputes over what constitutes the appropriate reference point for 
judging whether people would have agreed to such and such an arrangement. This 
is an insight which has a special relevance for the discussion in the political theory 
of liberal individualism concerning the conscious creation of institutions through 
agreement. If the test of legitimacy is 'would individuals agree to such and such 
arrangement?' then we need a model which tells us what individuals will agree to 
when they interact. It seems natural for contract theorists to model the 'negotiation' 
as bargaining and interpret the outcome as the terms of agreement. Hence the need 
to know the likely outcome in order to have a 'standard' for judging whether the 
institutions in question might have been agreed to. 
Responses to the conflict of individual and social choice are varied. One 
response coming from conservatives like Oakeshott is that the frailty of human 
reasoning excludes conscious, deliberate reform altogether. In their view attempts 
to change society in a specific direction embody pseudo rationalism, the failure of 
reason to define and respect its own boundaries. In Elster's view, this is an 
ultraskeptical conclusion. Morality and social norms also count more than mere 
enlightened self-interest (Elster 1989b: 158). Before proceeding to discuss Elster's 
view, it is interesting to see the contrast between two different versions of the 
'political' within rational choice theory. One strand advocates "sponta~eous order" 
and the other "social constructivism" or "political rationalism". The former draws 
support from New Right libertarians like Hayek. The contrast is best illustrated in 
their differing views of the State. 
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Questions regarding the role of State have preoccupied political theorists 
for a long time. Many political theorists believe that something like State can 
resolve the particular difficulty of overcoming the prisoner's dilemma and provide 
public goods. In the case of multiple equilibria the State can through suitable action 
guide the outcomes towards one equilibrium rather than another. Thus the problem 
of equilibrium selection is solved by bringing it within the ambit of conscious 
political decision making. Likewise, with prisoner's dilemma/free rider problems, 
the State can provide the services of enforcement and guide the outcomes towards 
the cooperative equilibrium. 
There have been two responses to this argument of State intervention and 
the thinking behind it has largely shaped the mental world of the twentieth century 
politics. Buchanan and Riker argue that there are problems of political failure that 
subvert the ideal of democratic decision making and which can match the market 
failures that the State is attempting to rectify. As argued in chapter 1, public choice 
theorists (Riker 1982; Buchanan and Tullock 1962) suspect the idea of something 
'like the "general will" or "common good" in whose name the State might be acting. 
These are essentially negative arguments coming from the political right against 
'political rationalism' or 'social constructivism'. The positive arguments against 
political rationalism turns on the idea that these interventions are not even 
necessary. The failure to intervene does not spell chaos, chronic indecision, 
fluctuations and outcomes in which everyone is worse off than they could have 
been. Instead spontaneous order will be thrown up in the form of a tit-for-tat 
strategy. 
From the standpoint oftit-for-tat strategy, the argument for th~. State seems 
to be weakened because it appears that a group can overcome the free-rider 
problem without recourse to the State for contract enforcement. So long as the 
group can punish free-riders by excluding them from benefits of cooperation, then 
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there is the possibility of spontaneous public good proVIsIon through the 
generalisation of the tit-for-tat strategy. Although this is possible in small groups, it 
is impossible to do away with the state in the contemporary large societies wherein 
the state plays a larger role. 
However, there are many practices and institutions which are surrogates for 
the State. Since something like the State as contract enforcer might well arise 
spontaneously through the playing of free rider games repeatedly, it need not 
require any a priori grand design. There need be no constitutional conventions. 
The result counts strongly for what Hayek refers to as the 'English pragmatism' as 
opposed to the 'European continental rationalism'. Hayek prefers the English 
tradition because he doubts that the formation of State is part of a process which 
liberates the social agent and that there is the knowledge to inform some central 
design so that it can perform the task of resolving free-riding better than 
spontaneously generated solutions like tit-for-tat (Heap and Varoufakis 1995: 195-
96). The implication is that reason has its own limits. 
Public choice theory represents an older normative approach to the state 
which has gained well established recognition in the economic profession. It 
consists of analysing the process of political decision making under the democratic 
system and of designing rules that ensure that the best preferred outcome will 
emerge from this process. Particularly relevant to the present discussion is the 
analysis of political parties as competing oligopolists trading in votes: according to 
this logic, each party lays down its political platform with a view to attracting as 
many votes as political m~ket in which politicians behave like merchants in 
approaching voters. Influenced by the economistic logic, the public choice 
approach evades the issue of power: the state appears just as a channel through 
which the preferences of the public concerning goods get expressed. The state has 
therefore no sui generis power as a voice of the social interest. Neglect of power 
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phenomena can be traced not to any inherently conseIVative ideological stance, but 
to the working logic of their scientific paradigm. The theorists working in this 
paradigm view the world as an arena where agents freely contract or refuse to do 
so and whenever explicit transactions are not identifiable, implicit deals are posited 
to save the model: all human interactions are reduced to contracts. 
Although there is apparently no general consensus about what power 
means exactly in rational choice theories, a useful starting point is Elster's 
distinction between force and coercion, taking coercion to imply the presence of an 
intentional agent or coercer, while force need not imply more than the presence of 
constraints that leave no room for choice (Elster 1985: 211-2). Force is an abstract 
mechanism through which the impersonal logic of an economic system limits the 
actors' choices and affects their life situation. By power, Elster· means that a 
powerful agent, for his own benefit, drives another agent to take a course of action 
that he would not have followed in the absence of the first agent's inteIVention. It is 
however important to distinguish between two basic forms of power according to 
·whether the power to act enhances or harms the influenced agent's interests. Power 
is considered exploitative in the latter case while it is akin to a leadership process in 
the former. The point is that public choice theories were essentially concerned with 
analysing the free play of market forces and their rules. 
Elster's views falls more in line with social constructivist thoughts. By this, 
I mean the attempt to account for the objectivity of our normative assessments by 
relating the ideals and principles employed in our critical practices to an expressly 
normative conception of free and equal moral persons. The justification of this 
normative ground is ultimately reflexive or recursive in the sense that ,there can be 
no higher appeal to something beyond the idea of that to which free and equal 
persons can rationally agree (Habermas 1990). For social constructivists one can 
tum social outcomes into matters of social choice through rationalist inteIVention. 
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However, it is important to cultivate a greater sense of irony and toleration of 
diversity in view of the contingency that surrounds our social institutions and 
practices. 
Arguing against public choice and social choice theorists who conceive the 
task of politics as devising institutions that can harness opportunistic self-interest 
to socially useful purposes (Buchanan and Tullock 1962: 21), Elster says that one 
of the aims is also to create a just society. He argues that justice provides an 
alternative guide to political action (Elster 1991: 116). Thus Elster's political 
rationalist solutions are grounded in Justice' as an alternative motivation for 
political reforms. 
His argument is that the main political reforms of the past century have not 
been supported mainly by instrumental considerations. Rather they have been 
carried by social movements anchored in a conception of justice. However it is 
important to note that Elster's aim is not to propose a theory of justice but to show 
the significance of it as a norm as opposed to self interest. This norm of justice 
. forms an alternative guide to political action. Elster argu~s that given the fragility2 
of instrumental thinking in politics, the chosen conception of justice must focus on 
the inherent rights of the individuals to equal shares in decision making and in 
material welfare. 
Elster (1991: 136) criticises Buchanan's version of "commutative justice" or 
"justice as mutual advantage". The arguments from commutative justice rests on a 
vision of society as a joint stock company, with the citizens cooperating for mutual 
advantage. For example, the ~mplication of Buchanan's theory will be that although 
taxpayers may be willing to have some of their taxes spent on non-t~payers, they 
usually insist on taking part in the decision to spend the money that way, and on 
excluding non taxpayers from the decision: 'no representation without taxation.' 
The denial of the right to vote to non-taxpayers rests on a very narrow conception 
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of justice. It is a vision of the well-ordered society as emerging from a bargain 
among self-interested individuals, in which those who have nothing to contribute 
and hence no bargaining power cannot expect to receive anything either, except 
from charity. Universal adult suffrage rests on a simpler and more compelling 
conception, transcending both instrumental considerations and commutative 
justice. Society is indeed a joint venture but the bond among its members is not 
simply one of mutual advantage, but also one of mutual respect and tolerance. If 
the first step in the development of democracy was the idea that no group of 
persons can be assumed to be inherently superior to others, the second was that no 
group can be assumed to be inherently inferior. 
To illustrate how a bargaining strategy works, let us assume that a 'reform' 
is proposed and justified on consequentialist grounds. For each citizen the reform 
has dual effects: burdens and benefits. For each proposal there is some group 
which will think it unfair, compared to some other proposal under which it would 
be better off. The very plurality of co-operative arrangements prevents anyone of 
-them being chosen. This is a bargaining problem in which the outcome may very 
well be the breakdown of negotiations and the perpetuation of the inefficient 
statusquo which has the advantage. 
Bargaining theorists like Thomas Schelling take the view that, in inherently 
conflictual situations the only way to reach agreement may be to hit upon a 
'naturally salient outcome', a 'focal point' or in other word a 'Schelling point'. So 
according to this form of agreement what is naturally salient depends on perceptual 
psychology, social conventio~s and shared history, not on formal features that can 
be stated in rational choice theorists. Typical focal points in bargainin~ are "allow 
no exceptions", "divide equally", "do as we did last year" or "do nothing". The 
parties are assumed to have a common interest in arriving at some agreement but a 
conflict of interest over which agreement should be accepted (Elster 1989c: 50). 
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Thus focal points In democratic politics do not always embody substantive 
equality, but they represent formal equality in the sense of impartiality or fairness. 
Agreement in a bargaining strategy is facilitated if one outcome is 
especially salient. For example, when two countries are bargaining over their 
common frontier, their task is greatly facilitated if there is a river that goes through 
the border region. When a country emerging from colonial rule has to choose an 
official language, the language of the colonial power may be the only one that is 
acceptable to tribes with widely different dialects. 
Following Habermas, Elster (1986a: 118) offers a different solution as far 
as agreement in politics is concerned. Bargaining must be distinguished from 
attempts to reach agreement by rational discussion. In the latter, manipulation or 
misrepresentation for a position is not allowed. In rational discussion, the only 
thing supposed to count is the power of the better argument. It is easy to argue, as 
public choice theorists do, that ideals of fairness, equality and justice are mere 
window dressings of self-interest. Elster argues, however, that some norms of 
justice are more robust than others. 
In modem democratic societies the perceived justice of social institutions 
and policies is a condition for their long-term viability. The importance of the 
~ustice motive in social behaviour' equals its elusiveness. Like all norms, those of 
justice and fairness are extremely context dependent in the way they are interpreted 
and applied. Likewise, the norm of equality can be implemented in very different 
ways, depending on the reference group - equality with whom? - and the dimension 
along which people are required to be equal- equality of what? 
For major institutional changes an argument from positive justice is needed. 
Elster (1988b: 324) argues that values like justice, liberty and democracy have 
been the major proximate causes of social change over the last few centuries. To 
be sure, the efficacy of these values must in tum be explained by 'material 
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conditions', but this is different from saying that they are themselves material in 
content. 
If a reform is perceived as fundamentally ~ust', people will be motivated to 
endure the costs of transition and the extensive trial and error procedures that may 
be required before a viable implementation is found. Elster substantiates his case by 
giving two examples: one is universal suffrage and the other is the rise of welfare 
state. 
Constitutionalism and Democracy 
Another aspect of democratic politics which is of considerable importance is the 
significance of constitutional constraints. The focus on constitutions is because 
they are the embodiments of legitimacy in most democratic societies (Elster 1988: 
304). It is a truism that constitutional constraints make it more difficult for the 
assembly or the society to change its mind on important questions. Regarding 
majority rule, groups no less than individuals are subject to fits of passion, self-
deception and hysteria which may create a temporary majority of decisions which 
will be later regretted (Ackerman 1989; Holmes 1988; Elster 1988a). 
The purpose of the constitutional constraints is two fold. One is to guard 
against the 'irrationalities' by 'self-binding' and 'precommiting' to rules (Hubin 1986: 
82-94). The other is that constitutional change is brought about by way of Justice'. 
Here again, justice forms a bedrock for evaluating institutional changes and 
constitutional choices. Elster. is influenced by the arguments made by egalitarian 
liberals like Holmes (1988: 19-58) and Ackerman (1989: 5-22) as .. against the 
libertarian liberals like Buchanan. Buchanan's constitutional contractualist position 
is feared for its conservative implications since it preserves the status quo, making 
change impossible. The very logic of the self-interested, utility maxImIsmg 
202 
behaviour of individual creates a moral presumption in defense of how economic 
and political goods or resources are distributed in the status quo. What individuals 
possess by way of economic and political goods or resources is what they should 
possess. In tum this justifies the incentive and political force to preserve the status 
quo. 
A conservative position about collective action starts from the assumed 
interest of the individual over protecting his existing assets and freedom of action. 
The very set of assumptions which drive the theory of rational choice creates a 
strong moral justification and political force for the current distribution of 
economic and political goods and resources (Petracca 1991: 186). Coupled with its 
narrow and self-regarding empirical conception of human nature, rational choice 
theory can be used to justify a government system fraught with political apathy and 
acquiescence and great inequalities in the distribution of economic goods, political 
power and privilege (Petracca 1991: 186). 
A constitution gains legitimacy from what has been called "the normative 
force of the factual": compared to the alternatives, which are contending with the 
status quo and with each other, it has the privilege of existing. Elster (1988b: 326) 
argues against the view that one may rationally count on being able to achieve full 
democracy by the temporary abolition of democracy on the grounds that the 
current generation has rights that set limits to the sacrifices one can impose on it 
for the benefit of later generations. He argues that on the positive side only 
democratic processes are feasible and legitimate paths to socialism. His view is that 
the process must be legitimat~ in order to be feasible. If the general tendency of 
socialist reforms is perceived to be fundamentally just, people will have the 
motivation to ensure the extensive trial and error procedures that will be needed to 
implement them. So the task of politics is not just to devise institutions that can 
harness oppory:unistic self-interest to socially useful purposes but also to create 
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institutions that embody a valid conception of justice. In other words, is 
constitutionalism only a tool deployed in the self-interest of the property-holding 
class? Or are constitutional guarantees for property in the interest of everybody? 
Against Buchanan's contractarian principle of unanimity and commutative justice, 
Elster defends the claim that constitutional change can be justified only on grounds 
of distributive justice (Sunstein 1988: 349). 
Drawing the contrast between democracy and constitutionalism, Elster 
argues democracy is defined as simple majority rule based on the principle of one 
person one vote. Constitutionalism refers to limits on majority decisions, more 
specifically to limits that are in some sense self imposed. The limits can take a 
variety of forms. They can be procedural or substantial. One central rights-
protecting element in modem constitutions is the principle of legality: to be 
punishable, an act must be explicitly forbidden by a law which was in force at the 
time it was committed. The effect of the principle of legality is to exclude arbitrary 
punishment. So constitutions serve two overlapping functions: they protect 
individual rights, and they form an obstacle to certain political changes which 
would have been carried out had the majority had its way. The latter function is 
served in several ways: by declaring certain changes as unconstitutional; by making 
the process of change so complicated and demanding that few proposals will be 
able to clear the hurdles. The central argument for constitutional constraints on 
democracy is that without such constraints democracy itself becomes weaker, not 
stronger. 
It is important to recognise these divergent views within rational choice 
theories for the reason that it can open up possibilities of theoretical conversation 
with other research traditions. Elster's criticisms sharpen the case for the 
Habermasian enterprise of discursive democracy. 
204 
Interestingly, attempts at a critical and productive engagement with critical 
theory came from rational choice theorists like Jon Elster (1986a) and also 
Buchanan and Vanberg (1989) who have shown a great deal of hermeneutic 
sensitivity in their attempts to explore Habermas' work. As Johnson (1991: 197) 
says, 
although Habermas does not directly engage in debate with rational 
choice theorists, other theorists challenge rational choice theory under 
the banner of communicative action. 
From the standpoint of rational choice, the whole problem with Habermas's 
enterprise is that it is utopian and unrealistic (Buchanan and Vanberg 1989: 49-62). 
Even Elster (1986b: 103-129) fears that discourse ethics might be dismissed as 
utopian precisely for its idealist nature. As one can see, this criticism is not just 
made by rational choice theorists but also shared by liberals like Ackerman (1989) 
and Holmes (1988). 
Unlike Habermas and to some extent Elster, Buchanan (1986: 44-52) 
argues that there is a potential for 'tyranny' if the enterprise of politics is interpreted 
as being analogous to that of science as a 'truth' discovery process. On his view, 
Habermasian dialogue precisely commits this mistake. For Buchanan the truth-
discovery claim is only possible in the domain of science. Contrasting Belief, 
Science and Truth and Interests, Politics and Order Buchanan (1986 44-52) 
argues that in its common representation, science is a process in which conflicts 
about truth are resolved. In it the existence of reality is itself independent of any 
belief about it: that is to say objective reality exists independent of subjective world 
views. So the scientific enterprise is necessarily teleological, even when the 
provisional nature of any established truth is recognised. By comparison and 
contrast, politics is a process in which conflicts among individual interests are 
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settled. In this enterprise there is 110 independently existing "interest" analogue to 
truth, towards which an interaction process converges. The end-states emergent in 
the two processes remain categorically different. Buchanan argues that when 
politics is wrongly interpreted as being analogous to science, as a truth-discovery 
process, coercion may find morallegitimisation for those who claim enlightenment. 
By contrast, when politics is rightly interpreted as a process for settling conflicts 
among interests, which are acknowledged to be individually derived, those who 
seek to impose preferred solutions do so without claim to moral superiority. 
However, Buchanan is mistaken if he thinks that the Habermasian 
enterprise is aiming to discover any transcendental absolute truth. Moreover, in 
Habermas' case, since the method of discovering truth is by universal consensus it 
is implausible to see the legitimisation for tyranny in politics. 
It remains to be seen how far Habermas' ideal of communicative ethic is 
viable for a democratic public ethos. The concern for a democratic public sphere 
stem from his critique of scientism and technocratism which have subverted the 
.. scope and domain of an informed public realm. So the ideal of discourse ethics is a 
critique of this sort of political culture. As Knight and Johnson (1994: 290) argue, 
what is central in this view for present purposes is that the political order consists 
of rules and procedures that revolve around the requirement that collective 
decisions be criticised and defended with reasons. Habermas's view is that the 
conceptual pressures built into the structure of language induce pragmatic 
contradiction among those who seek consistently to defend narrowly self-
interested policies. Habermas's discourse ethics is an intersubjective or "public" 
version of Kant's categorical imperative. Insofar as a discourse ethics requires that 
the validity of social norms be tested in actual discourses rather than through 
monologically conducted thought experiments, his construal of the principle of 
publicity emphasises more than Kant the need to encourage and maintain a wide 
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array of institutions that together constitute an active and robust public sphere. The 
concept of publicity (Habermas 1991: 196-211) assumes a prominent role in 
Habermas' work. Thus in Habermas' theory of communicative action, the idea of 
agreement is located in the structure of communication. The central task of critical 
social theory is to identifY ways in which this ideal can be institutionalised within an 
actually functioning public sphere. 
The aim of discourse ethics is to provide normative grounds for social 
criticism and the justification of this normative ground is ultimately 'reflexive' or 
'recursive' in the sense that there can be no higher appeal to something beyond the 
idea of that to which free and equal persons can rationally agree. Habermas' claim 
is that an analysis and reconstruction of the conditions of mutual understanding can 
provide a normative foundation for social criticism. 
5.2 Conceptualising Politics: Towards a Moral-Cognitivist View 
·As argued in chapter 3, following Benhabib (1989: 149~50), the purpose of the 
discourse theory of legitimacy can be seen as not to develop a blueprint for social 
order but to suggest a critical vantage point from which to judge power relations in 
our societies. Consequently the political utility of this model is to uncover the 
hidden relations of power and ideology in the social and political realm rather than 
offer any design for social and political institutions. The representatives of this 
position include Dryzek (1992); White (1988; 1987); Bohman (1989); Baynes 
(1990); and Benhabib (1986; 1989). 
The political implications of Habermas' programme are explici~ly argued in 
his earlier works Theory alld Practice (1973: 41-81) and The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere (1991: 181-235). Habermas begins his 
analyses by tracing the conceptual history of the category of the 'political'. 
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Aristotle saw politics as being continuous with ethics, the doctrine of the good and 
just life. As such, it referred to the sphere of human action, praxis, and was 
directed to achieving and maintaining an order of virtuous conduct among the 
citizens of the polis. Habermas argues that the practical intention of politics, as 
well as the nature of its subject-matter, determined its cognitive status: politics 
could not assume the form of a rigorous science, of episteme but had to rest 
content with establishing rules and norms. The capacity thereby cultivated was 
phronesis, a prudent understanding of variable situations with a view to what was 
to be done. 
With the rise of modem science, the classical conception of politics 
was drastically altered. Theory came to mean the logically integrated 
systems of quantitatively expressed, lawlike statements characteristic of 
the most advanced sciences. Given their description of the relevant 
initial conditions, such theories could be used to predict future states of 
a system; providing the relevant factors were manipulable, they could 
be used to produce states of affairs. Adopting this ideal of knowledge 
of politics, Hobbes outlined a program that took human behaviour as 
the material for a science of man, society, and the state. On the basis of 
correct understanding of the laws of human nature it would be possible 
to establish once and for all conditions for a proper ordering of human 
life. The sphere of the practical was absorbed into the sphere of the 
technical; the practical problem of the virtuous life of the citizens of the . 
polis was transformed into the technical-administrative problem of 
regulating social intercourse so as to ensure the order and well-being of 
the citizens of the state. To this extent both scientific~technical and 
economic-administrative apparatus became dominant in the social 
integration (McCarthy 1979: viii). 
Habermas' insistence is that praxis cannot be reduced to techne, 3 nor 
rationality to instrumental rationality. Political emancipation cannot be equated 
with technical progress. And rationalisation in the dimension of social interaction is 
not necessarily instrumental. Habermas attempts to base this form of social 
integration in communicative action which is a moral practical insight of 
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determining the intersubjective norms. Habermas' aim, influenced by Weber, is to 
recognise the significance of values and norms in shaping the world. Politics, in its 
discursive mode, is a creative process of self-realisation responsible for redefinition 
of worldviews. Habermas pointed to the difficulties of combining praxis and 
techne. Rationally organised work can do no more than generate products. It does 
not produce truth or intersubjectively valid norms. Habermas aim' is precisely to 
maintain this distinction between economy and politics, or labour and interaction or 
production and language. Social consciousness is independent of the economic 
realm. 
Since discourse ethics is cognitivist in the sense that it presupposes certain 
abilities and capacities among the participants, one can draw moral and political 
conclusions from such program. Habermas's discussion of democracy scattered 
throughout his writings is cast primarily in terms of the sociological concept of 
legitimation (Habermas 1975a; Bronner 1994: 284), rather than in terms of 
normative political theory or philosophy. But because Habermas interprets 
- legitimation in a normative and cognitivist manner, it should not be too hard to 
reconstruct the normative political theory and the relation between 'knowledge' and 
'politics'. 
Habermas' understanding of politics takes a 'cognitivist turn' by the fact that 
he considers the recognition of the legitimacy of a political order to be a matter of 
'epistemic judgment'. One could as well say that he is an epistemic populist 
(Bronner 1994: 284). On the cognitivist view, a group must collectively manifest in 
its members' social relations~ips certain abilities of speaking and acting necessary in 
order to establish and reproduce a form of life with a democratic polit~,cal order. 
Habermas' endeavour is to establish a 'minimal cognitivist' ethics and 
politics on which institutions and practices can be based. This claim can only be 
defended if one transforms two basic categories of the modern moral and 
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epistemological tradition, 'autonomy' and 'competence', in terms of critical social 
theory (Benhabib 1986: 282). On the one hand Habermas argues that 
enlightenment should be criticised only when it is drained of its cognitive and 
normative content, when its institutions are no longer a means of achieving the 
emancipatory goals of social learning and justice, but he doesn't offer any political 
realisation of his ideal except for an abstract discursive democracy. Habermas sees 
an intimate relationship between 'knowledge' and 'politics' as well as between 
'epistemic justification' and 'social criticism'. Habermas's cognitivist interpretation 
of democracy is an attempt to revise and improve the enlightenment by means of 
critical social theory, in order to let it better fulfil its emancipatory intentions. Most 
often critiques charge Habermas' theory as utopian and unrealistic. But if one 
carefully analyses Habermas' idea of the public sphere, discourse assumes 
prominence in the institutional realm of civil society constituted of associations. 
Since Habermas transforms epistemology from a foundational discipline 
into a normative theory of social learning (Habermas 1984; 1987; 1979), the 
concepts of reason and knowledge which emerge from this theory can be applied 
to politics, in order to explicate the moral and cognitive presuppositions of a just 
democratic order. The normative force of these epistemic contents can then 
become the basis for a critique of ideology and power in the modem state. Thus, 
when both are normatively interpreted, 'knowledge' and 'politics' are interrelated: 
under certain general and specifiable conditions, politics can become a process of 
social learning directed to human emancipation. Such a rich and multifaceted 
concept of emancipation is the goal ofHabermas's attempt to rescue, by means of a 
thoroughly cognitivist interpretation of democracy, the enlightenment's connection 
of knowledge and politics. 
Just as the consequences of one-sided conceptions of enlightenment reason 
have become clear in this century, so too have the consequences of the non-
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cognitivist reactions against the enlightenment. Shorn of the enlightenment's moral 
and epistemic commitments, democracy takes one of the two forms: either it 
becomes a way of aggregating individual preferences or it becomes a mere legal 
procedure, reducible to something like the counting of votes in majority rule or the 
rule of law in liberalism.-l In either case, it can become irrational: on such 
impoverished interpretations, the theory of democracy typically ends up in the 
familiar paradoxes of the tyranny of the majority. These results lead some to reject 
democracy entirely as one more myth of the enlightenment~ for others it is to be 
restricted so as to eliminate its irrational tendencies, as in Riker's recent proposal to 
limit the sovereignty of majorities to getting rid of ruling elites at periodic intervals. 
Bohman (1989: 266-7) argues that given the obvious failures of concepts 
of the 'will' and its preferences, only one option seems to remain open: democracy 
must once again be given an epistemic or cognitive dimension. Its results and 
institutional structures must be judged by epistemic, rational standards appropriate 
to its practical domain. This is precisely the task of Habermas' interpretation of 
. democracy as a process of communication and sociallearoing. 
The connection between competencies and abilities on the one hand and 
autonomy and emancipation on the other has a lot to do with what reaching a 
democratic decision actually entails. In truly democratic order, participants must be 
able to determine the rules, values, ends, means and institutional procedures of 
their own association with each other, rather than accept as given those that have 
been handed down by tradition or convention. The cognitivist interpretation of 
democracy specifies the capacities and competencies presupposed in a democratic 
order. For Habermas, democracy is based on abilities of social cognition, self 
reflection and moral reasoning, the same cognitive abilities on which the social 
. scientist depends as a· participant in dialogue. Unlike the social scientist, whose 
abilities are manifested in adequate theories, the political achievement of these 
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cognitive abilities is manifested in the participation and successful reproduction of 
a social structure and type of communication which Habermas calls practical 
discourse. That is, democracy is the political expression of a set of general abilities 
required for complex interactions, including the ability to remove oneself from 
ongoing social life and to make public, shared judgments of epistemic adequacy 
based on a common set of norms and interests. The point of a cognitivist 
interpretation of democracy is to specify and analyse the formal and epistemic 
conditions for the possibility of participating in such a practice of discourse. 
Habermas focuses his attempt to retain the normative rather than the 
foundational status of epistemological notions like truth and reason in an empirical 
research program he calls reconstructive theory. The aim is to develop a modest, 
fallibilistic, empirical and yet universal account of the rationality manifested in 
human activities. Normative social theory as envisaged by Habermas retains the 
fundamental task of epistemological reflection in supplying standards and criteria 
of rational adequacy and justifiability. For Habermas, the various competences 
_ represent aspects of an emerging form of reason in different, irreducible domains-
what he calls discursive rationality. As the highest exercise of the abilities which 
are only acquired socially in interaction and collective learning, it may be called 
communicative competence. 
From the standpoint of Habermas, democracy is not itself a particular 
competence, but a method of institlltionalising learning in such a way as to 
politically protect and enhance it. Democracy is therefore a practical hypothesis 
about how a collective will may be formed in public processes of deliberation. In its 
institutions, a collective will ties the development of social systems to control 
through a politically effective institutionalisation of discourse. If this IS the effect to 
. be achieved, the proper goal is not merely to secure individual liberty, but to 
~stablish intersubjective social structures free from domination, violence and self-
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deception; for this to occur, the topic under discussion must be conscious, rational 
decisions about the moral structure of society itself As evident in most modem 
constitutions, the structure of decision-making itself must be reflective and open-
ended; the scope of the issues which this process considers cannot be limited a 
priori, but is itself an issue for revisable, public deliberation. 
Habermas's discussion tends to be more on the level of practical discourse 
in general than of the political structure of democracy. In his idea of the public 
sphere, the notion of publicity itself takes on a normative rather than a merely 
functional significance and one permitting the formation of public opinion in the 
normative sense of a 'general interest' and not in the factual sense of the result of an 
opinion poll. 
Habermas identifies a number of basic features of post conventional moral 
reasoning which must enter into a similar description of collective practical 
judgments in democracy. These features are the hallmarks of any modem 
cognitivist ethics, whose universal norms extend to the political sphere as to any 
.other domain of action. Once these abilities for moral-practical reflection are 
described, they can be applied to democratic processes and political obligations in 
two crucial ways: first, Habermas' social reinterpretation of the categorical 
imperative supplies a distinct understanding of how universality is achieved in 
collective deliberation; and second, a comparison of the critical, reflective abilities 
which constitute the basis of both democratic participation and social scientific 
analysis shows how the independence of standards of rational consensus may be 
maintained through self reflective critique of ideology. Social scientific theoretical 
knowledge will ~ave an important place in democratic order. As both independent 
.. 
of and yet continuous with participants' knowledge of the social order, it can have 
a public, enlightening role in uncovering systematic self-deceptions and ideological 
and distorting influences on democratic structures of communication. 
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Unlike the early modem emphasis on science, Habermas finds "the rational 
content of modernity" in its new possibilities for moral and political identity. In 
modernity, moral and political reasons must have the following epistemic 
characteristics in order to motivate highly competent actors who have undergone a 
basic learning process that devalues all traditional moral and religious identities. 
Their abilities of moral reasoning extend to the following dimensions: reflexivity 
and universality 
There are numerous necessary but not sufficient conditions for agreements 
with these epistemic and formal characteristics. Some are related to the formal 
conditions of the process of communication itself To analyse these communicative 
conditions, Habermas has constructed a counterfactual model ideal speech 
situation. The role of this model has been both misunderstood and overestimated in 
discussions of Habermas's view of politics. It serves the analytic purpose of 
thematising issues of the structure of communication related to participation in the 
processes of reaching agreement. All democratic institutions must more or less 
fulfil these conditions, or else the agreements reached could be problematised as 
forms of pseudo or forced consensus. For example, if an agreement were reached 
under conditions in which all speakers are not given equal chances to speak, equal 
chances to utter any of the different types of utterances, or equal opportunities to 
adopt any role in interaction, then the consensus so reached could have been 
formed by extra-discursive means. Habermas' point is to provide a counterfactual 
normative standard for the ideal conditions of reaching agreements in 
communication~ such a standard serves as an independent test of any de facto 
agreement. Thes~ formal norms of communication and interaction in processes of 
.' 
reaching agreement are more inclusive and specific to the actual structure of 
democratic decisions than the usual interpretation of simple procedures, such a 
majority rule, or one person, one vote. 
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If these interdependent formal and cognitive conditions are met, then the 
result of the collective process of deliberation and argumentation will express a 
socially effective rational will based on a communicatively shared and established 
general interest: 
the discursively formed will can be called rational, because the formal 
properties of discourse and of the deliberative situation sufficiently 
guarantee that a consensus can arise through appropriately interpreted, 
generalisable interests (Habermas 1975a: 108). 
Unlike Kant's view of moral reflection, in collective deliberation no needs 
are prima facie excluded until after collective deliberation is concluded and the 
generalisable interests are formed. But this general will cannot be determined in 
advance; it is only in interaction in institutionalised discourse that such interests are 
formed and discovered. If this were not so, no procedure could rescue democratic 
discussion from the intractable problems involved in ordering already fixed 
individual preferences. 
Discursively redeemable norms or generalisable interests have a non-
conventional core; they are neither merely empirically found nor simply 
posited; rather they are, in a non-contingent way, formed or discovered 
(Habermas 1975b: 177). 
Democracy becomes the political form of this communicative process, 
where everyone affected by the decision must be party to the agreement, be able to 
recognise the validity of his judgments, and form this judgment and will in a 
collective process. 
Rousseau already recognised that not everything can be decided by the 
"general will", although he restricted the scope of issues to a greater extent than 
Habermas's interpretation would warrant. For Habermas the question is not to 
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distinguish the general will from the will of all; it is rather, to determine what sorts 
of issues can or cannot be settled in a consensual manner. In this regard, Habermas 
recognises that there are limitations to practical discourse that are not present in 
theoretical discourse. In political institutions, participants are actors as well as 
speakers, so in this sense science does not offer an apt analogy for democracy. 
Given the communicative interpretation of democracy as a process of 
discursive will formation, one can locate a whole range of potentially effective 
ideologies that might restrict communication even in these relatively transparent 
and self reflective institutional settings. In the modern world, ideologies become 
primarily what Habermas (1970b) calls "distorted communication"; that is, they 
need to be analysed as barriers or structural restrictions on social processes of 
communication, which in modern conditions become significant primarily in 
discursive political contexts and in everyday interaction. 
The first sort of ideology has to do with the formal level of communication 
In the political process. Given Habermas' definition of democracy as an 
institutionalisation of discourse, it can be inferred that the basic formal 
characteristics of democratic institutions and procedures, such as equality, must 
now be recast in communicative terms. All the basic formal conditions of 
communication related to processes of reaching agreement are contained in the 
counterfactual construction of the ideal speech situation, so that any violation of 
these conditions is inconsistent with the thoroughgoing democratic participation of 
all those affected. There may be different types of violations on this level. They 
may be internal to the process of communication itself, such as in the failure of the 
institution to create a framework sufficient for all to have an equal chance to be 
heard and to participate. 
As Bronner 0994: 307-310) argues, material social conditions may also 
influence communication. For example, if participants enter the discourse with 
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large scale pre-existing inequalities of wealth and power, the difficulty in reaching a 
rational consensus will rise in the same proportion as the degree of inequality. 
Habermas thinks this is because such material conditions allow the privileged 
actors to act strategically~ in any case they distort the formal requirements of the 
internal structure of communication in a process of consensus and create 
fundamentally conflicting aims between economic and political institutions. 
Capitalism, Habermas has always insisted, is inconsistent with democracy, since it 
organises society non-democratically. Its structural inequalities delegitimise any 
existing democratic structures by having them take on functions with regard to 
economic conditions. 
These same 'material conditions' also may affect the 'cognitive conditions' 
of participation for certain actors, since it is surely the case that the acquisition and 
exerCIse of certain politically significant competences requires access to social 
goods. 
In public choice theories, democracy is interpreted as a device for 
preference aggregation of individual preferences under conditions of non-
cognitivism, instrumentally rational behaviour and self-interest. Non-cognitivism 
means simply that values and preferences are like emotions, beyond the reach of 
rational argument (Dryzek 1991: 406). It is this self interest or non generalisable 
interests that does the bulk of the damage. It also means that individuals cannot 
escape these problems by subjecting their preferences to rational scrutiny and 
possible adjustment in the interests of determinate collective choices. The 
distinction between facts and values has been the departure for a non-cognitivist 
treatment of practical questions. The conviction is that moral controversies cannot 
be decided with. reason because the value premises from which mora~ questions are 
inferred are irrational. .From the standpoint of critical theory, public choice theories 
articulate a non-cognitivist theory of politics. 
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The cognitivist theory of democracy sets out general cognitive conditions 
for the formation and discovery of collective and individual autonomy, which 
particular societies may violate or fulfil. Habermas sees more in the rationality of 
collective decision than simply relying on individual judgments; he does judge any 
consensus by cognitive standards, lest he fall back into the paradoxes of pure 
proceduralism which plague such formal-democratic rules like 'one person one 
vote'. Discursive will formation must issue in a general will, and not merely in a 
procedurally correct decision; Habermas' contribution is not only to understand the 
formation of the general will in communicative terms, but also to analyse the 
cognitive presuppositions for successful participation In processes of 
institutionalised discourses. 
The model of a public sphere envisioned by Habermas is thus by no means 
limited to proposals for reforming the traditional institutions of parliamentary 
debate. Rather the public sphere must be broadly conceived as a vast array of 
institutions in which a wide variety of practical discourses overlap. On this model, 
the moment of deliberation, so to speak, does not reside primarily with the 
judiciary nor with the body of elected representatives, but is dispersed throughout 
a vast communicative network. 
Towards a democratic public sphere 
In conclusion, I shall elucidate the political function of the Habermas' 
model of public sphere. The importance of the public sphere lies in its potential as a 
mode of social integration. Public discourse is a possible mode of coordination of 
human life, as are state power and market economies. But money a,~d power are 
non discursive modes. of coordination; as Habermas' later theory stresses, they 
suffer from tendencies toward domination and reification.5 Thus state and economy 
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are both rivals of the domination of the public sphere. The public sphere remains 
above all a critical principle of public life. Habermas aims to recover the enduringly 
valuable ideal of the public sphere from its historically partial realisation (Calhoun 
1992: 4). 
The liberal public sphere emerged in the specific historical circumstances of 
a developing market economy. Habermas defines it as a sphere between civil 
society and the state, in which critical public discussion of matters of general 
interest was institutionally guaranteed. In its clash with the bureaucratic practices 
of the absolutist state, the emergent bourgeoisie gradually replaced a public sphere 
in which the ruler's power was merely represented before the people with a sphere 
in which the state authority was publicly monitored through informed and critical 
discourses by the people. 
Habermas traces the complex trajectory of the development of the literary 
and political self-consciousness of this new class with the rise of the novel and of 
literary and political journalism and the spread of reading societies, salons and 
coffee houses. At the same time this also meant the crystallisation of the 
contradiction between the liberal public sphere's constitutive catalogue of "basic 
rights of man" and their de facto restriction to a certain class of men. And with the 
.. further development of capitalism, the public sphere expanded beyond the 
bourgeoisie to include groups that were systematically disadvantaged by the 
workings of the free market and sought state regulation and compensation. The 
consequent intertwining of state and society in the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries meant the end of the liberal public sphere. 
The public sphere of the emergent social welfare state democracies is rather 
a field of competition among conflicting interests, in which qrganisations 
representing diverse constituencies negotiate and compromise among themselves 
and with government officials, while excluding the public from their proceedings. 
219 
The press and broadcast media serve less as organs of public information and 
debate than as technologies for managing consensus and promoting consumer 
culture. 
While the historical structures of the liberal public sphere reflected the 
particular constellation of interests that gave rise to it, the idea it claimed to 
embody - that of rationalising public authority under the institutionalised influence 
of informed discussion and reasoned agreement - remains central to democratic 
theory. In the post-liberal era, when the classical model of the public sphere is no 
longer sociopolitically feasible, the question becomes: can the public sphere be 
effectively reconstituted under radically different socioeconomic, political and 
cultural conditions? 
The public sphere can be conceived above all as the sphere of private 
people coming together as a public; engaging in a debate over the general rules 
governing relations in the basically privati sed but publicly relevant sphere of 
commodity exchange and social labour. The medium of this political confrontation 
was peculiar and without historical precedent: people's public use of their reason. 
Public sphere was constituted by private people. The private sphere 
comprised civil society in the narrower sense, that is to say, the realm 
of commodity exchange and of social labour; imbedded in it was the 
family with its interior domain (Habermas 1991: 30). 
The typical illustration of publics would be the arts (theatres, museums, 
paintings, literary' associations, music, poetry, journals, reading societies so on). 
The publics constituted organised discussion among private people that tended to 
be ongoing. Their historical effect in the long term was political: to prise the high 
decisions of the state out of their conventions of secrecy and subject them to the 
open rational scrutiny ofthe public sphere of discoursing individuals. The common 
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institutional criterion was discussion of the problematic areas which until then had 
not been questioned. 
However, Habermas is aware of the inadequacies of the bourgeois public 
sphere. The bourgeois public sphere was based on the fictitious identity of the two 
roles assumed by the privati sed individuals who came together to form a public: 
the role of property owners and the role of human beings as pure and simple 
(Habermas 1991: 56). 
Habermas shows the disintegration of the public sphere with the emergence 
of advanced late capitalism. Thus he argues 
In the hundred years following the heyday of liberalism, during which 
capitalism gradually" organised," the original relationship of public and 
private sphere in fact dissolved; the contours of the bourgeois public 
sphere eroded. But neither the liberal nor socialist model were 
adequate for the diagnosis of a public sphere. Two tendencies 
dialectically related to each other indicated a breakdown of the public 
sphere. While capitalism penetrated more spheres of society, the public 
sphere lost its political function, namely: that of subjecting affairs that 
it had made public to the control of a critical public. The principle of 
the public sphere, that is, critical publicity, seemed to lose its strength 
in the measure that it expanded as a sphere and even undermined the 
private realm (Habermas 1991: 140). 
The public sphere as a functional element in the political realm was given 
the normative status of an organ for the self articulation of civil society with a state 
authority corresponding to its needs. The social precondition for this developed 
bourgeois public sphere was a market that, tending to be liberalised, made affairs in 
the sphere of social reproduction as much as possible a matter of private people 
left to themselves and so· finally completed the privatisation of civil society 
(Habermas 1991": 74). 
With codifications of civil law a system of norms was developed securing a 
private sphere in the strict sense, a sphere in which private people pursued their 
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affairs with one another free from impositions by state (Habermas 1991: 75). The 
functions of the public sphere were clearly spelled out in the law. A set of basic 
rights concerned the sphere of the public engaged in rational critical debate 
(freedom of press, freedom of opinion and association etc.) and the political 
function of private people in this public sphere (right of petition, equality of vote 
etc.). A second set of basic rights concerned the individual's status as a free human 
being, grounded in the intimate sphere of the patriarchal conjugal family (personal 
freedom, inviolability of the home etc.). The third set of basic rights concerned the 
transactions of the private owners of property in the sphere of civil society, 
equality before the law, protection of private property, etc. (Habermas 1991: 83). 
As a consequence of the constitutional definition of the public realm and its 
functions, publicness became the organisation principle for the procedures of the 
organs of the state themselves; in this sense one spoke of their publicity (Habermas 
1991: 83). 
The political public sphere of the social welfare state is marked by two 
competing tendencies. Insofar as it represents the collapse of the public sphere of 
civil society, it makes room for a staged and manipulative publicity displayed by 
organisations over the heads of a mediatised public. On the other hand, to the 
degree to which it preserves the continuity with the liberal constitutional state, the 
social welfare state clings to the mandate of a political public sphere according to 
which the public is to set in motion a critical process of public communication 
through the very organisations that mediatise it (Habermas 1991: 232). 
Thus for Habermas it also led to the disintegration of that specific portion 
of the private realm within which private people, assembled to constitute a public 
and to regulate- those aspects of their commerce with each other .,that were of 
general concern, namely, the public sphere in its liberal form. The downfall of the 
public sphere, demonstrated by its changing political functions, had its source its 
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the structural transformation of the relationship between the public sphere and the 
private realm in general (Habermas 1991: 142- 143). To this repoliticised social 
sphere the distinction between public and private could not be usefully applied. 
The attempt to relieve the public sphere of the intrusion of private interests 
failed as soon as the conditions under which the privatisation of interests was to be 
accomplished were themselves drawn into the conflict of organised interests. And 
the political public sphere tended to adopt the interests of civil society as its own. 
Interventionism had its origin in the transfer onto a political level of such conflicts 
of interest as could no longer be settled within the private sphere (Habermas 1991: 
142). 
Reframing the argument in terms of the rationalised life world, Habermas 
draws a distinction between instrumental rationality and communicative rationality. 
Habermas argues that the symbolic life world is colonised by two mechanisms of 
money and power. The life world is subjugated to alien standards of technical 
control. 
Limitations of the C011cept of Discursive Democracy 
Discourse theory is not without limitations. Rational choice theorists might argue 
that the process of dialogic exchange would not necessarily preclude the 
occurrence of paradoxes of collective choice, since differences of judgment might 
remain after debate and dialogue, leaving 'voting' as the only practicable way of 
overcoming disagreement. But from the standpoint of critical theory, voting does 
not exhaust democratic practice. What might advocates of deliberative democracy 
learn from public choice theories' critique of voting? Most obviously they might 
acquire a subtler understanding of the internal difficulties of aggregative 
arrangements. 
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Knight and Johnson (1994: 279) argue that many are skeptical of the 
democratic institutional mechanisms that rely solely or even primarily on electoral 
mechanisms, i.e. on ways of aggregating individual interests or preferences. Knight 
and Johnson (1994: 279) complain that aggregation is not adequate to the task of 
producing normatively binding political outcomes. They insist that aggregation 
needs to be supplemented and perhaps entirely supplanted by institutional 
arrangements that embody and enhance democratic deliberation. However Knight 
and Johnson (1994: 279) point to internal difficulties to the ideal of democratic 
deliberation: there is the problem of how deliberation might be institutionalised. 
The problem of collective action, prisoner's dilemma need to be resolved through 
institutional mechanisms and no amount of interpersonal dialogue is possible in 
large communities which need to take large decisions. Even deliberation can itself 
be susceptible to distortions. 
As Sen (1986) says social choice problems are not so simple that they can 
be overcome through dialogue. Idealised deliberation is seen as a critical standard 
from which to assess existing institutional arrangements. But the prospects for 
moving existing arrangements toward the standard set by this idealised scheme are 
debatable and Knight and Johnson (1994: 287) argue that such movement would 
require a highly conflictual political struggle and moreover the outcome of that 
struggle is highly uncertain. Again it would depend on the vagaries of strategic 
advantage and in that sense, could not be justified simply by reference to the 
process by which it was brought about. 
The case of deliberative democracy is not without problems and internal 
difficulties. It can be charged that Habermas' discourse ethics is realised only in 
small and relatively homogeneous societies rather than larger democratic societies 
wherein the only way of political expression is through 'voting'. 
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So the question is how far deliberative democracy is realisable. Democracy 
is a procedural nonn not a theory of justice. Some see democracy as aggregation 
of preferences and some others see it as deliberation. Defenders of socialism who 
see discursive democracy as a means to achieve socialism down play the role of 
majority rule and democratic procedures (Bronner 1994; Bohman 1989). Instead, 
they uphold the ideal of the rational consent of all, following ideally extended 
democratic debate among competent and conscientious citizens who are striving to 
achieve the common good. 
The advocates of the discourse-based conception of socialism are of the 
VIew that in the ordinary sense of the tenn democratic· society could be as 
democratic as you like, yet thoroughly unjust. The ideal is recognisably drawn from 
the thought of Jurgen Habennas. The ideal of deliberative democracy shades over 
into the ideal speech situation ethic, the idea that any ethical claim implicitly 
supposes that it could be redeemed in an ideal deliberative procedure in which no 
force except the force of the better argument prevails. If sufficient stress is laid on 
the idea of rational consent to rules directed toward ~he common good, the 
possibility of conflict between majority rule procedures and the attainment of 
substantively just outcomes can be eliminated. 
But the very idealised democratic conception at this lofty level of 
abstraction is then left virtually without links to any recognisable notion of 
socialism in the sense of public ownership. What has happened is that the ideal of 
deliberative democracy, so idealised, has become a hypothetical-rationality test, 
roughly a restatement of the Rawlsian ideal of wide reflective equilibrium. But this 
is a purely fonnal notion that has in itself no substantive ethical or political content. 
Neither would it be wise to try to do as much as we can to create circumstances in 
which the conditions of free, rational dialogue among all citizens are approximated 
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as fully as possible. Critics argue that to try to create a free public realm, rational 
dialogue end up recreating the unholy chaos of the tower of babel. 
Advocates of deliberation claim that it somehow mediates or transforms 
rather than simply minimises or accommodates conflict. And they argue that, in the 
ideal case at least, it will issue in consensus. This is because deliberation has the 
effect of transforming the substance of participant's preferences. This might take 
the form of exposing and revising objectionable preferences or of inducing 
reflection and consideration of the grounds for holding otherwise unobjectionable 
preferences. In either case, deliberation involves changing preferences. Deliberation 
might transform preferences. By contrast, rational choice theorists consider 
preferences as normatively fundamental and hence immune to revision. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have tried to show that rational choice theorists articulate 
a noncognitivist theory of democracy. The objection is that just as the deficiencies 
of one-sided conception of enlightenment reason have been explicated by 
Habermas, so too democracy interpreted as mere preference aggregation is devoid 
of any moral-cognitive content. Habermas' discourse ethics, on the contrary, 
appeals to not just instrumental motivations but also moral-cognitive ones. 
From the standpoint of critical theory, the embodiment of reason in the 
political realm means the establishment of a republican form of government with 
guarantee of civil liberties and an institutionally secured public sphere, so that 
political power could be rationalised through the medium of public discussion to 
-
reflect the general will or common good. What is central in this view'for present 
purposes is that political order consists of rules and procedures that revolve around 
the requirement that collective decisions can be criticised and defended with 
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reasons (Johnson 1994: 290). Critical theorists recognise that societies are moral 
and ethical communities and not just comprising of atomistic self-interested 
individuals. 
For Habermas, the discussion of political issues is inseparable from moral 
questions. In this respect he stayed close to a position that he developed in The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1991). Habermas seeks to locate 
a ground where political conflicts can be addressed rationally within the context of 
definable norms, which are open to critical scrutiny. What becomes more 
interesting is that unlike his predecessors' wholesale dismissal of the political 
rationale of liberalism, Habermas, by contrast, is cautious and recognises that the 
effectiveness of the ideal of discourse ethics depends on the prior institutional 
realisation ofliberal democratic public sphere. To put it in Bronner's words (1994: 
285), Habermas is a brilliant theorist ofliberal democracy. 
One of the persisting problems with critical theory is that unlike rational 
choice theory the empirical referents are blurred. In claiming that discourse ethics 
is merely procedural and formal, the theory can be inexa~t and ambiguous if its 
empirical referents are not well specified. At least on this account rational choice 
theory is better off since it directly addresses empirical problems. Critical theory 
does not address institutional questions. Habermas' theory is equally indeterministic 
insofar it evades the question of substantive issues. 
Critical theorists see the rational choice enterprise as excessively concerned 
with analytical techniques at the expense of social values. By contrast, discourse 
ethics fails to address the question of institutionalising deliberative democracy. To 
say that the public sphere functions as a platform for democratic public ethos does 
-
not solve the problem of institutionalising discourse. Although both theories are 
critical of majoritarian democracy as a procedural ideal of democracy, they offer 
radically distinct solutions. The strength of rational choice theory lies in resolving 
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problems at the institutional level and so a reference point is always maintained 
anchoring on to the procedures of democratic institutions. On the other hand, 
discursive democracy is so abstract that it fails to realise in any institutional 
mechanisms. As Dryzek (1992: 397) argues, critical theory lacks any empirical 
content for politics and ends up being only an ideal. 
Notes 
1 Elster's argument is that individual preferences arc susceptible to weakness of will or excess of 
will. Moreover expressed preferences cannot be assumed to represent the real preferences since 
according to 'concealed preference hypothesis', choices often conceal rather than reveal 
underlying preferences. 
2 Elster challenges the idea of 'given' preferences. In his works Elster (l983a; 1989a) argues that 
individual preferences cannot be taken for granted. It is important to see the complexity of the 
formation of preferences. Moreover individual preferences come undcr the influence of 
mechanisms like cognitive dissonance reduction. irrationalities like weakness of will and excess 
of will etc. He argues that to explain intentions causal explanations need to be invoked. 
3 This distinction between praxis and techne goes back to Aristotle and is recently invoked by not 
Habermas but many continental philosophical variants like Gadamer and Arendt. The 
significance of this conceptual distinction for contemporary theorists lies in its critique of 
instrumental-technical rationality. 
4 This is clearly seen in public choice and social choice interpretation of democracy. Their 
inerpretation of democracy is non-cognitivist in the sense that preferences are beyond the reach of 
rational argument. 
SIn his later work 111e Theory o/Communicative Action Vol. II, Habermas develops his thesis of 
colonisation of lifeworld. Lifeworld is distinguished from both statc and market as potential 
threats for domination and power. 
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Conclusion 
The thesis is a critique of the concept of 'instrumental rationality' in social sciences. 
For a long time the debates and controversies on this theme centered mainly at the 
level of philosophy of social sciences. For instance, the dispute over "methods in 
social science" has been the most contentious issue among different theoretical 
paradigms (Bernstein 1983; Held 1980). Since my previous research involved the 
study of interpretive theories and positivism at the level of the methodology of 
social sciences, my focus in the present study is exclusively concentrated on 
political theory. 
I began my thesis by defining the theoretical dilemma for political theory, 
namely, the problem of collective choice. Hence, the central problem of defining 
the rationality of collective choice in politics and its reasonableness form the 
subject-matter of the thesis. Two theoretical traditions offered different 
explanations: one is rational choice theory and the other is critical theory. Rational 
choice theory modelled collective choice as an interaction ipvolving instrumentally 
rational individuals. Alternatively, critical theory sees interaction as discursively 
constituted. Rational choice theorists exemplify the Hobbesian tradition, involving 
pure self-interested individuals, whereas Habermas' communicative reason is a 
quasi-Kantian conceptualisation of social interaction. 
In the social sciences, economics was the first to incorporate the tools of 
mathematics and other scientific methods to further the ambitious task of 
'scientising' the discipline. The reasonable success of the discipline made other 
social science disciplines adopt these methods. This trend towards precision and 
prediction has become a burden on the social sciences in the recent years. This 
urgency for the scientific status of the discipline is unprecedented in the history of 
ideas (Przeworski 1985: 379). Consequently one such theoretical paradigm 
claiming to be scientific and precise in its investigations of the problems of social 
and political reality became prominent in the late 1970s and 1980s. This is the 
rational choice paradigm. Its claim for the 'scientificity' and 'universality' of the 
discipline led to employing the tools of economic methods for the study of politics. 
Since the time of its introduction into political science, rational choice theorising 
tended towards contradictory impUlses: an interdisciplinary spirit that seeks to 
unify social science explanation and a parochial tendency to interpret all social 
phenomena through the lens of micro economics (Green and Shapiro 1995: 203). 
By contrast, the theoretical programme of critical theory emerged as a 
challenge to instrumental reason. Anchoring his theoretical project of modernity in 
the distinction between strategic rationality and communicative rationality, 
Habermas provided a theoretical basis for critical theory in his theory of 
communicative action. Moving away from the philosophical preoccupations of 
previous critical theorists he redefines critical theory as a critical social theory. 
Thus from Habermas's standpoint the theory of communicative action is not seen 
as 'meta-theory' but the beginning of a social theory concef!1ed to validate its own 
-
critical standards (Habermas 1984: xxxix). 
The theory of communicative action, building on Kant, offers a broader 
interpretation of rationality. It connects three spheres of rationality: the cognitive-
instrumental, the moral-practical, and the aesthetic-judgmental. Thus rationality 
conceptualised in language becomes a significant attempt to further the struggle for 
political liberalism. The theory of communicative action does not posit a self-
sufficient subject confronting an object, but begins instead with a symbolically 
structured notion of everyday life in which reflexivity is constituted. 
The thinking of Habermas is essentially devoid of romantic impulses. He is 
sharply critical of his predecessors who equate science with the domination of 
nature. Habermas entertains the validity of scientific reason within delineated 
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boundaries and thus, following Kant, draws a distinction between the subject-
centered reason underpinning instrumental rationality and speculative reason or 
reflexivity. The new pathologies of the life-world fostered by instrumental reason 
are consequently only one aspect of modern society. 
If interaction forms the essence of social life then inevitably we must 
theorise the different modes of interactions in social and political life. The subject 
matter of social sciences unlike that of natural sciences is complex in many ways. 
The complexity of social reality makes the task of defining the specificity, scope 
and limits of the logic of rationality a difficult task. So any theoretical paradigm has 
to take into consideration the unpredictable nature of social reality. The study at 
the level of theoretical traditions also has advantages in so far as it opens up 
possibilities of not only theoretical insights but also practical questions concerning 
the legitimacy of democratic politics. 
Here in the conclusion I will assess 
1. Firstly, the respective merits and demerits of the two competing 
conceptions of rationality. 
2. Secondly, internal critiques of rational choice theory like Jon Elster who 
have extended the critical theorists' basic intuition that strategic rationality cannot 
adequately sustain social and political interaction by way of a critique of the 
concept of preference formation. 
Critical theory and Rational Choice theory share both overlapping concerns 
and parallel theoretical weaknesses. Although the works seem to have no 
immediate connection, there is an underlying common theme running through all of 
them. The concern is with rationality and the reasonableness of democratic 
consensus in politics. The issue involves the normative grounds for resolving 
disputes or conflict of interests. In other words, both are concerned with 
. determining what 'rational' can mean in social and political interaction. Critical 
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theory's expanded conception of rationality can help rational choice theory in 
resolving the problems of aggregation and collective action dilemmas. On the other 
hand, critical theory needs to be open to rational choice and revise its protrayal of 
rational choice as aiming to build an orthodox positivistic social science. 
The confrontation is between choice and dialogue~ interests and norms. 
Both analytical and continental theories are concerned with fairness and justness of 
collective choice. What are the criteria for judging the normative validity of 
collective choice mechanisms? Is it choice or dialogue? However, both paradigms 
can be enriched in their scope of explanation only if they open up and engage in 
conversation with one another. The theoretical investigations can be extended in 
numerous ways provided there is a sufficient degree of refinement in the theoretical 
postulates of individual rationality. And since politics is a realm of collective choice 
par excellence, this gives scope to examine the issues of not just collective choice 
but also power, domination and justice. Both theories proceed with the notion of 
the 'individual' as a basis of analysis. Rational choice theories have shown the 
logical inconsistencies in democratic mechanisms sJ,lch as voting, public goods, 
collective choice problems. 
Rational choice theory discovered two classes of findings: one is the 
problem of preference aggregation and the other is collective action problem. Both 
problems illustrate the conflict between individual rationality and social rationality. 
Consequently rational choice theorists tried various solutions to overcome this 
theoretical dilemma. Solutions range from contract to spontaneous order. Unlike 
rational choice, Habermas' model of collective choice is conceived not as a process 
of preference aggregation, in which there is a mapping from a set of individual 
orderings to a social ordering, but as a process of dialogue in ''which reasons are 
exchanged between participants in a process that is perceived to be a joint search 
for consensus. In this model, preferences are contested, challenged, altered, 
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modified and subjected to criticism. So in Habermas' framework, the aim of politics 
is not aggregation of preferences but also transformation of preferences through 
public discourse. Thus Habermas' theory offers a broader typology of motivations, 
which include normative, expressive, critical and not just instrumental ones. 
With regard to second problem (the problem of collective action), critical 
theory can help resolve collective action dilemma. If politics involves resolving 
collective choice problems then the question immediately involves the normative 
grounds for assessing the fairness and justness of collective choice mechanisms. 
Although in many respects State guarantees an ineliminable solution to collective 
action problems, there are many spheres of social life wherein the State fails to 
intervene and in most cases the intervention of the State leads to counterproductive 
outcomes. Since politics is not only concerned with framing rules for social and 
political interaction it becomes important to define the fairness of the conditions 
under which interaction takes place. This is clearly seen in collective action wherein 
game theorists have failed to come up with unique solutions. Game theory 
demonstrated how strategic interaction in so stark an environemnt generates 
indeterminacy. It thus makes conspicuous the need to identify additional, non 
strategic mechanisms to coordinate social and political interaction. In this respect 
critical theory identifies just such a mechanism - the binding force of validity claims 
raised in communicative action. Thus 'language' forms the mechanism for 
coordinating social and political interaction. 
Thus by engaging in conversation with critical theory, rational choice 
theory could abandon its hard core programme of homo economicus and appeal to 
a broader typology of "motivations in order to better explain and model social 
interaction. In this conjunction, rational choice gains conceptually in that its 
individuals become free to choose how to act (be it dramaturgically, 
communicatively, in conformity with social norms or even instrumentally). Thus by 
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invoking a wide variety of motivational assumptions, rational choice theory can 
better explain co-operation in prisoner's dilemma situations. 
Interestingly, rational choice theorists have themselves been willing to 
abandon economic subjectivity. For example, Brennan (1989) introduces ethical 
motivation in political behaviour. And as discussed in chapter 3, Vanberg and 
Buchanan (1989) allow discursive reason in constitutional choice. Other internal 
critics like Green and Shapiro (1995) have shown the pathologies of rational 
choice theory when it comes to explaining collective action. Most importantly, Jon 
Elster professes sympathy with the fundamental tenet of Habermas' discourse 
ethics. Elster invokes social norms to supplement instrumental rationality. This 
move towards incorporating norms into their theoretical edifice is a crucial break 
for rational choice theory for a more open recognition of the significance of norms 
and the role they play in establishing a collective choice. The other significant 
aspect of Elster is that he provides an interesting critique of the notion of 
preference formation (Elster 1983a; 1983b; 1989a). In Elster's view the notion of 
fixed and given preferences is a fragile foundation for social choice. In fact, 
preferences are not given in, the sense of being directly observable. If they are to 
serve as inputs in social choice process, they must somehow be expressed by the 
individuals. Moreover choices often conceal preferences rather than reveal 
preferences. Thus, in Elster's view, politics does not involve just the aggregation of 
preferences but also the transformation of preferences through dialogue. Not 
optimal compromise, but unanimous agreement is the goal of politics on this view. 
Critical theorists need to show a greater deal of hermeneutic sensitivity in 
recognising the mulitiple theories present in rational choice theory. Rational choice 
is not a monolithic, homogeneous theoretical enterprise. And" especially when 
rational choice theorists have themselves begun exploring the work of Habermas. 
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Jon Elster's work provides a good example of both giving internal critique and also 
recognising the strengths ofHabermas' discourse ethics. 
In Habermas' model of collective choice, the individual is a critical, 
reflective, moral one, unlike the pure instrumental maximiser in rational choice 
theories. So Habermas' discourse ethics provides a normative standpoint to assess 
the fairness of the agreements or consensus. In turn, critical theory gains from this 
conversation with rational choice paradigm since the latter provides substance for 
its currently rather abstract critique of politics. The strength of rational choice 
theories lies in its concern for institutional design. More importantly, although 
deliberation offers a better ideal it cannot escape the difficulties in its institutional 
realisation. Since fairness and justice are matters which cannot be evaded in any 
formulation of social and public policy it becomes imperative to emphasise the 
normative significance of these notions. 
The contrast between rational choice and critical theory can be seen in their 
respective conceptualisation of the 'political'. Rational choice theorists share the 
conception of the political process as constituted by atomised individuals engaging 
in secret voting, whereas critical theorists defend deliberative democracy. One way 
the public sphere is discursively institutionalised is in its differentiation of value-
spheres. Habermas sees the public sphere as being autonomous from both market 
and state. It is an arena in which the civil liberties and democratic rights of 
individuals are safeguarded. Of importance here is the normative concept of the 
public sphere. Thus for Habermas the political point was to secure 'criticism' as a 
moral imperative extending beyond mere self-interest (Bronner 1994: 287). But as 
he argued in his thesis of the colonisation of the life-world, the public sphere, 
rather being constituted by the discursive engagement of participants, is becoming 
increasingly defined' by the same forms of instrumental reason as exhibited in the 
state and the market. 
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From the standpoint of critical theorists, rational choice theory is deeply 
flawed in that it takes instrumental reason as the only form of reason realised in 
modernity. By contrast, critical theorists conceptualise politics as a moral-practical 
domain wherein rules and norms governing the decisions are subjected to criticism 
and revision. Consequently the domain of politics is kept separated from market. 
Rational choice theories, with their assumption of homo economicus, end up 
subjecting political rules to the rules of market. Treating the polity as no more than 
a set of isolated individuals interacting to maximise gains, the model is devoid of 
any moral prescriptions. 
To conlcude, theoretical encounters at the level of paradigms needs a 
careful treatment of issues under investigation. Viewing social science research as 
constituting paradigms is advantageous since paradigms are not closed, static 
scientific communities but typically sustain multiple theories working within the 
paradigm. Theories often coexist with empirical anomalies for long periods of time. 
Moreover, they are never decisively falsified by the facts. They are rejected only 
when an alternative and more plausible theory is proposed. Green and Shapiro 
(1994) in their book contend that little of what has been claimed for rational choice 
theory is backed up by empirical results. The same applies to critical theory. It is 
also esoteric and far removed from the empirical problems. The paradox is that the 
need for empirical inquiry of social reality is shared at a meta-theoretical level 
without actually confronting it. In this sense critical theory is 'a priori' theory. 
Often, critical theorists mistake empirical details for empiricism. Thus an 
opportunity for conversation across the two traditions arises inasmuch as critical 
theory also benefits from this encounter by gaining content for its currently rather 
abstract critique of politics and rationality. 
Alternatives to rational choice theory range from the normative, to cultural, 
.. to institutional, to psychological theories. Given the complexity of social reality, it 
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is unreasonable to expect that only one general theory can be developed to explain 
disparate phenomena that rational choice theorists think: of as political. This has 
nothing to do with the poverty of theory but rather with the recalcitrant complexity 
of the political world. 
The interesting point is that critical theorists like Habermas concede the 
role of instrumental reason but question the universalism which is so deeply 
ingrained in the mind set of the theorists. In other words, rational choice theorists 
should recognise the failure of their theories to explain much of empirical reality 
and open up to an engagement in conversation with other theoretical paradigms for 
better explanations. On the other hand, unlike his predecessors Habermas does not 
dismiss instrumental rationality but confines its role to spheres like science and 
technology and market. Strategic rationality has a role but a limited one. By 
contrast, politics is a realm of collective choice and so cannot be modelled on the 
lines of market. Elster (1986b) is also sympathetic to this distinction between 
market and politics. Political process is not just seen as an arena for self serving 
interests but also a place to deal with questions such as justice, power and 
domination. 
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